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ABSTRACT 
This study is set forth wtth a tWIn objective, viz . to test the 
" follchv- the- leader" and "leading indicator" hypotheses as applied to 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange ' s (KLSE) plantation share prices . 
Simple Pear son product- moment correlation technique, with lags , is used 
in both parts of the study . 
In the fi rst part , the general belief that the movements of the 
KLSE follow those of other leading world bourses and bourses in 
M'3.1aysia ' s major trading partners are tested . In general , the resul ts 
obtained in the June 11976 - September 11983 period studied support this 
conventional wisdom . Slight divergences to this general observation 
occur in some cases, especially wi th some of the mini-bourses of Asia 
and Europe . The strength in the correlation coefficients (r) displaye d 
by the KLSE Plantations index are strong with respect to the constantly 
referred markets (Wall Street, Tokyo, LOndon, Hong Kong and Si:ngapore ) , 
ranging from 0 . 794 to 0 . 983 . Lagging observations on the major bourse s 
consistently show significantly hi g h and st able correlations, implytng 
that t9.king the cues from leading Overse9.S lead is one f a ctor that 
affect the KLSE's sentiment and direction . However, indire ctly this 
' follow-the-leader ' phenomenon m9.Y not be done ind iscriminat ely aft e r 
all . The ' concealed' underlying forces that shaped the hi gh r values 
obtained ffi9.Y be attributable to, among 0 thers, the dual or 
mul tiple- listings of some shares (e.g . Sime D'3.rby) on more than one 
exchange whose movements are manifested in their respective share price 
indices ; and expectations in rises in price of rubber, presumably 
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following the interpl~y of the demand/supply forces for the industrial 
raw material by rubber goods manufacturers (e . g . B.F. Goodrich) in 
industrialised economies. The resul ts also highlighted the superiori ty 
of some indices over others, e.g. of NYSE CompOsi te index over the 
widely followed DOw Jones Industrial Average, and FT-Actuaries 500 
index over the Ffnancial Trmes Industrial Ordinary index. 
The second part of the study deals in brief with the macroeconomic 
parameters (by compOnents, financial and monetary aggregates, and also 
rubber prices) to which highly posi tive correlations are obtained wi th 
respect to KLSE Plantations index, i.e. within the 1972-11932 stU1.y 
period. In the 'leading indicator' exposi tion - usinO' data 
'J covering 
from \1967(1) to 11983(1V) with respect to quarterly GNP, ~nd January 
\1972-June 11934 wi th regards to !Jlonthly averages of rubber ~nd palm oi 1 
prices - the corresponding KLSE Plantations index marginally leads the 
GNP by two quarters, lags behind rubber prices while palm oi 1 prices 
tend to act more as an equilibrating factor on the basic trend of the 
plantation share prices. In general, the scenario on the basic trend.s 
is one of rubber prices ~nd plantation share prices moving in close 
concert (with rubber leading the w~y slightly), followed by the general 
movements in palm oil prices. This pattern diverges marked.ly 1uring the 
11974-(II)-11977(I11) and 11933(IV), periods, i.e. with respect to the 
inverse relationship between the two commodi ty prices, wl th palm oi 1 
exerting a 'cushioning' effect to the falling rubber prices and the 
overall economy. 
A. closer examination on the stock market cr~shes in 1973 ~nd 119811 
reveal that the econo~ic preconditions prior to the two crashes 
differed quite markedly . As a whole the plantation shares are 
relatively not badly-hit by the crashes, thanks largely to the 
equilibrating effect of the buoy~nt palm oil prices . Some lessons from 
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the crashes 8.re drawn which may prove to be of importance to policy 
makers and investing public at large. 
To sum up, this piece of work is hoped to provide some background 
to the nature and behaviour of KLSE's plantations sector and the 
experiences during the stock market crashes. Further studies are called 
for to substantiate these findings before concrete p~licy implic8.tions 
can be safely drawn. As such, developing pre1ictive econometric models 
based on economic fundamentals (including spot and future prices of 
rubber and palm oil) and evaluating the impact of the takeovers of 
foreign-owned plantation companies by Malaysian interests are deemed 
necessary. 
THE M~L~YSIAN ECONOMY AT A. GLA.NCE 
AREA Malaysia Peninsular 
(sq km) 330,434 1 31 , 587 
1983 
POPULATION (mi 1. ) 
Malaysia 14.888 
Peninsular 1 2. 345 
Sarawak 1 .409 
Sabah 1 .134 
NA.TIONAL PRODUCT (M$mil.) 
GNP at mp* (11970=1100) 29,640 
Public consumption 6,552 
Private consumption 16,828 
Public investment 4,412 
Private investment 6,105 
Exports 1 3, 770 
Imports 16,323 
GNS at cp** 15,9311 
Per capita at cp 4,304 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT (M$mil.) 
GDP at mp (11970=1100) 31,442 
Agricultural sector~ 6,922(22~) 
Manufacturing sector~ 8 ,742(28%) 
Services sectorl 15,778(50~) 
EXTERNA.L DEBT (M$mil.) 
Net foreign borrowing 4,403 
Foreign debt servicing 
ratio (%) 4.6 
BALANCE OF PA.YMENTS (M$mil.) 
Overall balance -55 
EXPORTS (M$mi 1. ) 
Total exports (f.o.b.) 32,828 
Rubber 3, 664 
Palm oil~~ 2, 997 
TR~ DE BA.LA NCE (M'tmi 1. ) +2, "07 
SELECTED PRICES 
Rubber, RSS1 fo b K. L. 247 
(M cents per kg) 
Pa 1m oi 1 crud e, fob 999 
K. L. (M$ per tonne) 
Overall CPIs: 
Peninsular (11980=1100) 1120 .4 
Sarawak (1 1967=1'00) 1198 . 5 
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18, 0113 (50~) 
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MONEY ~ BI\NKING 11934- e 
Money Stock (M$million): 
Total money supply 
Private sector liquidity 
Interest Rates (~ per annum): 
Prime lending rate 
3-month Treasury Bills (avge rate) 
Exchange R~tes (equivalent to 
Malaysian Rinngit): 
1 US DOllar 
1 Pound Sterling= 
1 Australian DOllar = 
100 Deutsche Mark= 
1'00 French Francs= 
1100 Hong Kong DO llars= 
100 Indian Rupees= 
100 Indonesian Rupiahs= 
1100 Ital ian Li re= 
1100 Japanese Yen= 
100 Netherlands Guilders= 
1'00 Philippine Pesos= 
100 Singapore DOllars= 
1100 Swiss Francs= 
100 Thai Bahts= 
Snd December 
13,432.3 






8 . 50 
5.09 
As at 
26 December 11984 
buy / sell 
2.395 / 2.429 
2. 803 / 2. 874-
1.984- / 2.054 
75 . 800 / 79 . 400 
24.300 / 26.500 
30.000 / 33.000 
118 . gOO / 20.700 
O. 21 6 / O. 237 
0.1110 / 0.130 
0.956 / 0.995 
66.500 / 70 . 900 
111' . 500 / 112. 900 
1109.000 / 111 '2 . 500 
92 . 300 / 96 . 1 00 
8.500 / 9.400 
LA-BOUR 1983 
5,580 















Unemployment rate (t) 
800.3 








INTERNA.TIONA.L ECONOMIES (~ growth) 
e 
* 
Real GNP: All OEeD 2. 4 
CPI: All OECD 5.5 
4.3 
5.3 
Estimated figures. f Forecasted. figures. 
Market prices. ** Current prices. 
Taken together with livestock, forestry and fishing. 
2.8 
5.3 
Comprising of manufacturing, construction, mining and quarrying. 
Inclusive of transport, storage and communications; wholesale and 
retail trade, hotels and restaurants; finance, insurance, real 
estate and business services; ~nd Government services. 
Crude and processed. 
Sources : M~laysia, 1984. Economic RepOrt 11934/85, Ministry of 
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the pre sen t - i .3. Y per i 0 :} 0 f '3.. n e 8 0 n 011 yin t r'l n s i. t i 0'1 . 1 t n J W 3. C C ::> un t s for 
just over 2)"~ of the n'ltion's ,gross rio:nesti8 pro:iu8t ~,}D?), pro'fiie 
jobs to SOlIe r)~ af tot3.1 e'11ployei 13.bour forc~, qni contributes qbout 
4 f"\~ to f' h . V J ore1~n exc 3.nge ~'lrn1n~S 
th8n the '3.gri.~ultur'3.1 s8ctor rell'1ins pr::> fi. t '3. b 1 ~ , 
') 
·.Tel11l""""""::yod ...,...,..:1 .., ..... 1·crn1· f'l'c'-'nt f'_ ""\.,... ~~ l'n T·,o1"'.l..:l ~011110il' t.y l1""r_lr~t-:::.-1'1 - .. . ~ .. J ~ -:l. •• .1 A. ::> ~ "" 1. .J _ _ · 1 _ _ A. '- _ ~ 
3.ccounting for ))~ of t''l8 T,ofJrlj 's D'3..1'11 oil, t'5s of the 'vorlj' s 11'1t ~lr'3..1 
rub b 8 r "), '3.. nil' 7~ 0 f t I-]. ~ ·,v 0 ~ 1 ri. 's p '= D P ~ r , '1 S ':1 -3 1 1 '3.. S s i g n i fie q n t vol u 11 8 S 
of ti 11 ber, 8080nut oil, tob'3..8cO the 
13e:S'3.n in 173S ·v'l en Fr3.ncis Light 088upiei P-3Wlng for th~ "Sri :ish 
E3.st 1n1i3. COl1P'3.l1Y. 13rit'1in's grip o 'r~1"' t~~ ~bl'3..Y ?enins'.ll'3.. 
con s 0 1 i i 3. t ~:i .v i t h the irs e i z u r 8 0 f '1'3. 1 3. C 8 '1 fro 11 t'1 e D.l t 8 h i n 1 7 1'5 , 
l-].en88 m'3.~'<:i.(l'S the t'1e beginnin~ of 'British rule' i'1 '1'3.1'1Y'1. 
2 'A 1 . . t· 11 th 1..:1 ' 1..:1 . ..:I j t f '1'3. '1YS1'3.. lS S 1 , 8 ',-{orl S e'3.11ng p O.lU~2r '1n expor 8:' 0 
rubber, tin '3..n:} p'3.111 oil . 
)Frol1 h~r80n 'rubber' refers to n'3.tur'3.l rubber e xc ept ·v"lere otl-].er T,iLse 
st'1tei . 
4Fo :' ietqils see, Profile of t'1e ? il1'lrv ~ol1moiity S~ctor in ~ql'3.ysi'1 
(~1inistry of Prill'3.ry Injustry, 1 g35) . 
? 
In the ovgr~ll context the ~~ricultur~l sector ~~s instrunent~l in 
in 1953 ~~s exp~n1ej ~nl ren~nei ~~l~ysi~ wit~ the inclusion of 
Singapore , S~b!:lh (fo rnerly Bri tish Borneo) ~ni 
to~ethe r Tlfi th tin , I-lers t~e pi 11qrs of t~e econollY e'Ter since the 
co1oni!:l1 jays , lat~r to be strengt~enei by til1ber , pepper, pql'11 oil, 
~ result ~f ~ctive iiversificqtion 
progra nme since the 1 950s . S t q tis tic ~ 1 1 Y s pea 1.( Lng the i 11 po r t '1 n ceo f 
t'1.e ~~ricultur'3.l '3ector , or the "A. sector" in the Ku~n3tsi~n sense , in 
the 'h.l!:lysi'3.n econo,ny is '3i~ni fic'3.nt qS C'ln he seen frol1 1'~b1e 1 -I . 
The scen~rio was cle~r- cut with respect to t'1.e percentq~e contribution 
oft h e 1\ '3 e c tor i n v q 1 U;~ '1 i i e ito '} D P ( i n p q r tic u 1 '1 r iJ i '1 e"( po r t 
eqrnLn~s) !:lnJ. enploY1lsnt gener'3.tion iesnite the r!:lnii ~ro,.,th ~nd 
7 
structllr~l tr1.nsfor'n'3.tion ' t1.!:lt is t'l1.(in~ pl1.ce in t1.e ·1~1'lysi8.n 
econony . 1'he lecl ine in the sh~re of the A. sec~ort~ GDP 'lni enpl ')V1l e nt 
is ine~it~ble ~s coull be seen in i~s llQ'1.ifest1.tion iuring the econol1 ic 
40 ','1 e 'I e r , i n ~ b sol ute t 9 r1l S the con t rib 'J. ti D n 0 f t ~ e '\ '3 ~ c tor i '3 S til 1 
subst'lntiq1 ~nd 1.r~u'1bly will rell1.i n 30 into the foresee~ble future. 
r 
')1'''le l1ain rnoti 'Te of ~'1.e Sl rop3~ns v ::mt l.lrin~ 'eqst',nris ' _11.S to -I:;:''3.ie 
but in the 1uest for it t1.ey , . .,ere pr ·~pqrei to io 1.rlything T"hi~~ 
r e su1tei in coloni'3.1isl1 qnj t1.8 e xnloi t~tion of t1.e peninsulq's !'ic'1. 
n~turq1 resources ~lq~qthir bin 10'1.'l~'3.i 1171,p . ~~) . 
SSingqpore optei to sep~rqte fron ~1 '11qy3i~ to becolle 1.n i'1.iepe'1.ient 
n q t ion i n A.ll 'S 11 S t 1 g S 5 . 
71\ phenon enon Pl1.t "I['3.S first igscribei by 81~ ~ ~I ' J~ i , l'l,er' 
exp~niei by ~~l1ong ot~ers) Fo r'3.stier '11~~), ~uznets ~1 lS~) , 'lni 
Johnston 1.n1 'hllo r ~ 195 1) in t"1ei r "'} eneral !'~nsfor'n'ltion 'bie1" i . '3 . 
b~ ed on t1.e cl'ls3is'l1 school of th)u~ht . ,;:)0 '3.1so '101.(1.tqr:- 1''lllin (1 )'3'2i 
for '3.n ~c'3.1 ellici1.n ' s ?iew of the l111.ysiqn experience . 
'3 In th e fo!"n of r'1nii rUr'3.1- 1 rb::l.fi '11i~r '1.tion '.v"lich '3'11'1 inc!'e'3.si'1~ 
urb'3.n un ellploY1lent '3.ni the nll'3hr ~:)Qnin ~ of '31U'ltter settle'11 9nts i n the 
urbqn '3.re'3.S ; couplei \..,it~ '3.1!:lrnin~ inCre'3.S9S in p~ii lands bein~ left 
i11 '3, '3.n1 1.cut e ~ort'l:s e s of l'3.bou i~ the est1.t, 3'.lb-s.ector : th3reby 
'lct '1 ma~nets to t~e influx of ille~al rni~r'3.nts, notqb1y froll 
Indone si1.) . 
iec1inin~ ste'3.iily to ?2 .2 ~ in Ig~l '3.ni projecte~ to re~ister in 
const'3.nt 1971) -oric-3s '3. 17.9~ '3.ni 14.41 s'1 '3. re by 193~ and I' g,)) 
t . 1 I '1 1 . 1 q 31 1 r 1) '"r '" ~ ','1 t \ P"J ' s 1 ') 1 93 At· t . t i resp3c Ive y \_'3. '3.yS1'3. , .p. 0 • _ 1 _ + es In'3. es Cl e 
IV i t h '3. fu r the r ? '3 "S '3. n::i t 9 ~ S h '3. r '3 3 '3. t t rib u t '3. b 1e tot he i n -i us t r i e s 'l n i 
is pro ,jecte::i to re~ister '3. 11 .1 1, 1-') '~ qn-i t~. 71 sh'3.res resp '3cti'/e1y 
In ter'TlS of e'Tlp1oynent, the sh'3.re in the A sector 1.'3.S 'llso 
iec1ined steqii 1y over t'1e ye'lrs. The percel1t'3.g;e of t~e l'3.bour force 
enployer1. in the A sector ''I'3.S s'.lbst'3.nti'3.1 ::iurinfS the e'3.rl ier ye'3.rs qfter 
1 jS7 . 'f1.e process of structur'3.1 tr'3.nsfor'TI'3.tion vi.s-'3.-vis ellploynent 
shqre in -'3.griculture ~'3.s t'l~~m its toll 'tlit'1 +,).S~ rell'linin~ in the 
sector by the eni of 193 J. By- 193=) it is proiectei thqt only ')S . g~ of 
T (l e i '1l po r t 3. n ceo f the ~ sec tor is,:) -3 S t ref 1 -3 C t e 1 in its for e i ~ n 
exch'ln~e e'3.rnin~ c'ln'lcity sinc~ o:'1e of 
tr :de-dep'3nient econonies in the '..;o:-l-i - to b3 nresise in t"li'l 'n'3. teri'3.ls 
or prill'3.ry cO'1lllo-iiti es . For eX'3.'1lp1e, i'1 1 )~) elCnorts 'llone 80nnrise-i 
of t'1e :;D? the '3conony ''Ii t"1 its 
iepenienC8 Or} '3. f3 ~<v prillqry cO'1llloiities is pron-3 to th--3 s'rl'lnCS8s in. 
3pro .iectei to gro'tl sluggishly qt '3.n '3.nnull qverq~e r'3.te of ) . g~ 
bet'tl3en 1971 to 119g.J. 
10 ~'3.cro tnter-\gency P1'3.nning Group, heqiej by the Fin'3.nce ~inistry. 
Tab le 1-1: S9le~tei In1i.~qtors of A.~ri~1l1 tur'3.1 Sector's 
3~'3.r9 i~ E~ononi~ ~~ti~ity iu~in~ the S3con1 Five-¥~qr Plqn 
'3.'11 '3.cross fi '!~ -'hl '3.ysi3. Plq~ p"~rio13 , 11965 - 11')'10 
5 - Y e '3. ~ P 1 '3. ~ per i 0 i s -'f : S ? Y? 1 s t "1 P 3'1 P rr '1 P F '1? ') t ~ vfD 
1 957- 1 95') 1 970 1 97') 1 9-3) 1935p 1 gg)p 
(jross '!)ollesti~ ?ro1u~t , '3.t 197') mD 
( ~r" 
\ ) million) 4'172f 6'5')2f 12'3')9 17'):)=) 26223 '))159 SS75') 
A. sector 
, l"tf)" +,) . 7 ') 1 . 5 '3') . 9 27 . 7 2') . :) 21. ') 11- . 1-s shqre, .) 
Ell D 10 Y1l en t 
-rot'3.l e'n ploY1l en t 
( ' OJ')) 21493. '1e ')~95 . 9 1247. 1 ')')9') . 5 5 r '7- 9 ") 1 ") • :1,1. 
A. sec to r 
, 
s"1'3.re ("1) r r '1 5'2 . 1 )O . =) 15 . ') t) . 6 )5 . 9 s 
" ) 
') ':) . '3. nq 
Une-nploy-nen t r'3.te ~ '; ) nc n~ 7 . S 5. 4 5 . ') 6 . 2 nq 
Sx:ports ( f . o . b . ) 
-- -
Gross ~ol1lloiity ~xports 
('1''' \ - D :ni11io:1) )5)'3 )73'3 5162 9~~1 23201 411 4') nq 
A. sec to r 
, 
sh'lre C; ) ')2 . 1 )1.') '35 . S s n~ '1~ nc nq 
of 10['1 i ~ h s"1qre of : 
rubber 9x:pJrts -:;) JJ ~') ) 3. 4 21 . 9 16 . 1- 1') nq 
p'3.1'1l oil eXDorts (~) ? '3 ') . 1 1 ,+ . ) 3. 9 1 ,) '1'3. 
~ Refer to t"13 . e~onj ?ive - Ye3.r ?l3.n (196)-:)5), First 1qlqysiQ Pl'3.n 
(1 ' 966 - J), ~1iri -h1'3.ysi'3. Pl'3.n ~1 971 - 75), "fi'ourth '11.13.ysiq Pl'3.n 
(1 '17 5 - 3)) '3. n i F if: '1 '·h 1.. -'l. Y s i 1. P 1 q n ( I 'J S II -3') ) • 
T'3.ken to~et~er 'ofi J"1 :orestry '3.~j fishin~. 
f 
D 
'}op qt fq~tor cost Cht io~'3.1 ~e~011nts of TV9S t ~·hl -1Y3i'3. 111.) ')-67). 
Forecqstej fi:S1..lre3 ~ ~~ononic ~~DJrt 1 g§4:" 13'5, '3.n1 F'1? 1193 1 - 3=)-r:-
19=)7 fi'S'..l~es . 
nc Not cql~'..llqtei . 
Sources : DJ3, l'3.tio~'3.1 \~~O'..l~:s ~t1.tistics , vqrio~s issues ; 3N~, 
~uqrterly ~~onoll i~ 3u1leti'1 , ~1.rio'..lq i3SU~S; ~,)F , S~o '1olli~ 
Report, 'I'3.rious issues; ~?] . 1931. ?o lrt~ f13,11.Ysi.1. ?11.'1 
1 931 - 1 g 3=), :(u q 1 q 1 1111 p'..l ~ • 
9xternq1 jel1'lnj . ' 
five llqjor ~o1111oii.ties ~D9trC)1~..lll , rubber. tillb~r, D'3.111 oil '3.ni tin) 
proiucts I-l-. ~)..,) '3.!10J ler _ -h 1 '1 ys i 1. ' S 
""uln~r'3.bility ,,0 ~'(te:,n 'll fqc:ors is qlsJ '1 SO'..lr~ ~ of stren-:st'1 in th1.t 
1 1 L nce the 1 :)')3 , 
~u~b ~ r of 2yc1es ~nj 
the ~urr9nt 9cononic 
1 93')) . 
"1 '3.1'3.ysi3. ' s e ,(Dort eqrnin'Ss 
t ro u:s '1 sin 11 ') 6 1 - 6 '2 , 1 9 S S - 67 , 
s 1 0 ',d 0 ".,n 'tl'rl i e '1 b e ~ '3.!1 in 1'3. t e 
"1 '3.S ~one t"1 r8 u~ h q 
IIg7 1 -72 , 1175-76 3.n1 
193) ([sllQi1 (3'111e"1 
~ ~lob~l re~ov9ry ~ill be benefici~l to t~e export sector ~n~ h~nce t~e 
ov er~ 11 econo'll y. 1'3.ble 1 - 2 oqints 3. Di~brre of the si tuqtion of the 
1(~y export COllllo1ities for 11-S1)-1 ~ 9 '3) qni qS projecte1 for 1'~'34 . 'rh~ll~h 
rubber is no lo~:ser t~e dOllin~nt export , t~e i.niustry is sti.ll 
,\.13. 1'3. ys i 3. ' S sin,gle ellployer , provi1in~ jobs for ,+ 2 5, g ') ') 
sl1!3.1l~01der f9.11ili es qnJ !3.nothe~ 1' 12, S ~)') est3.te T,vork9rs 10peni on 
rubber pl3.nt~tions for t~eir livelihooi. 12 
1.2 The Relative Position of Plant3.tion Agriculture in the M!3.1aysian 
Scono'llY A Historic3.l Perspective 
"hlqysi3.Yl econony - a the 'ne th.:l.t h9.s croppsi up 'llTTlost enilessly in 
ll~flY schol '1.rs' oursui t of kno ,.;lei:se qn'1 in t~e literqture on 
" ieve 10 pllen t • II 1) econOll1';S . ~h t~e~ '3urprisin.gly, t'1e relqtive 
inport3.nce o f t~e 11 4-pl~ntqtion sub-sector per S8 h~~ 
---
rel3.tively less qC~iel1ic 1 r i.:1terest. ") 'JniJubteily t~is sub-sector 
cO:1stitute only '1bout one-t'1iri of t~e vqlu~ qii '2i by the t:... sector qS !3. 
12~0l1p~i ses of 41 . ~~ qni 7j~ . 21 respectively in terns of inciience of 
poverty in 1930, 1. . e . by rurql-urb~n str~tq ~~1ql 'lysi~ 1'111 ,? )7j ). 
l)De'3.ls ',ii th structure '1:11 behq'liour of econo'11ies ~v"l~~e output per 
he':3.d is less th~:1 11 13) U'3S2 , )J) (L~'Ni'3 l ' gS~) . ~onetheless t~i3 LD~ 
definition is purely ~rbitr!3.ry, e . :s . the l,vorli B~nk/I3qD jefin~s then 
!3.S 'lo 'N to upper lliriile inco"1 = econollies ' 'N'it1. S:1'P p:~r cqpit':3. of less 
th3.n 19311 Ij'3'!>7,O.J') ( \vorld B3.n:< 1(33) 
14-"?l':3.ntqtioYls" '3.n1 " e st~tes" il1 t~is t~esis qre USed interchqncs e qbly 
T!lith the '3alle lle3.ninCS qccoriei i'1 the ~13.1 'lysi'3.n context, i.e. referincs 
to 1':3.'1:1 size of 110re thqn 1,)J !3.cres ~t').47 hq) with 'll':3.n':3.~~n ent , e it~er 
3. priv3.tely-list81. ~Ol1p3.ny, f3.11i1y or inii 'riiu'lll '{-ol..,nc~i, ~ni Jp9r'ltei 
by hir~d 1 ':3.bo ur (mostly by II1Ji~ns of South Inji~ ori:sin in rubber 
est9.tes, 3.ni of lqt~ 'llso by ille~~l Inionesi'lfl lli.csrqnts in both rubber 
3.nd oil p~l11 est~tes) . 
15 . ot 9.ble -!lorks into this 9.re':3. 
Dr':3.bble (1173) which 1e9.1s wit~ 
perspective, Voon ~1975) from q 
p~ints ~ c011prehensive picture of 
incluie t'rtose by J3.cl(son ~1 959) ::In-:1 
t'1e eqrly pe ioi from q historic3.1 
re~io~ql context , 'ln1 B:lrlow 11973) 
the rubber iniustry. 
T~ble 1-2: K9Y Export Com~oiitieg, Mal~ysi~: 
Vqlue, Volu~e ,qn:i Prices, 1950-1 '931 
Co:nmojity 19'5') 197') 1975 193') 1931 1932 119'33+ 19'34-+ 
RUBBER 
V~lu9 (~mil.) 20)1 
Volu~e('OOO tonnes) 9~2 
Price'sen/kg)* 235 
P~L~ OIL (cruie ~ pro~esse:i) 
Value (~rni 1.) 51 
Vol Ull e ( '') 0') tonne s ) 9 3 
Pri~e (t/llt)** 6?1 
TIN ~ TI~-I~-CON~E~1~\T8S 
1724 
































V~lue (~mil .) S07 1013 1206 2S05 21')3 14g~ 1617 14-03 
Volu'lle( '000 tonnes) 77.9 94.8 77.9 69.5 56.5 ,~8.5 53.0 46.0 
Price '1) Ik~) "" 5523 10. 77 15.07 '35. 7r 32. ')4 30. 17 '30. 50 30. 51) 
CRUDS PETROLStN 
Vqlu9 (-Smil.) 147 
VolU1le ('000 tonnes) 2515 
Price(1S$/b~rrel)" 
164- 727 6703 691!8 7694 161)0 3560 
3542 3240 11227 1014') 11973 14046 16743 
4-2- 112.411 ')5 .70 ')3.93 37 .27 30.95 29 . 20 
S A.',v L033 
V~lu9 ('13mil .) 11 9 643 659 2621 2173 3373 3105 ')')72 
Vo 1 u-n e (' OJ) C'.1 m) 
Price (~/cu ~) 
2')-39 1')397 10643 15152 15316 1'9271 207')0 192')1) 
57 59 53 11') 176 IT) 15,') 160 
SA',vN TI~3E8 
Vq 1 U9 ~ )mi 1. ) 
Volu~e( 'OJ,)C'.l m) 
Price (:l/cu 11) 
:1!\ NU? !\CT~ ES 

















~ 1 ') 
T)T~L sx~o:rrs (;1'):nil . )')622 5163 9]'')) 232 ,)1 271,)) 2311') 32-)13 ')6161 
+ Ssti11ates by Fin~nce ~inistry, 1alqY3iq . 
* Aver~~e prices of ~Sql f.o.b. Kuala Lu~pur . 
** '~uo tei in f. o. b. Kl.l a la LUll pur pric es. 
"" Quoted in f.o.b. Penqng prices. 
" Averqge export prices f.o.b. for ~alay3ian ~rqie3 (Miri light 
cruje, Labuqn cru:ie ani Ternbun~o cruie). 
- "?etroleull (cruie and p'3.rtly refinei) prices for 11950 qre 1uotei in 
1'1> pe r tonne. 
Sources: '10~, 'Scono~ic l1eport, various iSSU9S; 13N'1, q,l,arterly 
Scono'llic Bulletin, vqrious issues; D~S, Annual Stqtist ic~l 
Bulletin '1alaysia, various issu9s. 
1 is 
',ofhole to the (;DP, an:i their pr-o:iu':!tion is largely for e'<port '..,~ile q 
16Local rubber consullption has exp'3.niei stea:iily since 1 972, lar~ely 
1ue to tyre 1l!3.nuf:tcturin.g (Gooiyear ani Dunlop have establ ished tyre 
factories l08ally on joint venture basis with 1I,hlaysi:tn interests) as 
well :ts in other rubber goois 11anuf.!3.cturing industri-9s (e . g . 
Hutchinson-'1~pa of Fr~nce and Hoes'.:!ht of l,vest G~rnany). 
1 
lar~e p8.rt of other agri:::ultural output (m'linly footi crops) is for 
do~estic consumption. Nevertheless so~e ather asp~cts :ire worth t'lkin~ 
a closer look at, i.e. higher proiuctivity - presuffi8.bly due to superior 
technology, large l8.nd b'lse of high fertility class, large or better 
acceas to working c'lpi t8.l, and better rnanagellent level 'lni expertise 
(e.~. op~rating with econollies of sC'l1e). Corporatewise, high~r profits 
th'lt llQst limited plant!3.tion co~panies gener!3.te seellS to poi'11: '3.1so to 
the f'lct th8.t it h3.S somethin~ to do with their entrep~eneuri'll s~ills 
which :ire often lacking in sllallholder agricul ture. ,11 
The history of plantation a~riculture in Ma1'lY'l dates back to the 
late 18th century ~Ni th the C~i nese and the Earo p'~!3.ns lea i ing the show. 
The for:ner c ul t iva tej pepper, gambier !3.nd t8. pioc'l , while the 18. ter 
st'3.rtei with spices before moving to sug'lr, coconut !3.nd P'3.ra or natural 
rubber. Shortly before the turn of this century S'3.W the introiuction of 
rubber cultivation to ~3.1ay'3. by the British, which later ex p'lnried 
',.;11 1 g b ,.;I b th bb b t· 1 t i b th ',.;1 th r'lpL.l. y as UJye.l y . e ru er OC>ll s l-nU a e y . e r'lpl.l. g row 
in the auto~ative industry 'lni Wc>rld W'lr I . 1g r~is l~i to the sprouting 
of publicly - listed estate co~p3.nies on th'3 Lonio:1 Stock Exchan-se and 
the trai ing of these shares (together ~vi th tin stoc~s) consti tute the 
l '1rnis refers to the notion of "est'lt e ~an.agellent" being more 
efficient th8.n "sllallholier llanage-nent" in the context of ~al'lysi!3.n 
8. g ri cui tu r e , T,of i t h S c h u 1 t z' s the sis 0 f " po 0 r but e f fi c i en t " 
ch'lracteristic of small farners being borne in mini. 
1 8r,fhere :3:npl e supply 0 f sui t:3. b le l8.nd '<lere -nai e '3. vai 1 ab le to Eu rop,~an 
pl'lnters through British influence to the Sult.aY].s iuring the colonial 
administration . Chinese 'lnd Indi!3.n c'lpit'llists 'lni peas:3.nt ~'llay 
smallholders 13.ter followe:i into the iniustry (Snod~r'lss 19~O,p.1 1 9) . 
~mong the non-British co-np'lnies that venture into plant:3.tion oper3.tions 
include the French ani Belgian Soc fin grOl.lp ani the Copenhagen-b3.sei 
Unitej Plant:3.tions. 
19::{ubber W'lS first used as 'In industri:3.1 r3. TH' 'nateri:3.1 following the 
est!3.blishllent of factories in Europe 8.nd U. S . A.. in the early 1300s; 
boosted by the commerci!3.1 application of vulc8.nis!3.tion process after 
18)9 , the developllent of the pneu'TI.:3.tic tyre in 1999, 8.nd the subse1uent 
boo~ to the auto-notive industry in early 19J03 were the dOllinant 
factors which led to a rapid grc>wth in rubber consumption . 
main activity of the stockbroking busine .3s i~ Ma 1 '3. V'3. ani SinfSapore 
then. By the 1920s, 'British' '1'3.1:1Y'3. beca11e :1 unique eX'3.nple of '3. 
3uccessful export-oriente'i colony - 8. priceless je'llel in t~e crown of 
. . 1 B . t· 20 l~perla rl aln. 
Price flu~tu~tions of rubber in world markgts have been very ~u~h 
like the nature of the proiuct itself - 'bouncing' all the 'l1'3.y . High 
prices w~re realised folloTIILn~ stil1ulating de11!3.nds for it :1S (!:1n be 
seen :1t the onset of the '3.utol1otive age of the e:1rly 1900s, iuring the 
outbreaks of the last two 'Jlorld W3. rs, the wDrl'i cornmoii ty boon cre:1tei 
by the Korean War in 1950-5321 and the two oil 'shocks' of 1913-11 and 
1 919-3'J. 22 But w'rlat goes (bou"lces) up must COl1e 'iOW1. - as 11istory h:1s 
shown us in 1912, during the iark 1ays of 1' 932 which s~w rubber 
beco~ing virtu'3.11y 'tlorthless in wDrld trade, ~nri the c011peti tiveness 
pJsei by synthetic rubber since the post-war ye'3.rs, !3.nj in recent til1es 
during the dow1.turn of the business cycle in the 1971-17 y~'3.rs ~nd the 
curre~t global recession consolii:1ting itself fro~ '1S1 onwaris. 
In the over~ll '3.n'3.1ysis the future for rubber looks gloo11Y - at 
least to the Surope:1n (!'3.pit!3.1ist planters, :1nri hence their arjent 
sear~h for :1n !3.1 tern:1tive crop to replantei rubber . '23 Li1.ce rubber, oil 
20For exallple, ~1~1'3.Y'l ' s contribution t() Britain's post - ·'Il.r balance of 
p"1ynents in 1947 totallei :1 l1assive US$2J'J l1illion fro'll rubber alone -
·exceedei e'fen the entire Bri tish ~anuf'3.cturing eXp0rts in the sa'Tle ye'3.r 
('1organ 1971). It ~.,as to no surprise that Pur~ell (195+) stated bluntly 
that : " .••.• ',iL thJut 'hlay"1 the Sterl ing systell :1S 'II~ l(no'll L t could not 
exist." 
21 In supplying gro\ofing 'liar neeis as wgll as '3. resul t of 1.o'Tlestic 
price inflation in the industri!3.lised countries. 
22'.fnich 'Tle'3.ns hicsher projuction costs for sY'1thetic rubber !3.ni hence 
escal:1tion in pric es . As a result jel1and for rubber sh'Juld i'Tlprove with 
rises in prices for Lt. 
23Stens fro'll their fear of the ne:1r-monop30nist ~:neric"1n purch:lsing 
power for rubber :1ni the constant thre~t by A11erican and .J3.p'3.nese 
investors over their near-mo~opolistic (mainly An.glo-Datch) grasp over 
rubber production (Morsan 1971). 
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p3.1m cui tivation (f3.S ini ti3.11y 8. product of the Europ'~3.n est3.tes. 24 The 
govern1lent's intensive agri~ultural iiversific3.ti::>n progra rYl'1le of the 
19SJs provi'iei the 3.idei 3.ivant3.ge to 13.rge est3.tes 3.nd est3.te groups, 
out of which two crops (oil palm and cocoa) were proved t::> be the best 
3.1tern8.tives to rubber. The groltTth::>f the oil p'3.lm industry h'3.S b~en 
remark3.ble. By 1966, ~3.18.ysi3. 3.1realy beca~e the world's l~r~est 
producer and exporter of oil p3.1m. In terns of cul tivate'i hectare3.ges 
the incre3.se If3.S five-fold b,~tween 19S1 3.nd 11970 25 t 3.n1 is expectei to 
re3.ch 2 million h3. by the eni of this century.25 Currently oil p3.lrn 
r3.:1ks secon1 only to petrol~um 3.S the most i'nport'3.nt export e3.rner, 
with 3.lmost 1.4 million h3. 3.1re3.iy planted wLth the crop 3.nd 3.ccountin~ 
for '1lore than 551 of the global trade. By contr3.st, cocoa cultiv3.ti::>n 
hl1S exp3.nde·i ten-fold since 1974, 3.ni is exp'3ctei to re3.ch "350, 000 ~a 
by the end of the Sl1me perioi. This is 13.r~ely 3.ttribut3.ble to 
plant3.tions w~ich incre3.sin~ly sTtTL tch from rubber to these neli 
perennials - 3.S C3.n be seen from the planted are3. unier imm3.ture crops 
(as cO'llp3.rei ''lith repl3.ntei rubber) in App~ndix !\. Bot~ crops possessei 
the cOllp3.r3.ti'le advantage over rubber" in tens of the ec::>no1lics of 
repl "nt;ng or pro~uct;on, 27 ex te..:l 10 t f· t b ·1· t 23 Cl. .. ~ .l.. . pec.J. ng- e rm pro 1 3. l 1 Y , price 
co:npeti tiveness in relation to their substi tutes, 3.ni wL th resp '~ct to 
new rnarkets29 3.nd end uses. Tible 1-"3 gives the br'83.kiolffi in terlls of 
cultiv9.ted are'1 under rubber and oil p'3.lm i~ ~3.l3.ysi3.. 
24In 1957, the experillent3.l oil p3.1rn stock of the College of 
Agriculture 9.t Seri3.ng W3.S 1isperse1 to v3.rious est3.te groups. This lei 
to key research w'Jr'< bein'S coniu~tei by the forei~n estqt e s, e.g. the 
Guthrie group , H3.rrisons i Crasfield ani Unilever. In fqct Guthrie 
pl3.ntei their first oil p'3.lms in 1924, 3.t Slaeis E~t3.te in J::>h::>re. 
25~roll 1141-,100 ac in 19S1 to 745,7JO 3.C in 1 970 (~hnk f-hgqr3. ~'3.l3.ysiq 
1 971 ,p. 1 9S ) • 
26..... ,~ ..:l·t· S1...·ft· (!roun..:l' ')ee, ..IOllmO-.ll les: '1'1 ~n~ '-' ~ 
(1 11 !\pril11935,p .73) . 
27See for exallple, 3.n econollic stuiy by LLm 3.n1 C~3.i /1973). 
28\s confirmed by B'3v3.n 3.nd Gaerin~ (1 ' 967). 
29~'11aysi:ln p3.1m oil's share of the world oils-ani-f3.ts rnar1.cet h3.s 
incre3.sed from 2~ in 1960 to 17"t in 1'981- (Cl9.d 11995,p.79) 
Table 1' -3: Pl~ntei ~r~~ under Rubber ~ni ail Palm 
b y .~ :>:1 e 0 feu l t i v f3. t ion, 1 970 -I' 97'3 
RUBBE11 ('I)JO Cl:i) Est'ltes P -\ L \f 0 I L (' '))0 ''1:i) ~ s t ~ t e s 
--------------------- :is ~ of --------------------- ~s ~ of 
E SH 1 tot~l E SH ~ tot'll 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
1970 646.6 1077.3 I 723. 9 33 19).4 67.3 261 .2 74 
1971 631 .6 10'36.5 1 71 '3. 1 37 213.g 3'3.2 294. I' '1'3 
1972 610.3 1092.0 1 732. 3 36 245.4 1 g3. 4 36'3.9 70 
11973 539.4 11 )4. 6 1694.0 35 274.7 137.4 41 2. 1 67 
1974 574.2 1117. 6 1 6gl i • 8 34 324.4 176.'3 50).2 65 
1'975 563.) 1131.6 1694.g 33 355. 1 21 3.7 56'3.'3 62 
1976 553.3 11 30. 7 1634.0 33 377.3 260.3 637.6 59 
11977 558.5 1422.2 1 930.7 23 404.3 YJ7 .7 712 .0 57 
197'3 542.6 1454.4 1 997.0 27 43'3.9 349.0 787. g '56 
E = est:ite sub-sector; SH = s~allholder sub-sector; T = tot'll. 
Preli~inary fi~ure for Peninsular M:il~ysia only. 
Sources : DOS, Annu~l St~tistic~l Bulletin ~~13ysi'l, KU:ila Lu~pur, 
various issues; DOS , Oil P:ilm St'ltistics . Kual:i Lunpur, 
various issues. 
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S~'lres in the e3t~tes sub-sector are well rep~esentei in Lonion, 'l 
~:iiority of lolhi:!~ are ::!o-listed in both Sin~:ipore ani KU:il'l Lu'npur. Tn 
1973, there was 3 tot:il of 23 '1'l1'lysi'ln estate co~p'lnies lolL th 'l Lonion 
Stock Exch:inge (L3S) 1uot:ition :ind 3 tot'll of lS53 rubber est'ltes :ilone 
in M~laY:3ia.30 Tn ter~s of pl:int'ltion base, the largest conp'lnies 
luotej on LSE 'lre Guthrie Co~por'ltion wi th estat3s in ex::!ess of 7'3,542 
Si~e D:irby ('30,000 h:i) :ini Consolii:itei Plantations ( 51,')07 ha). Other 
est'lte cOllp'lnies with llore th:in 3,097 h'l :20, OJ ') acres) incluie Dunlop 
303ee , T~e Econo~ist Intelligence U~it or STU (1979 , 9P . 23-34) . 
1 1 
hect:ir~:irses :it the e'l(p'~l1se of rubber "lr-3:i 8.S r~flectei in T'lbl~ 1-1. 
Det"lils of t1.e est'lte cOl1p'lnies ~i.nclusi'l2 c>f ri.n,;~it rllbb~rs, st~rlin~ 
rubbers 'lnd. oil p:illls) listei on the ~1 qla Lurnpur Stock Exch:inrse ~r(L)8) 
Once it rtl'lS the drc>ps of the :,l'1ite latex that help~i buili :i 
n:ition from the co1oni"llist er:i 1vhich enied politic"llly c>n ,)1st A.urs ust , 
1 957 . indepenience the ~n:lin'S of co1c>ni'llisl1 iii not 
(unfortun'1tely! ) in 3. v'3. Y pe r-ne3. te econolli.cqlly, 'tlhen 
" l' l' ,,')1 neoco on1.3. lSl1 crept in. Forei:sn cC>llp'lnies ~st3.blishei '3.S lon'S :is 
the P3.st century sti 11 dO'Tlin:itwi the pl'lntqtion sub- sector unti.l only 
recently. ~'ll1eS like Sime D'lrby, 3uthrie SJrp 'lni H'lrrisans 'lnd. 
Crasfieli (H ~ C) , with their est'3.tes on pri.119 lqni thrau:shout 
P2ninsulqr ~'llaysi"l were the visible si~n of fc>r9i~n iOl1i(13.tion of the 
\'h 1 qys i ''In 2conon y. )2 
S'lW the t'lkeo'ler of Guthri3 Corp q(1i the buyin~ over ~f l1qiority st'l~es 
, th 1 t t' 't ' D 1 r.1 t t T'I. 1 n +- t U ' lf 1"7'., In 0 er p :in 'l Ion ~l'ln s, 'lIZ . :ylr Oi>f rl.J3 :l es , ull1 op "-,3 u 'l-,~s,l.'lr. 
i.n l,vh'lt the Britis1. press br'lniei 'IS 1. "1'l ',>fn r'1i 'i" ~0 'r9r ,}uthri~) qni 
" front door (l'3.tion'3.1is"ltion". :: ' 1es~ ie'llin~s -,{ere in f'lct D'.lrely 
commerci'11 tr"lns'3.ctie>ns folla'·rinO' th~ nan'll rules af the 
, .> 
the :1'11qysian government is p ;.lrsuin~ in 'lCCOr1'3.nCe to its Ne'tl ~-:::ononic 
") 1 The 11 e 'l n i n rs v :i r i e s s J 11 e ',.,''1 1. t 'v L t h i iff ~ r e n t :i u t "lor s . See , f e> r 
ex all pl-3 P:iqU1tl qn i F~ i (1 1 '17)), 8.n'1 Re yno 1 is (1 1 '17 7 ). 
")2rhobarn (119T3) 'lrgu:d qrs'3.inst this COllmon beli~f t'11.t fe>reign-
incorporqted export i.niustries qre purely " encVlves " in th~ \h1,:.tysi'1n 
economy . 1evertheless, in 1970 3011e 77 . 7~ of the rubber inillstry WlS 
o wnei by fo re i rsn in te res t s (He> ffm 'lnn '3. n i Tq'1 119 ~O , D . '21 ')) . 
))T'1e go'rer(ll1ent-b'lck~i equity i.nstitution, ?er'nod.ql'ln 'h.sionql 
Berhqd or PN'B , 'tlere behini the ' Guthrie r'liri ' qni ie'lls involving 
B'lrlow Est3.tes '3.ni H~E . D nlop QJliinrss '1~) iispJsei its 51~ 
pl'lnt'3.tion interests to !v1ul ti-?ll::,pase Ho11in'Ss erhqi ~ -1PHB), ltlhi le the 
~oori Industries \1:ilqY3i'3. Berhqi (FI'1A.) bought over 1. 'Tl:ijori ty St'3.\(9 in 
UP . 
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Policy's guiieline t~ corpor3.te o,.,-nership and/or sh!3.re of c3.pi t!3.l. 34-
All in !3.1l the Mal"3.ysi3.n governllent has ~hosen the l1arket route to buy 
over these forei~n . , COll p'lnleS interests in 
Mal'1ysi3. ''ihic1;l Ivere rightly Malaysi3.' s - bein~ 'lost' or I sold' luring 
the colonial rule . Now w~at lies 3.heai, w~ich is cru~i3.1, is the 
restructuring of these weal th or 3.ssets in su~h !3. way qS to ensure 
continu'1tion in their growth potenti3.1 plus '1 re:1istribution'11 asp"ect 
to it possibly in the traiition of "groTtlth with 
re:1 istribution" • 
1. 3 The Malaysian Stock Market : So~e Aspects of its Origin, Development 
and Role in Malaysian Economic Develop~ent 
~'1laysi'3. has q youn£S fin!3.nci'3.l mar'-<et that is 110:1ellei on the 
")5 3ritis'1 fin'3.ncial systen , is :1ivilej into tTtlO broai categories: the 
money ll!3.rket '1n:1 the capital :n!3.rket. S1uities qnd stock exch!3.n~e36 is 
just 0'18 instrul1ent of the c'1pi t3.l market, of whic~ Dr'3.ke (1 930,n.ll ) 
defines it as, 
"The stock exch3.n~e, 1 lnich is of gre'1t Lllport'3.nce in the 
ll!3.rketing of securities, is neither a saver, spenier, borrower 
nor lender and, of itself, ioes not create finqnci'1l assets. 
The stock exch3.n~e is not an interneii3.ry but 9.n agency, which 
pro v i i es the :neans 0 f con tqC t betTlleen tho se '>lno buy '1ni t~o se 
who sell se~urities. The 30-c!3.11ed n~~ issue llar~'3t so 
---~losely linksl to the stock exch9.n~e th3.t one l1'3.y re~arj it as 
3. -ie f3.cto, if not fOI'1l9.l, brqn~h of ex~h!3.n~e activi ties -
proviies 3. :ne9.ns of iirect finance for corporate borrowe rs froll 
public leniers. The new issue market 113.Y also proviie '1n '3.v e ~u e 
for injirect finance as, for instance, ',{"1en a "lire p'J.rchase 
")437 191~ the share of the corporate c!3.ke is tar~ettei to be iiviie:1 
in '1 30 : 40:3'] ratio bet,'ieen the bUl1iputer'1, n~n-bulliputer'1 ani forei~n 
interests resp~ctively. 
358'or 3. concise sunm9.ryon the ~'1laysian fin'1nci'1l llar'-<3t see, t{ellp 
(19'31') ; and for a det!3.ilei !3.ccount see, Drake (1966,I 'gSga,I 'g5gb). 
36<:" t· t ..l th' . t· , t' 't k 1 t' )ol1e 111es er'nelas " e secur1 1es m9.r<e , s oc l1!3.r({'3 or a 
' bourse' . For :1iscussions on the concepts ani ter-ninolo~y see, \yilson 
(1955) , 1'un lH'1i an:! Patrick ~1 1 973), Drqke (\ ' 93']) ani A1lstr3.1ian 
Ass"oci3.te:i Stock Exch!3.nges (119311) . 
co~p~ny ~~kes ~ public issue of debentures ~n1 uses the 
proceeis to llake lo~ns to p'J.rch!3.sers C)f dur9.ble "SoC)1.s." 
1 • 3.1 Tha Role of the StoC1( M~rket in 8conomic Developllent 
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Ap9.rt from the provision of ~ wall-run mar~~t-pl9.ce, usu~lly 
institutionalisei, the llajor role of ~ stock llarket is in their valuing 
of securities. ~is seconi role is of vit~l importanc e in th~t 
'correct' valu9.tion of securities provides sign!3.ls for the alloc~tion 
of s~~rce c9.pi t!3.l resources. Hc>wever, most economists 9.re skeptic9.l 
about the econollic benefits of securities m~rkets to LDCs. This virtu9.1 
neglect of 3e~uritLes markets in the liter9.ture of development 
econollics reflects a ~ener~l academic attitu1e that the subject is 
unillportant (Drake 193J,p.192). On the other h!3.nd pC)licy llakers in most 
LDCs which cho3e t~e 'free enterprise' dogll!3. tend to e'1lphasise the 
benefits C)f capit!3.l m9.rket ievelopment !3.lmost ~t the expanse of serious 
econollic c:)nsiierations. A pC)sitive 9.nd comprehensiva but graiualist 
appro~ch to c~pital llarket ievelopnent is vit~l to ensure 3u~cess (Tun 
Wei ani P~tric l~ 1973). This vier,oj'point W!3.S further ellphasised in that: 
"The key issue is not ,.,':lether 1llarl.cet-orientei LDSs shouli 
h9.ve capi tal markets or not but the de~ree to whi~h governl1ent 
policy sh:)uli ~ii their jevelounent." ~1'un ',vai and Patrick 
1973, p.2S,+) , -
It is then a 1uestion of ch:)osin~ vfr'lich route tc) t!3.~e be t 1,oj'a en a 
'demani-following' or 'supply-leaiin~' appro!3.ch . )7 
There has bean relatively little attentic>n given to financi~l 
aspects in e c c> n c>m i c developllent liter~ture,3g ',oj'hi~h is rqther 
378ae , P'3.trick (1 1955) for further iiscussion on thes~ two phenollena. 
3g\llon~ the few illportant conceptual wor~s on this topic are those by 
P~trick (1966), Gurley ani Sh'r;o{ (11967), Goldsllith (1 1959) , McKinnon 
( l' 973) and Sh a \of ~ 11 973 ) • 
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surprising in vi3w of the illport'lnce of c'lpi t:ll for-n'ltion in the 
39 inv8stllent :lnd jevelop11e~t spheres. 
Nevertheless, the ~b.l1.ysi:ln governlle!lt vie~is 40 the c1.pital llarket 
1.S !3.n import:lnt cOllpone!lt in its financi:ll develop'llent. 'Y~e G~vernrnent 
securities market h'3.s developei over the years mqinly !3.S q primary 
market, proviiincs :l 'c!3.ptive' source of funds for the fin!3.ncincs of 
develovnent in th '3 public sector. On the other h!3.nd the corpor!3.te 
securi ties m!3.rket is by f!3.r the m~re .!3.cti're component of the c.!3.pi t.!3.1 
market, al th::>ugh the pri~ary funis raised in this market represented 
only a fraction of the :l'llo'J.nt r.!3.isei by t'1e Govern'llent sec uri ties 
llarket. The role and irnport!3.nce of t~e securities ~~rket i!l the 
11.laysi:ln context is spelt out by the Central B'3.nk (B1.nk Negara 
~'ll'lysi.!3., B~~) , excerpts af ~hich reais; 
"Tt'lithin the fin .1.ncial systell, the c3.pit:ll ~:lr-ket in 'I~al'lysi!3. 
serves two 'llain purposes: firstly, it !3.ssists the pr-ocess af 
econollic ievelop1lent by llobilising long term funis fro'll :l wiie 
cross-sec tion of the pJp'J.latan to fin!3.nce the publ ic 
ievelop'llent prograll'lle :lnd priv!3.te investllent ~enerqlly. 
Secondly, it prollotes priv.!3.te enterprise by proviiincs .!3. 
convenient lle'3.~S for r'3.ising funis for corpor'3.te investlle!lt ani 
exp:lnsi::>n, and in ch:ln'Sin~ the aivnership11 structur8 of 
cOllpanies . ~n effective c.!3.pit1.1 ll'3.rket is aften :llloncs the ll.!3.ior 
objectives of fin.!3.ncial ievel~p119nt in ievelopin-'5 countries." 
(B~ 1 979, p . 31 5 ) 
l'he illpart'3.nce of the corp0r"3.te securi ties llarket is well 
recognisei by the M'lh3.thir aj'1linistr'3.tio~. ~he securities iniustry '3.S !3. 
39?Lnance as '1 'lubri ca~t' to de"/elopnent - q p~rase th'3.t 'tl'lS coinei 
up in the recent "Outl~ok '3=) Conference" heli i~ Febru3.ry qt C.!3.nber-r 'l. 
40Blsei on the type of fin'lnci'll qssets llarketed, the c'3.pi t'.ll llJ3.rkst 
in ~.!3.l:.3.ysi!3. 'll!3.y be 1.ividei into two p.!3.rt'3, i.s. Gover-nllent securi ties 
'1l'3.rk~t '3.nri the llarket in stocks '.lnd sh3.res, incluiincs other corporate 
securities. 
41 Pr-ob:lbly the e!3.rliest wJrl( on the o1,.,nershi p '.lna. control of the 
1.!3.Llysian econollY Ttl'.lS ione while in detention by Put'1uche3.r-y (195,)). 
Other works af rele\f:lnce include tl10se by ~'lrna.jiTtl'.l1:l ~1 1 95)), 'I"f1oburn 
(19711) and Lim (1 1 9~1) . By '133, the corpor:lte c.!3.ke W:lS sh3.red in a 
21 .91 , 43. 4~ and 29 . 7t., bet~3en bUllip'ltera, non-bulliputer'l anri foreign 
interests respectively I M1.1aysiq 19'311). 
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listei ,,,ith t~e KLSE , r '2presentin:s q t8tql rn9.r1.c~t c:lpit'3.1is'3.tion of 
T'1ble 1-4-: ~l'3.ssific'3.tion of Oriin:lry S2c~rities listei on KLSS 
3.S qt )1 st n1'3.Y I' T3') 
To. of N') . of 
=)ector COllp'3.nies Securities~ 
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9 , 53) , 4-64 . • 7 66 
1,7)4,612,1-SS 
1 , 51 1 , '172 , '23) 
1 , 1 =)9 , )1 4 , 153 
57 1 , 54- ') , 1 1- 9 
1 , )37 , )37 , 373 
7 ,1 '25 , ')')') 
"~o-n i ~ '3.1 
.\ 110U'1 t 
~5 , g3t, 651 , 153 
3')1 , '51S , 5")4 ,11 ) 
£ 11,3')4.939 
1) 112 ,1 23 , '391 
" "" 11 -z ? ? -z 3 1 c:: ? -)) , J _ _ , ) , )_) 
-s l' gl) , 315 , 27<:) 
3 ~ 331 , ) 1 'J, 911 
') 75),922 , 731 
'=) ') 333 , 76'1 , 931 1 
S 916 , 2)1) ,1 '77 
:s 243 , J24 ,1 4-2 
£ 13,677,971 
1)t, 365, 33S , 633 
£ 712 , <:)')) 
Tot:ll ll'3.r1.cet 
V'3.1u'3.tio~ -
'S31- , 551,117,142 
'1i 1 4, '500 ,6 )6,336 
') 5 , <:)30 , 312 , 12) 
') 4 , 559 , 711) , 221 
t :2 , 31 ' '5 , 75) , 621 
1) 1')9,,)75,')')) 
.... Exclu:iing p::-eferance qni lO:ln/jebe-:1tu::-e :inclule con'lert) c'1.ni~:ll. 
- ~3.r1.cet ~'3.1ues ~'3.V8 bee~ c:llcul'3.tei '3.t t~e l'3.st tr:lns:lctei prices. 
* 1ot'11 rn:lr~3t c'1pit'l1is'3.tion is )7') , 3')5 , 757,2)2 . 
S8urce : KL3~ , 193). 1~e ~~'3.19. L~~p~r 3t8C~ ~xch'3.nge ~~z3tte, 
vol.11, n8 . 6 ,-~71 . 
'!lith l10re t~9.n '1-;3) billi')n in ll'3.!"-<::et cqpitqlis'3.tio'1. ':lit'-1i:1 t~e S'3.11e 
perio:} the vo1ulle ')f stocl.cs tr:liei h9.s incre'3.s e i '3.11l0st t e n ti11e'3 to 
16, 1 934 ). 
." t f ~ 1'2 . -1 l~e ne u~ ·~s r~lse~ vi '3. new issues 
4-2Co11ectively inc1uie '111 issues of oriin'3.ry sh9.res (eit~er by 
public issues, p:oil'3.te plqCe11ents, ri~'1t issues or speci'3.1 iSSU3S) , 
preference sh'1r~s, iebentures or 10'1n stocks . 
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1 961-64, 11$~ llillion i~ 1 9~5, '11)55 rnilliQn irl 1'966-67, llnd. '1'1>722 
million in 1953-77 aver9. C7 in C7 some '1$72 million II Y9-9.r over the J J 
1 'J-ye-9.r period 1 979,p. 325). 1970s Ol:Hmris net funis 
r::lisei in the order of M$I IOO-'1$20,) million is of COllffiQn Qccur-ence. 
Det'3.ils of allJunts rqisei by n9 TtI issues thrJugh 80rpOr'3.te securi ties 
market ~re pr-esented in T::lble 1-5. 
Table 1' -5: Funis R::lised in the Corpor~t3 Securities ~-9.rket 
in M:ll9.ysi-9., 1951' -11932 
Types of Sto8k 
or Share iS3ues 
'51 -65 '56-70 '71 -75 '76-78* '79 '30 '~1 1 '32 
•••••••••••••••• (~1 1) 11 ill ion) ............... . 
Oriin9.ry sh9.res, net 125 276 292 250 21 1 137 9 '},) 591 
Public issu~s 103 , , 5 1 01 6') 2 2 104 133 
Priv::lte placellent- 5 22 2~ 21 
Rights issue 1 2 139 1 63 134 , 43 103 599 287 
Speci9.l issues " 35 66 32 , 97 94-
0ffer for s9.1e 28 
Pref-erence sha res, net 6 
BQnd. issues, net** 1 4 1 -4'3 2) 
LOlln stocks, net 339 1745 3379 4335 50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
~et funis r9.ised 1029 2023 42119 
* For period fro~ 1975 to Septellber 1978. 
- lncluiing inter-collp~ny place~ent. 
4535 21 1 157 9r)') 641 
~ To bUlliputer~ investors nOllin::lted or 9.pprovei by the ~inistry of 
1r9.d.e ::lnd. Industry. 
** Inclusive of iebentures/lo9.n stocks. 
In tens of tr9.iinJS, turnover is highest in the iniustri9.1s 
sector, sOllethin'S to be exp9ctei in ~n econQllY th~t is r'3.piily 'novin'S 
tOlv::lris m~nuf'3.cturinJS ~nd iniustrialis'3.tio'1. Even the'1 t'1e tr9.iin~ in 
pi an t~ tion St08 \{s (often d. esc ri bej llS 'corpo r9. te she 11 s' together Iii th 
spent tin llines stoc~s) S'3e'TlS to ~ttrqct qttentiJn in the upswings of 
business cY81es, esp'38i'3.lly 'lur-in'S the' uphill climb ph'3.se' out of the 
cycliclll troughs. 
T~e con8ern Jf the role 9.nd illport~nce of the 8orporate 
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sec uri ties injustry is reflectei from ~qlqysia ' s ,growin.cs foreign iebt 
qni curre-:1t accou'1t iefici t w'rIich forcej the Governllent to re-ex3.lline 
its econollic policy. As at the eni of 1993, these are r,=portei to h3.S 
s"valle'i to :131 16.2 billion. The reason lies fron the oversp,=ndin~ in the 
econollY since 1'93') (Khor 1983), especially with regaris to govern1lent's 
expeniiture qS, T3.ble 1-6 illustrates. Tne qrgu11ent is thqt loqns may 
not be the only T/,l3.y to get capital into the country. It TYlqy be th'lt 
e1uity is just 3.S good an1 could even be cheaper. 43 Thus the increasing 
ellphasis on the securities in1u9try, among other things, qS an 
import3.nt instru1lent tow3.rds Mal'3.ysian econollic develop:nent is perh'lps 
1'1311 justifiej. Nevertheless, by ~o[orld stqndar:is the securi ties 
injustry i~ ~al'lysia is smqll but, '19 Kemp ( 1'981,p.52S) jescribes it, 
is "s11all b\lt very '3.ctive". 
Table 1' -6: Fejeral Government Outstqniing Debt 
'lnd ~bt Servicin~ , 197~-1 934 
1915 1931 ' 1 9S'2 193') 1934e 
................ . (~~ rnilliJn) ................ . 





servicing r3.tio (~) 3.4 
Debt servicing/op3rating 





























-* After 10lor (1 1 933, p . 55). 
e Estill3.ted figures (Econollic Report 1934/37). 
Source3: ~inistry of Finance, Econollic qeport, V'3.riOU9 issu~s. 
43policywise there is still room for a 3C)'t ownershi.p by forei~n 
interests to invest in the cou~try. 
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1.3.2 The Origin 8.nd Developllent of th~ ~18.l':lysi'ln Securi ties In1ustr-y 
Tne developllent of the secur-ities iniustry e'ln be classified into 
three identifi':lble ph':lses, b':lsed an the ch':lnges th':lt tool{ pl':lce whi~h 
pronou'1cei 11' sha pei the fu ture Gour-se (l''ln 1 g73). T':le fi rst p~':lse T!I':lS 
from the humble beginnings of the l':lte 1 gth century to 1960, ':l period 
of slow llovement forw'lrd . New securities sproutei in 8. rubber-inspirei 
baoll of 1910 , only to be wiped out in the follo.;ing bust . The 
sh':lrabroking business erner~(' l in the '\·nke of the Bri tish corporate 
investllent in plant':ltion ani extr8.ctive iniustries. As with the rest of 
the fin'3.nci9.l 8.na cOllmerci'3.l T!larlj in the region, the stock llarket is 
iOllin9.ted by the Bri tish ~n1 the Chinese . ,\1 thaugh t'1e bra'-{ers fomei 
the :'1'llaY':ln Stockbrol{ers ' \ssaci9.tion in 1937, sh':lre tr'3.iin~ W'3.S not 
ione publicly until ~'3.y 1960. 44 
The seeoni p~':lse began with the est':lblis~nent of the M'llaY'ln Stock 
Exch9.nge in 195~ ':lni the oper':ltion of two tr9.iing roans - one i'1 Kual9. 
LTnpur ':lnd the ather in Sing8.pore. T'~e nerioi r951-llgS~ S'3.~'; '3. new 
issues boo'TI i':1 :'19.l'3.ysi'3. ':lni Sing'3.pore, where 21 cOllp:mies saught '1 
tot9.l '3.no'J.nt of :1~1 1 23 million, Tl '-lieh W3.S vastly overs1.lbs~ribej (Dra'-<:~ 
195jb) . Like 1l0st yaung stock ex~h':lnges, the e':lrly ye'3.rs were Tll':lrkei by 
wiiespreai interest '3.ni excessive sp3cul9.tion in sh'3.re iSSU3S. T~e 
cloujiest point jurin~ this perioi W9.S the r':lci8.1 riots of 13 ~'ly 19S9 
re~overy of the 'TI'lrket, ':lS the ~':ll'1ysian econony eller~ei fro'TI the 
Soan a new forei .gn nheno'TIenan 
.. 
grippei the th'3.t of the 
sens':ltion':ll t':lkeover ':lnd 'TIer~er - ':lni a new 1100i of optillisll prev'3.ilei. 
44'[:1 that ye8..r, the brokers ':lssaci'3.tion bec':lne the ''1'119.Y':ln Stock 
Sxch':lnge' whi~h W':lS '3UbS81uently reorg9.nisei ':lni renalled the 'Stock 
Exch':lnge of !hl':lYs i'3. , in 1953, the 'Stock ~"(ch'lnge of ~'llaysia '3.nd 
Singapore ' i'1 11955, and fin':llly the 'Ku9.1'l LUllpur Stoc~ Exch'3.nge' in 
'\1'3.y 1973 . 
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The third and present ph3.se beg9.n 1,·fith the split of the .joint 
Stock Exch9.nge of M'3.laysia S Ln~apore the subsequ8nt 
est9.blishllent of the sep'~rate exehqnges, i.e. KLSE '3.n'i SSS45 on ~ ~'ly 
1973 . Thi3 present phase S'3.W r.'1pi'i developnent anri fluctu9.ting fortunes 
Vlhich incluie t'.>l0 llarket er9.shes in 1973 '3.nd 1'93\ ' (' ~rash of T5 ' ani 
'Crash of >31 ' ); the t'lkeovers of long-establ ishe-i Bri tis~ plant3.tie>n 
interests in M'3.laysi'l via the llarket route by ~'3.laysi'3.n trust a~eneies 
and cOllp3.nies; 9.nd the est3.bli3hllent of 3. futures '1larket for 
co:nmc>di ties I \ starting wLth a p'llll oil futures in 1930 ani rubber 
futures in 199')) under the KU3.l9. Lunpur Cornllod i ties Exchan'Se (KLCS), 
~.,'>1ich llight h3.ve SOl1e links to the plantations ste>cks listed on the 
16 ~LSE . The l3.test rievelopnents centres 0n the propos'll for the settin~ 
up of '1 second b09.rd (probably Sil1il9.r to U. K.' 3 Unlistei Securi ties 
·'b.rket , U~'1) and the ~'1ll for the eniing of the historic dU'3.l listing 
of M9.1'lysi'ln-incor-po9.rte'i conp9.nies on SES e A.ppeniix B gives '3. su:n'1lary 
of the origins 9.nd. de 'relopllent of the M'llaysi'3.n secut'i t ies i.ndustry. 
45 Both :nark~ts 3.re deseribei by foreign 0bservers '3.S 'insep'lrable 
Sia:nese twins', ' twin ma~kets', or '9. bicycle m9.'ie for two'. 
46This '3.spect W9.rrants 9. separate stuiy '3.lto~ether . 
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CH~PTE~ 2 
REVIEW OF REL~TED LITERATURE 
1he ~r~wth of wor~ o~ stoc~ ~9.r~et e~ono~i~s h9.s b~9n consi1.er:lble 
~'li th r9.pi 1. strijes forw"l rj being ~9.ie since the 1 96')s . Tn t"1e 9.re:l of 
:llone voluninous liter:ltur~ h9.S incluie t~e 
n8.nyiissert:ltio'1=), unpublishei p9.p~rs qni in'restnent str1.te~ies :lni 
re'!ie~'f "'ill only cover liter9.ture th:lt is closely rel9.tei to t"1e t'tI:) 
Qre9.S of this stuiy . 
2 .1 Intel'-Rel9.tednes9 of Stock 1qr~et Perforn9.nces 9.~on~ World Bourses 
2 . 1 .1 ' ""!.i'ollo -v- t~e - L~9.jer" belief :lnd/or ":il'~9.ter Fool T'1.~ol'Y" 
1~is is :l grey :lre~' 1.c1.ienic9.l1y sp~q~Lng. ~tuiies on t"1e 
i f 1. ny, C :l P t 1.1 I' est '1. e i 11 :l ~ i n 9. t i O:l 0 f 9 ~ 0 non i s t s . "13 1 t t"1 e y '1 I' ~ p:) p11 1 '3. l' 
1~ biblio~rqp~y of over ) , 6')) 
t ~ e fie 11 "" 0 f cor po r 1. t e fin :l n C 9 
to the eni of 1l72 . 
? 
t"1eor :;ti~1.1 "lW1 
9.ni sp~::::ul9.tive 




- speci9.1ly tiLth su_cessful investnent stl'qte~ies '3.'11. 1101els 
ie'/elop~1 by rese'll' ~9l's ~n1 i:lve tllent 1.n9.1ysts. u~~ ','fO '<:S 'tlill only 
be olbli he1 ·.v~en t"1ey "ll'e no lonrser 9.pplic~ble (W'1Y else \vill the 
l'ese:lrcher or '3.n1.1yst publish then ?) 
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allong fin8.ncial anal ysts, financi8.1 journ8.1 ists and officials Tlli thin 
govern-nent circles, :lS refleGte:i by the :::onst:lnt reference of stocl.( 
'1larket's perfornances with the leaiing world bourses 
p:lrticular that of ',~~l l Street, LJndon or Tol.cyo) in 1.aily eiitori3.ls, 
investllent bulletins, :lS Tllell as in the Tre:lsury and/or Centr,3.1 B8.n1c 
3 reports. 
T'1e Glosest stuiy on this 8.SP3Ct so f:lr 'tlq,S prob ,8.bly that of Gan 
e t 8.1 (1 1 g ~:31' ) • They useri the co rre la tion technique to stu-i y the 
co-move-nent of the KLSE and other OVerS98.S rnarkets like N·ew Yorl,{, 
London, Hong Kon~, Tol,{yo , Sydney and Johannesburg ,over ~ perioi fro'1l 
1ay 197~ to ~cellber \1973. T'r'l9ir findings in 8. lllay iisprovei the GOllmO iTl 
believe that the 1l0ve'Tlent of the ~LSE follow those of other '1l8.rkets 
:nost of the ti-ne, esp3ci8.11y wLth regar'is to the '/er'l 10TIl :::orrelation 
obtained bet 'lleen ~LSE ani Nw,ol York (in this case the DJ-,-/ Jones )') 
Industri8.ls). \llong the conclusions th:lt they ri rew fron thei l' 
" follo ~.,- the-lea:ier" belief stuiy, the follJ ~-/ing see'TlS to be of 
i 11 po r t q, n c e, viz; 
(a) It is not true that the ~qlay3ian stocl.( rnarket alw~ys 
follows the le:liing foreign stock l1arkets. 
(b) It is illportant to be cq,utious in attributing q,ny 
p:lrti:::ular event (overse~s) th~t is .:serrn8.ne to only 8. 
p:lrticular leaiing '1l8.rket ~s q,ffeGting our stock llarket 
q,9 well. As 3UC~ we should not Sil1ply q,scribe factors 
:lffecting other leaiing '1l8.rl.(ets '3.S fq,ctors ~ffecting our 
market ~~LSS) as well . 
'c) ~:lrl.(et participants have :l fortiori re~sons to p~y 
more attention to local ani i'Tlpart:lnt world events thq,t 
impinge upon our stock -narket (KL3~) r:lther th:ln taking 
the cue iniiscrirninq,tely fron overseq,s. 
'd) Chartists ' :lnalyses that reliei 0'1 pe rfor'Tlance of le:liing 
stock llarkets for CU3S c8.nnot be ri.ght '1lost of the tille 
iue to the instability 8.nri inconsistency of the 
correlation coefficients. 
Kindleberger ( 1'979) in his interesting historical an:llysis (of 
3')f which Malaysia 's exp'3rience in this regard is no exception. 
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wh~t ~e called 'liter~ry econo~ics') of financi~l crises fro~ the ti~e 
~f t~e South Se3. Hlbble in the e:irl y 11'))3 to th~ T.·mrl:i dep:-esion of 
the 19'30s 3.ni the rnini p3.ni ·:!s of the 93.rly 11970s ~ave q spleniid 
qccount 3.S to the possible reas~ns u~:ierlying the stock 'Tl~rkgt crashes 
of the ti~e . He 3.ttributed the wi:iespreai specul3.tive m~niqs ~nj panics 
~s one of the m~i~ culp~its, an:i the 3.bsence of or f3.ilure of 'lenders 
of l:ist resort ' to stt~p in 3.t the ri:sht ti~e to reverse th '3 panics of 
the crises (e . g . the re3.son b3hini the prolongei 119'303 fupression) . 
T,'ii th regaris to the highly 3pe:!ulqtive 'llarket of the 1 920s, market 
pqrticip3.nts 'tl3re in a W3.y ftl3nt for the stocks in '1 ''}old rush' ~anner 
- throwing the fun:i::llnentals to the winis 3.n:i beca~e arjent s :..lpporters 
of the 30-c3.lled " Gre3.ter FooL T"heory" . 'l-
T~e stock 'Tlar'.(gt cr:ishes of 19T) 3.nd 119311 in M'll3.ysiq see~s to 
support the "Gre3. ter Fool Theory" 3.S the pre-coniitions of 3. 
specul"ltive ~3.rk~t '1kin to the U.S . of the 19203 were obviously there. 
This is prob3.bly to be expected in 3.n infqnt ll3.rket '13 ~3.l~ysi3.' s -
furthernore the people Ttlho 1.'3.bble in the stock llqr l{~t COlle fron 3.11 
'iv3.1ks of life, p0ssibly q subst3.;lti3.1 proportion kno T..rs little of t':l~ 
'NO rki ng ani beh3. v iou r 0 f the 11 '3. rk~ t. ~hese 3.re the p'30ple Ti'lO in the 
l3.st two cr'3.shes bec ,~~e 's3.crificial la:nbs' to th '~ profession~l 
players, insiie tr3.iers, i;lstLtution'3.l investors, sY1.iicatei investors 
'lnd of course the brokers thellselves. In essence, believers of this 
theory hold that stock prices '3.re nJt iep3nient on qnythLn~ t3.;lgible 
but r3.ther on the continu3.1 appe~rence of even gre'3.ter f~ols (or 
brav3.dos?) to p~rch'3.se the stocks qt 3.n even ~i~her price (1 ~ oh 193~i). 
TNhat the believers jo not seem to realise is th:it t~e s~pply of gre~ter 
fools will eventu'3.lly iry up '3.ni th:it they -nay be t~e finql purch:iser 
1So~etilles referrei to IlS the 'u'lofficiql school of thought' in the 
stock '1larket beh'3.viour literature. 
''3.ni the gr8'3.test fool) before '3. crqs"1 . ~~~ile3s to S1.y , t~e cs re '3.t3r 
fool t~eory is q ~u~h iis8reiitei one 1.~o~'S 1.c1.ie~ics 1.ni ~ost 
pro f3ss ion 1.1 s. 
r 
enpi ric'3.1 evidence on the ~LSS ~ave shown a iiver~enceQ fro~ t~e 
" R q n ion I,V'3. 1 k "10 i e 1 ' lor the ' Ttl3 1. k f 0 r'n ' 0 f the " Sf f i c i en t "11. r 1{ e t s 
Hypot'1esis" ':3.S (,,1,.. 0 n a Kl' ·~ T.T v : l _ ? . 'J'" tI'TO of Doi 1 s' 
stuients 'Li~ '3.ni \ TtlO rki no on :1Btt 1.. i sse rta t io~s ~ in 19'31i. Doiis 
(lg'33) t~in~s that t~ese iepartures are probably to be founi in so~e of 
the te8hnic':3.1 ':3.ni insti tution'3.1 char':3.cteristics of t~ese '1lark~ts. '\s 
De r sec ,) u 1 i DO S sib 1 Y bet I' u e 
-"- -
'3.ft-.-r '111, or '3.t le1.st p '3r~':3.p3 ~t':1ou:sh hiCShly unli1.(ely) stock pri8es on 
:{ L S 8 t ~ nit 0 f 01 10 ','l e i t ~ e r the I s e~ i - s t I' 0 n.g lor's t ron g I for'll 0 f t'1 e 
8'1H. Hence, flrther in1'.1iries into t~e b,ehqviour of st081.( prices on 
th8sis 1.i~s to oroviie sane). 
When one ':3.n'3.1ysei the foll 'Y:l-t':1e-181.ier be~aviour, t'1.~ 1uestioY} of 
Ttlhich in:iic9.tor to US8 80ll8S to :niYli . t'1. this resnect, stocl.;: price 
in:iices offer q f'3.irly gOO l proxy 0: t~e ~",ho13 ~1.r '(9tl s tr~ni to t~e 
exteni th'3.t they refL ect or serve 1.S '1ctu1.l b1.'!'oneters of the over'lll 
~'lrket. 10 wh1.t extent '3. st08
'
-( '1l1.r1.(et pri8e ini ~x '3.8tu'3.11v represents 
the llar~et is '3.n 1.spect th'3.t is vi t1.1 for 'lny n e 'lnin~ ""'.11 cOllp'lris ')ns to 
be :n'3.ie. 
5A.n '3.re'3. of stuJ.y:, ',v''1ich attr9.cts '3.cqie'nics luitp cOTlsiief'?blv, 
especially in t~3 U. J . '-'lith SOl1e stuiies b e ing lo!'l. e q1so 11'1 Brlt'll1., 
A.ustrqliq, Surope '3.nd elsew''1ere. 
r: 
°U'11ike on the SSS, see B-1SU (11977), 
iiss~rtations of l(oo (1 931 1 ) qni :{ T,fon~ (1 ')31 1) 
Do~1s ~1 g3~) a '1. 1.. t~o 
unier '1i supervision . 
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R~se (19711) provide1 some iiscussions on this issue of ,9.ccurg,cy, 
i.e. focusin~ on the question of usin~ ~eonetric or qrithmetic meg,ns, 
on the distribution of shg,re price ch~n~es, on using wei~hte1 or 
uGweighte1 iniices, ~nj on the coverage wi th respect to U. K. • s shg,re 
price indices. As 8. c~se in point, the Financial Times In1ustrial 
8rdinary index or F'r 30 inriex (u3in~ geometric meg,ns in the 
~ornput~tions) h~s been sho'Nn t~ un1er-estimate the market movements by 
as mu~h '-is 33't between 10 \nril 11962 to the end of 1970 (M''lrks 8.nd 
Stu8.rt 119711). R'lYcoc'<:s ,~ni P1J1len (1961) listed the underlying re~sons 
for the jeficiencies ~.,"1 i ch the FT 30 in1.ex inherently possess. Short 
ani Bru111flell (1 '976) ~ame '.lp 1..ri th the ~onstruction of the Financial 
Times-\ctu':lries injices, g, contribution from the '1ctu~ri'-il profession 
to portfolio investment . HeY'flood in his 11971" 8 presiienti"ll address to 
the Insti tute of Actu~ries stressei ~is strong a.'ivo~acy of replacin~ 
the FT 3J-shQres iniex with 7T-Actuaries indices . 
stock market injices of Sins'3.pore . Th3 1(L'3S used \vei~hted iniic-es by 
sectors, i.e. each ~ollp-Jnent sto~'<: is 1'iei~hte1 by the number of 
oriin9.ry shares outstandin~ using the L~3p'eyre' s iniex mathoi. Hence, 
the relative importance of e9.~h stock is taken ~are of. 7 Appeniix F ~in 
relation to C":l9.pter t ) presents the list of selectej shares usej in 
the conput'-ition of ~)S Plantations index. 
Apart from the 's'J.periority' of certain stoe '{ pri~e iniic '9s over 
')thers thera is the ot~eraspect concernin~ t~e composition ')f the 
stock or share price in1ices, i.e. by sectors or by iniiviiu'1l 
conpanies . TI-J.ese ll9.tters '3.re i rn p~ rtan t fo r 'naki ng 
jud~ement3 'flith respect to the move:nents of stOC'{ pric~ iniices am:::>ng 
7L"lrger comp'3.nies will have greater influence in the iniex - giving '-i 
true reflection of their bigger influen~e to the economy. 
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c 'Juntries. For · inst!3.nce, the 'co·nposition!3.1 m:l'ke-lJ.p ' of stOC'{ price 
indices would proviie !3. strong b!3.sis for m!3.king cOllp'3.rg,ble qng,lyses. 
For exallp1e, the F1'-~ 500 sh-9.res injex shJu1d be llore c!0'11pqr'3.b1e to 
both KLSE :in':i SE'3 Plant3.tions in1ices th!3.n S:iY the Dnl J::>nes 3'J Lndex 
or the FT 3') in:iex. The first three have SO'11e of the salle shar-9s 
included in their conput'3.tions, e . g . Sille D3.rby g,n1. 9 Dunt::>p. The 
Econonist in their ~~ekly issues beginning from 1'5-21 D'3Cellber t 931 
fe:ltured on the cO'Tlp::>si tion anj brief backgr::>unri of the lla .jor stoel.( 
price in::lices which cOllpris-91. their 'tleekly 'W::>r11 Bourses' p'9rfor'11ance 
sUll'll!3.ry. 
If s to c k 11 3. r '< e t s ' p-e r f 0 rna n c e s ri iff era 11 0 n 'S co Ut1. t r i e s ('3. tie !3. s t i !l 
sOl1e) then there is !3.venue for Sitli tching or tr'3.nsfering investllent 
p'Jrtfo1ios :icross !1:itionql bou'l':iaries, e . ~ . inflo \v or outflow of the 
11 d ' ho t ' so-ca e ~on3y i.e. :in i'11portant 3.spect pert:iinin~ to 
internation:il investllent porfo1ios. 
2.2 ~acroecono~ic Deteruing,nts of the Stoc~ ~arket level 
LL ter:lture on the ieteFninqtion of the overall m,'3.rl<:et level is 
sp!3.rsely joeullenteri :is couparej to other :ispects of stoc~ market 
econ::>uics :in::l its rel'3.tej fi!1:i'1.ci:il :lnrl investllent '3.n'.3.1yses. t\s such, 
stu::lies on t~e rel'.3.tionship between stock 'llarket beh!3.viour ani overall 
econonic ~ovellents have receivei less attention froll !3.caiellics an:i 
non-aca::lellics alike . This :ioes not illply th:it inquiries into th:it :ire!3. 
is unillport'3.nt, in f:ict it is of vit:il illportance to policy rn!3.\{ers, 
especially within governllent circles th:it qre closely linkei to the 
Treasury '3.nrl the Centr3.l B~nk . 
3 For SLlle furby, it is even listei on the HJng :(on'S market :lnr1 
incluieri in the Hqng Seng in:iex. 
2.2.1 Busines3 Cyc18, Scono~i~ Growth ani Stoc~ Prices 
1''le stock lnarket is nOlo[ ->'1iiely regarje'1 as 9. leaiing in:iicator of 
the economy, 9.n area of stuiy (or r9.ther 9. p9.rt of the business cycle 
an::.llysis) that has been the feature of the N3.tional 13'.lreQU of Econol1ic 
Rese9.rch (NBEIt) sin~e th3 119'20s , the U. S. D~part~ent of ~ol1l1erce since 
1951, the Conference B.)9.rd of the U. S., the Centre for Tnternationql 
Business Cycl~ Reseqr::!h 9.t Colu~bi'l University in Ne',o( Yor\{, -9.nd the 
Austr9.1ian of Co~m,=rce in association with '1:albourne 
University's Institute of ~ppliei Economic 9.ni Soci9.1 Researc~. In 
short, the function of the "le~liin~ in1ex" is to cons istently proviie 
adv9.nce 'tI::.lrning of ch-9.nges in economic 9.ctivity, of whi·::!h the stock 
~9.r~~t injex: (iniices) is clail1ei to be c>ne du~ to the fact th9.t the 
stock ll3.rket 9.ni the econollY 9.re inextricably linkei. 
J en k L n sin his 1:j S:) 9. I' tic 1 e , '\ Di s ~ u 3 S ion 0 f E::! 0 n 011 i C -9. n d S to c k 
Hqrket Trenis, 9.ni .'\'1 Approa::!h to Forec9.sting', provi iei a case for the 
U. K. shortly before the rise in B'1nk of S>1~l9.l1.i' s Pri~e leniin~ Rate 
in October 1957. Cl9.rke (1 '9'3')) foll()IITe-i '.'lith an investilS9.tion into this 
area qnd exp3.niej the ~!lalysis in 3.!l 3.ttellpt to suggest expla'lations 
for '~'1e broaj rise in e1ui tie9 since the 89.rly '1975 Ttlhi::!h has 19.stei 
twice3.s long 3.S the a '/er-9.ge cyclical incre9.ses of the 13.st 40 -.".83.rs. 
He also spe~ul3.tei UpO'1 the type of ,~ycle th9.t C9.n 'Je expecterl from 
thereon. 
~urst ~1 ' 97')) stressei the f9.ct that the s~9.1es of the plot bett..feen 
the D'] "3 ') in i ex 9. nit h ~ G :{ P 0 f t h ~ U. S . ~ at::! h '1 111 0 s t per f e c t 1 Y • Th ere 
is e~en 3.n iniic9.tion in the G~P of the ups ani iowns of t~e ~'2-month 
cycle! HO'..fever, the observe1 correl9.tion :ioes not necessarily i 'nply 9. 
cause an1 effect rel-9.tionship. In f9.ct, it l1ay well be sayLn~ th3.t both 
the DJ ~J ani the G~P simply re::.lct to the S3.11e causes , or the 
?7 
rel~tionship ~~y e~en be purely eoin8iient'll. 
?' . 2 . 2 ~or~~tive ~ni/or ?rgiietive ~~ero~ojels of Stoe~ ?rie8s 
tend to focus ~ore on the ~onet~ry "!1.ri~bles 'ln1. inter'3st r'ltes wL th 
·v::lri8.bles per se e f10 i e 1 s P18. t 
h'lve the G~P gle~ent in then 'lre r~ther r~rg, they ineluje stuiies li~e 
the ones belo'v . 
For eX9.~ple , 1'~i 8.nj Ip (1'97 3) ,ieve l opgj 8. nor'Tl8.tive 110'1el for tl-te 
SI = - 55 . 2) + ?7J(jD?) + '3 . c)?(IQ) - J.01 (C'P) + 6 . 2'3('1S) 
q 2 = .J. 9 1 , 3 SS = '56 . 1 2 , '! = '1 2 . 1 '3 
IV'!"} ere 31 = stoel( pri8e inie'{, 
r; D? = csros s ,io11es tic pro1uct, 
1q = interest r'3.te, 
"'J 
.) . = '::orpor'1t ,e profi t, 
8.ni '13 = ~oney supply . 
investor's invest'Tle'1t p)sition iU3 to the ,!"}i~h Y'lri'3.Ylce of t1.e ~nnu8.l 
stoc~ price inie'{ fron t~e oreiictioYl. 
Stuiies on t~e rel~tionsl-tip between sto~1( 'Tl'3.r~et be~8.Yi~ur ~ni t~e 
prices, f')llo',v::d by r;~p ~ro ',l{th r 'lte '1n:i 'l business 'v'lrnin:s iniic'1tor. 
'r~ese results reflects t'1.e f'let tl-t'3.t n')st list::d co~p8.nie'3 cO~prL3g 
injustries other th~n the .\ sector. 
prices precei3 busiYless 'lcti'liti e s by ong n~rioi . !\ft 3 r 
correctio:1s to ~ulticolling'3.rity proble11 8.n} pl'3.yLn~ :lrou'1i wLtl-t ~ f e '.v 
9qu3tion on stoc~ orices in Kor~3 , viz ; 
In ~? t=1 . '34~1- + J . ')1g11'1D'12~V t - J • 1 T)Jln'v::>I t (5 . T5) (~ . 1-7) ( - 1- . tt) 
- J . 11~411nRGqt+) · 9)~)lnS?t _ 1 +) . 1~g5~1 
~ - ?52) (119 . 11 1 ) ~?2C)) 
q 2 = ) . 9'21- , SSE = ) . 0)1 7 , D·v = - ) . 1 97 , 
w~er3 S? = ~~r~9t price of stoc~ ~~r 5')') ~o~ , 
~?~V = ~ver3.~e i:3.ily out8t3niin~ of totql ~o~ey (~?) 
DYJ: \V = 2
TPt = 
RG'3 = 
:lYl 1. D1 = 
F~nninc;s ( I' 971 ) 
iuring the l~qrter , 
'12'\ V t - '1 2 \. V ~ - 11 , 
wholesq13 price ini9x , 
yL91is on ~ov~~nnent :3.ni p~bli~ b~ ~is, 
iumrny on stoc,< sp-3cul3.tion in t~e 8econrl 1 113r~ '3r 
of 1 :;91 . 
h3S recently oro 00 S9 '1 
- . 
3. systen for 
1u3rterly b3Sis . 'V"\-}9 :echniqu2 ·,'{g.S ievelop3i by usi1'1~ four in:i.icqtors, 
three -3cono~ic qni one t9chnic31 , ~i~ ; 











qcc91~r~ti~n in t~9 ~on9V su~ply , 
c h :3. ~ <s 9 in t ~1 e s pre :3. i b 3 -: ",F! en 10 :l ~ - t ~ r-n 31'1 i 8 h 0 ~ t - t e r on 
inter~8t r~tes ~3S 3n ' infl~tion 3XP3ct3tions' iniicqto~), 
t~9 ~ei2rql bui~et ieficit positio~ , ~~i 
r3.tio of tr3i i n~ VOlU1l2 b~t~'lee~ t~e Tlre 1,! Y~rlc S:oc', S'(c~~n~e 
3.ni the Aneric:3.n Stoc~ ~xchqn~e . 
four 1U:3. rters , on 1 Y o;].e of 
~fter qj"justin~ for j u:n n y If :3. r i q b 1 3 S , 1- ' v rte Y' '''''·'' lllJ.. L" ""'.7 
- .... ..::l v J. J 
"113. 3 , 
~ '~ 
Y t = - :2 . 2~? + 7 .175'(2,~_1 + 1.~)5"<Lt 
\.ijustei q2= J . 2~~ 2rror = S2 . )) 
ot~er '3i X 'lI~re i ropp~i . ') C 3 r r i ,:d 0 u t Q n TJ . K. 1. q t ~ 
1jnenploynent , r3Jio 
confiienc~ , r:3.tio of 
r 3tio of spec13.1i t ' 
of output to ~:3.p qcity , ~on uner creiit, consuner 
oii - lot short sqles to totql short sqles , 3'1i 
s~ort s:3.1e3 to totql short 831e8 . 
? 
(-;r'lncser W)T3) . 
C011bLw3.tion of 
= -. 1SSJ4 + J . OJ)71V t + ) . ')))44~~+ J . ,))1212?~t 
: • f)) J 1 ) ( • 0 ')) 1 -+) v ~ . ro '] 1 ) 
? ~-=') . 57 * t-stqtistic = 12 . 6 ~ = 1 j . 376 
Y t + I = ne~t 110nt~ ' s c~qn~e in t~~ 1YSS iniex, 
V~ = iifference in nsiie - iownsi1e vo1une, 
U
V 
= chqn:ses in oriers fDr iur'3.ble .goDis iniustries , 
Fc{ t = 
t fr2e rese rves . 
'rhe 1l0je1 i s 1:3.r~e1 y bqSe1 on tl1e Ker'1.n ' s 1971 :no1e1 qn:! ~"1e "J'lsti fiei 
P · T' "C' L t- ~ rlC~ :leory D. '3.v'3.ne '1'11 'rutt1~ (1 (7)) 
- q t res pec t to 
t~e fu~ia~e'1tql iniic'3.tors . 
'r~e re1:3.tionship between ~oney supply qni stoc~ prices ~'3.S 
'3.ttr'3.ctei '1 cDnsiierqb1e '101ulle of reseqrc"1 , 9.11DnfS ',v1ich t~e not'3.b1e 
contributin'S 'tfDr<s to the 1iter3.ture inc1ule t'1e l(~rqn rnoiels ~I ' J71} , 
the H'3.rnbur:S9r- Koc~Ln ('t - '() 1101e1 (I I17?), t~e lfoll9.-,]9.ffee ("-i-J) 110ie1 
( IIJ71) '3.n1 the ':;oDper llD1e1 (1171) . 1,) ' 
2 . 2 . ~ Stock Prices '3.ni ~'3.CrOeCDnol1ic 1~~3 
th'3.t econonic 
stocl.( nrices . 
of eviience t'1ei r 
( 
,'lni 
1 j3 t ' s 
other tyP~S 
\To • 1 ? 1 ,S 
- , , 
entitle:i ' Stoc'e Prices 9.ni Sco'1o"'1i-:! 1~ ·,'ls'. ~1~ir 'lY11.1ysis 'O{'3.S on t"l~ 
u. s. sto k ·n'3.r!{~t, fron Septe11ber 197 :0 )ctobe!" 1 932, '..1S1nfS s llr '/ey 
i9.t'3. Dn ll'3.!"{et p '3.rticip'lnts' expect9.tio'1s of eco'1011ic 9.'1nOlnCell~nts to 
1 ')... ,., "" ( I I 1'")7::) ) f ~ t . 1 1 i' . t \,.. ) ~ e , .J 0 0 p~ r \ 7) 0 r '3. '-.1 e '1 1 e 1 s c 1 S S 1 0 non ' 1 e 
1101e1s . Pes'3. rdo (1974) h'3.S iisC1lssei t~9 ~q'1y lillit'ltions 
econo'netric 1101els of Ker'3.n , I-{-'{ '1ni H- J, '110'1-:> ''lLth 'rILs 
using both U. S . '1nj C'ln'1ii'3.n iat:3. . 
fi rst t'rtree 
of the U. S . 
1 . t- . ep lC'1 ... lons 
l1e1.SUr9 ch3.nges or . 1 1 s'lrprls~s . their conclusions 
incluie the followin~s :-
~ i) ~f 8 ~i i ~ f 0 Ml 1. t i 8 n t ~ 3. tis i i r ~ C t 1 y r e 1 q t e ito 11 0 net "l r y 
policy signific2ntly qffects sto~~ prices ~i . a . qCt9 '3.S qn 
' interest r'3.te expect3.tions iniic'3.tor) . o\nnJu:1.cei 
incre'3.ses in t"1e 110ney supply th'J.t qra surprisin~ly l'3.r~e 
have '3. s i CSni fi. cqn tl y neg '3. t i '.fa 9ff~c t on s toc l( pri ::!es • 
'ii) Lil1i.tei eviience W'3.S fou~i to support the vie~ t"1'J.t 
I su~prises in either infl'3.tion , 11e'3.surei by the ~Pl or t~a 
proju~er price iniex , P?I) or reql 8con811ic qctivity 
(l1eqsurei by t~e u~el1p18Y1lent rqte '3.ni iniustri3.l 
proiu~tion) '3.ffect stoc~ prices . 
(iii) Anticip3.tej cOllTIonents of eco:1.ol1ic qnnJuncel1ents io not 
signific3.ntly ~ffect dqily novel1e:1.ts in stoc~ prices . 
~iv) 30119 e7iie~ce 3ug~ests t~'3.t t~e respJnse of stoc~ prices 
to new infornatio:1. l13.Y pe~sist beyoni the qnnOU~cel1ent 13.Y. 
1 1 T.r • h' . t t· t 1.-. 1 t: 1 -l t 1 t: t-l ~ 1. C 1. 3 1 11 po r q n 9 1 n c e : l e 11 q r ~ ~ J S ··lJ U J. r e ~:L 0 n y J 0 " ~ e 
un '3. n tic i p'3. t e i c 1~ q n g e , ',0[ ~ i 1 s t t h '3. t po r t i J n 0 f q Yl q'1 Yl J U:1. C 911 ~ '1 t t h q t '.'13. S 
"-3.nti~ipqtei Sh8Uli hq'le 3.lreqiy b~en tq~~n into 1.ccou~t by the sto ~ 
11 '3. r k e t . l' h i 9 r,d 1 1 ~ 0 1 i i " t h ~ S"1 tt h 0 1 i ~ :; r 11 e • 
")1 
CHI\.PTER '3 
OBJECTIVE O~ THE STUDY, ~ETHODOLOGIES AND H~THESES 
3.1 The Need for this Study 
Even 9.fter two :iec!3.iea of in:iep'3ndence the presence of the ol:i 
c~~panies with their trqiing h~uses !3.nd V9.st estates thr~ughout 
Peni!lsul!3.r ~1.l!3.ysi9. renai!l as bogies wi th their continU31. r1ollin9.nce 
o v e r the e con O"TI y. 1 Colo!l i '3. 1 i s 'n h 9. S ~ '3. 'i t 9. ken up '3. n e Ttl f 0 r1l , i. e. t!l!3. t 
of "neocolonialis~", '1S the fOr1ler Finan~e l\1"inister, Tencsku R'3.zaleicsh 
H'3."TIz1.h , once !3.sserte1; 
"Foreign COll p'3.n ies 9.re still bocsies. They h!3.ve !lot 
transferred their te~hnology t~ ~ur people, thay have not 
brought in c'3.pit'3.l, they '1re relying on dOllestic funds '3.nd 
bo rr.) THing fr~ll b!3.n'<s here, !3.nd. they have n~t traine1. ~ur 
p30ple. They are stiLL the S9."TIe. II 
It 10['3.S only re~ently th'3.t Ma l"1ysi'3. were !3.ble to \irest ~ontrol o'/e r 
these plant'3.tion gi'3.!1ts,2 her.)Ttffi resour-ce-b3.sei in1u'3tries, vi'3. the 
~arket rout3. These tr!3.ns!3.ction coups were ~!3.ssive ani expqnsive 
undert!3.~incss, the i~p'3.ct of w~ich is yet to be re9.lisei in '3. benefici!3.l 
senae especially to the overall econony !3.ni i!l p!3.rticul'3.r to the KLSE. 
1Un:ioubteily th~ugh there is "TIore rubber !3.nd oil p'3.l~ !3.cre!3.cses run by 
S1lallholders qn'i federal ani st!3.te a~encies than il1!3.ll the est'3.tes of 
the big private co~p"1nies put together. 
2It began with Si~e Ihrby in 1976, folloT ..... ei by G'.lthrie Corp, B'1rlow 
Est!3.tes ani Dunlop EstateS in 1 gS1 , ani H'1E an'i ~P irt 11992. Ap'3.rt from 
these stocks in the other sectors, wnion Tin !3.nd Inch(!ape ~O(9re 
successfully br~ught bsck hO'Tle in the e!3.rly 11970s and Il g'35 
respectively. 
tr'3.n3for1l'3.tio1. , t1e still 
so i n f u t u r 3 , !} 1 b ~ its 1 i 'S "1 t s 1 '3. n:s e s i 1. P rio r i tie '3 . Do est 1 ~ t:... .:> e c tor' s 
p8rf::n"nanC8 h'3.lfe 'lny signifi~'3.nt il1P'3.Ct on the KL,:)S ? lr is ~jV'ls) it 
vise vers'3. ? 1:"9se '3.r '3 th~ l(inl 0f 1uestions ~.,hich this stuiy '3.i-ns to 
'3.nsw~r , esp8ci3.11y ' .. Lth r~g'3.ris to th9 seconi p'3.rt of this thesis . 
'3.cs ric ultu:"9 p')ssib1y '3. 1'3. est'3.te -type op:?r'3.tion, this stuiy is t'1.9'1. 
thought to b8 of vit3.1 i-nport'3.nC9 tO I,{'3.r.is r~'3.1ising this ob.jecti'.[e of 
3.2 The Objective of the Stuiy 
-r'1.e ,obje~ti 're of t1.is SL11Y lS t';ten to '1n'llys2 so-ne ieter'nin'3.nts 
s1.'3.re ~.,i t h e np1'lsis US9 of 
rn.'3.Cr08COno11ic inii8'3.tors ~'1.'lt 'lr~ C10391y rel'3.t ei to the '3.~ri~ult lJ.r'3.1 
t IVO - fo 1 i ") , v L 3 ; 
~ I' ) T '1 t e r - re 13. <:; e i :1 e q s I) f K S '):;; D 1 '3. n t 'l t ion s to C ~ P r i 8 ~ S ' '; L t 1 
selectel ~orli bJurses, 'lTli 
') , 1'\ ~ 0 r i e yo 0 f t \., ~ 'l n 'll y"l. e '3 . b 0 ion t \... :::> +- t' + \., '1'" 1 Y . ~,,- - ' 1 _ .. ~_ LS '3.S~ . 1 ' I J 'le v 1.'3. ... J ' le ' -.. 'l Sl'ln 
980:1011Y bein~ l'3.r'S~ly r'3.19 i8uenient ~.,i 11 t.o;ni to lOOi{ fort'1 to t'1e 
i n ius t r i '3. 1 i e i e co Tl 0 11 i e S '3. S the p'3. c 8 - set t e r f') r 1. ire C t ion - f 0 110 ',v L n ~ 
the ' export pessil1ism' lin9 0f1.r:>1l11ent of Pr:?bis~'1, '1yri'l1 , 'ln1. 0 '1.~rs 
(QJYflo11.s 1c)77) b~for3 t1.'dng '1 closer loo~ '3.t the i011estic Qn1. 
region'3.1 eco:1011ies (i . e . th'3.t 0_ ~~SA~) . 
the over~ll Mllaysian econo~y. 
Fir s t 1 y t h 9 f 0 c us i s J n t he so - c all e d "f 0 110 ".'1- the - 198. d e r" bel i e f , 
i.e. in exa~ining the valiiity in the general belief th~t the 
rnove~ents of KLSE follo~."s closely ~."ith th!3.t of other lea1ing ,vorli 
stock 'n8.rk9ts. 4 Froll here, closer exa'nination is rna1e #'ith regg,rds to 
whether or nJt ~ 
-~~-----
( . ) 
,l the prices of co-liste1 stocks on 'nore than one exchange 
jiffer, and 
the overall "foll01,aT-the-19g,1er" b '~lief l1anifests itself 
too wh~n viewed corporatewise, i.e. between the pric~s of 
major rubber stocks (liste1 on KLSE) and the overall KLS~ 
Plantg,tions index with that of th~ world's lar~est rubber 
go J 1 s ~!3. n u f g, c t u r e r s ~ q U J t 91 inN e TN' Yo r k ,Lon ion, pOl r is, 
Milan, Tokyo, Frg,nkfurt ani Zurich). 
Secon1ly this stu1y is inten1e1 to explore the relationship 
between KLS3 5 Rubber index5 with G~P ani relate1 l1acroeconornic 
indic~tors, i.~. attellpting tJ fini out the applicability of the 
I' 
"leaiing iniicator" hypothesis J to the ~1alaysian caS9. If th9 ~fficient 
~arkets Hvpoth~sis7 holis tru3 then the stock mar~et tenis to 
'forecast' t~e state of the econo'nY in the short or lon~ run by valuin~ 
the shares in terllS of t~~ir growth potentiaL, eXpt3cte1 profitability, 
etc. in g, future setting or ec:)nol1i::: environ~ent. In this respect the 
KLSE Plantations index is treatei as an 'expect~tions index' on the 
qS3u'nption thqt privg,te expectations qre realisei . In so ioing t~e 
4partly this belief ca'1 be vie,v31. 3.S sY'1onY11ous to the so - c!3.11ed 
"Greater Fool Theory" i.e. popular iuring th~ South 89 '1 Bubble era 8.n1. 
the U.S. prior to the:::lassic 1 9~9 cr!3.sh to the extent if the 
'following' is 10ne in1iscrillinately or blindly. 
5Inclusive of bJth ringgit rubber and oil P'lll1 co~panies . A.s such, 
it is qctually g, "Plantations iniex". Thus the "l(L~S S Rubber iniex" 
qnd the "~LS E Plantations iniex" is usei interchange!3.bly in this 
th~sis. 
6 A 1 0 n g the 1 in e sst u i i e i by the N'1 t ion alB 1 rea u oJ f Ec 0 n 0 11 i c R 3 S e !3. rc h 
(NBS':t) in th9 U.S. ani the National Institute of Appliei Econo~ics ani 
S:)ci~l Research ~~IESR). in this stulY the focus is on only one leaiing 
iniic!3.tor, i.e. the l(LSE Ringgit Rubbers injex. 
7 '1''1e 1Ni1ely 'qcceptej' hypothesis on stock price 
abbrevig,te1 ~1H. S3e, Firth (1977). 
beh!3.viour, 
stoc'.( prices teni to fo rete 11 the econOll ic 't t' 8 Sl Uq lon , i . 9. the stock 
prices ten1 to le9.1 the G"lP by 'i cert'3.in perioi of ti.lle. 9 Tt is this 
' lead tille ' th-'3.t is of vi tal illport9.nce for policy fornul-'3.tions 9.nd / or 
prescriptions - '3.nd thus fOr1ls the focus of this stuiy into this '3.re9.. 
3. 3 ~ethod olog ies 9.n d Hypo theses 
3. 3. 1 Inter-~el'3.tedne3s of KL38 Pl9.nt9.tion Stoc~ Prices wit~ Selectei 
T,V 0 r 1 d Eo u r s e s 
3. 3. 1 .1 ' "?ollo ·f - t~e-Le-'3.jer" belief 
Puru~se : To stuiy the co-move~ent of KLSS ~ ~ubber iniex with the 
le'3.1 in'S o'/erse'3.S 1l'3.rkets ~n1 TNi th steel.( exch9.nges of cou:1tries ".,hich 
:'l'3.ve tr ::de rel'3.tions ~{it l:l ~alqysi1. . 11) This study '3.i'11s to test the 
V-'3.1i1ity of the "follo TN'-the-le9.1er" belief 9.'1lon:s investors, corpor9.te 
-'3.ni ~overnllent circles . 
T~a stoc~ ll9.r~et indices of the i.~dustri1.1ise1 
econo-ni-es 3.re vie TNe1 '3.S reflectincs or follo',-1ing th2 U9.ce for busine.3s 
and econoTIic growth in those eeenollies . ~~e Ibw JJnes Iniustri'3.1 
Aver'3.ge 'OI' 1):) ',-1 Jones )) index, 1.bbrevi'3.te1 9.3 DJTA or DJ ))) for 
inst3.nce is often '/ie ,{ei 'IS t'1e U'3.cesetter for 1. S.' s business cY8le, 
TN'hich 9.1so sets U'3.ce for glob9.1 econollic gr-:nTt"l. Tn si'nplifie1 teMl9, 
incre-'3.se1 in1ustri1.1 pro1uction lle9.ns inCra9.Se1 for 
'33 ,{ eX3.lli!1iT1~ w1.ich C'3.lle first b9t'N~e!1 t'19 KL3S "ehi8~9n" or th9 G'IP 
"egg" . See, Hurst (lg7)) for q si11i.l'3.r '3.r~ullet1t 0:1 th9 fuTN "chi c\c~n " 'IS 
G'TP " " , 1 eCSg . 
9It is 3.1so uossible th'3.t the stoc~ 1l'3.r ''(9t "follo IN3" the G'lP (?) . 
10 \tte-npts '13.ve been 11'3.1e to incluie '3.S ll9.ny r9present9.tive cou~tries 
3.3 P()33ible (csiven the ti11e con3tr3.int '3.!11 113.3'3i'/e i9.t'3. collection 
involved !) to give the cOllp'3.rison 9. glob9.1 picture . 
benefi t - in whi ,~h C'1se the t(LT~ '1) Rubber iniex sh')ulj r~snoni. Ani on 
the other siie of the ~oin ',,;1.en 1/13.11 Street 's!l eez~s ' the worli ,'lOulri 
be do·~ with 'flu' !11 H~nceforth, the "follo~v-the-le3ier" belief should 
hold true if, 3ni only if, stock 11arkets 110ve in concert ,vi th e3ch 
other. 
M~th)iology By rU"'lni~~ si11ple ,~orrel'1tion tests (~nti 
observ'1tio~s) usinES ti11e seri~s :3.at3 of stoc:<: nrice in:3.ices for the 
various 'Tl3r~3ts ~ listei in A?p ·~nd ix C). GL ve~ tiolO series of i '1t'1, X '1nd 
Y, the corre13tion coefficient (r)12 is conputei 3S follows: 
!l 
'1LX Y 
i= 1 i i 
r = ------------------------------------- ___ _ 
1------------------------------------
/ ~ ? n 2 n ? n 2 
I 1- nLX - (LX) J[nLY -(LY ) ] 





T~e nonthly closing ~LSE ~ qubber in:3.ices '1nd selectei 
overse3S stock 3xchan~e iniices '1re u~relatei anti 
ini~penie~t of e'1ch other. 
T1.9 re?erse is tru~. 
D'lt3 '10nthly stocl< 113r'<:et indices ~aver3:ses or end of month 
closing quot3tio[ls) for t(L3~ S Rubber in:3.ex ani selected leaiing ani 
"mini" w::>rli bourses' i~iiC!es ' '1r~ usei, coverin~ 3 p3riod fron J'cl'1.e 
th h t roo t b 1 '"'l3"Z 1 ') I. " . ro u g . 0 .'.) ~ P ell e r '7 ) , L • ~ . g l 'll nES rl s e to 3S tille series 
observ3tions per iniex). ~e s)urces of 1.3t'1 r ::mges fro1l d3ily 
110\s the 1929 "Bl'1c'{: Tl..lesJ,ay" 3n:3. t~e recent ~10b31 recession h'1ve 
provei (?). 
121'his is the P~3rs0n proJ.uct-mollent coeffici~nt betw~en X qni Y, 
which is 3ctually 3. lle3SUre of linear correlation. ~or further ietqils 
see, M3ndenh3l1 '1nd Reinlluth (1 1973, pp.)3S-')91). 
1 ) (H'i thin a p3rioi T,.;~en c011p3r3ble i,qt3 for the v3rious bourses 3re 
ava i 1 able in the C3nberra 1 i br3ry sys twn. An 3 t tel1 pt h3S been made to 
exp3.ni the cover3~e 3S wiie as possible with resp~ct to country s31lple 
ani tille span of the analysis - wherever practical. 
")5 
r neW3p3.perS "e . ,g . The Fin!3.nci,ql Ti-n~s, LJn1.an), l..veekly l1:l~1.zines (e . g 
S3.stern ~~anJl1ic stqtistiC3.l 
public~tians/reparts (e . g . 
3.ctu3.1 affici3.1 j~ily injices of the stack llarket 
Closing Indices, 11972 -11931) . Appendix: E gives the '3 uml1!3.ry of the 
r e levant sources to e:lch ind ex . 
3.3.1.2 The P!1eno-nenon af " Twin !l3.r1{8t" ar "Duallv Tr:ljed" Securities 
Purpose : To test \'1hether there 1.re 1.ny significant 1ifferences in 
the prices of stoc~s th3.t 3.re tr:liei on -nore than one exch3.nge . 
Rqtionqle : Stocks of the S3.11e co-np1.ny should not :iiffer in price 
wherever th3y are listei for 3.S long 3.S the stock ~arkets ,qre efficient 
or close to being efficient . T1.is ~oulri offer 3. re:lson 3.S to 'l'lY the 
"follo-'1-t1. e-l e,qier" belief holis true between stOC ~{ price iniices whi~h 
h 3.i s i 11 i 1 a I' :3 to c l,(s in the irs t 0 c l.c S 1.11 pie coOn pD sit ion . 
~etho::lolo~y \ve~1{ly prices of '3. p3.rti~ular stoc~ i.e listei 0'1 
more th3.n one exch3.nge W3re testei for qrbit~3.ge . ~ll nrices were 




'f1.e ~v3el.cly closing quot'1tions of stocks tr:liei on 
~ore th'1n one ex:ch3.n~e iiffer in n~ices. 
T1.e rev erse is true . 
-,veekly ,~ Friiays or eni of \'1~e k ~ closing =luJtqtions of 
pl3.nt3.tion stoc'<s '1ni iniustri,ql sto':!i{s ',t/i t'1 '/qS t plqntqtion 
. t t 14 far the 19'31' 5 'vere ~ollectei fro'll i'lilV ne ~vs n3. ner s In eres s year -c • 
14For exql1ple , Sil1e Thirby 3.ni Genting HL~hlan::ls . 
15T1.e ya3.r 119311 -"1'1S chosen for it '/lqS the Y83.r -..v'lich s3.w'h.l:lysi3.n 
t'lkeovers of three British pl3.nt'ltion gi3.nts , tr3.nsactions whi~h c!3.usei 
excitel1ent to the London Stack Exch1.nge . 
The FinanciCll Tirngs (London) an'l T~e Str'li ts Tillgs (Sin'S~pore). The 
corresponding foreign exch'lnge r'ltes qre obt:l.1.ne1 froll H)ng T{ong's 
weekly editions of ~si'lw~ek. 
3.3.1.3 "Pr01ucer-Consu:ner" RelCltionship of "1ajor Rubber- Pro'iucin~ 
COllp'lnies with the World's L'lrgest R~bber Goods ~'lnuf'lcturers 
Purpose To further test the "follo :.of-the-leader" belief - this 
ti'Tle the S~0p-9 is n9.rrow'3d down on to indiviiuql corp:)rate p~rfor'nances 
'lS being reflectei in the markets. 
R9.tionale Strong export earnings of rubber THill have '3. iirect 
illp'3.ct on the profitqbility of exp')rti!lg cO'1lp'lnies. ~~ up3ur~e in 
de:nand for rubber will have galvanising effects on rubber price trenis. 
In this stulY, the rubber 8xporting cO'Tlp'lnies Clre rep~esentei by the 
llajor rubber-prolucing conpqnies (Dunlop Estates. Guthrie Ropel, H ~ C, 
High ~ Low, KLK, etc .) 'H''1 i 1 e the Ttl 0 r 1 i 's 1 a r g est rub b ~ r ~ 001. s 
ffi'l:1ufqcturers (a gool proxy would b '9 the 11 tyre-'Tl9.'luf:l.cturin.g 'Siqnts , 
e.g. Firestone, D..lnlop , Pirelli, ~'1 Lchelin, Brii~estone qn1. Continent'll 
1 S 
represent the dell:l.n1.ers Qr conSUllers 0f rubber. LL~'3 the 
"follo'H-the-lea1er" belief, it 'tl')uld be logic:l.l for the rubber-
producing cOllp:l.nies tQ p-srfor1l i!l line in response to trl'lt of l'lr~e 
rubber goo':is '1lanuf'lcturers, giveTl t~'lt in':ii'liiual corpor'lte l e ·velop-
ments ':ii':i iistort the llQr'-<:'3 t tr9.lers' e'l'llu:ltion of t~~ 
situation. 17 
1 61 h e fa c t t h:l. t t he sec 0 rpo r'3. t ion s :l r e U'3 i n ~ '3. S i Z 9 Q b 1 e pro p0 r t ion 0 f 
synthetic rubber in their operqtion3 is ,,,ell notel, '3.3 reflecten from 
the resp'sctive n'3.tion' 3 tot'3.l consullption figures for both n'ltural and 
synthetic rubber. 
17T~is situ:ltion 11ay be jifficul t to 
3pe~ul'3.tive rUllours :l.bout t:l.keovar biis, 
run loose in the m'lrket. 









T'le ,'l3ekly closing pri8es 'Jf iniivi'iu'3.l 'Tlajor rubber-
proju8in~ co~p~nies ~listei on th9 KLSE) and the worli's 
largest rubber g~ois ~anufacturers (quotei on t~e ~aior 
w~rld bours9s) are u~rel~te'i ani a~i iniep3nient of ~'3.ch 
other . 
The reverse is true . 
)3 
Weekl y (Fri'iays) data w~re collectei fro~ ~LqS ~~ily 
Closin~ Price Iniices l ·gS1 and iaily n~W3p3.perS, ~a~elv th3.t ')f The 
usei wer e as 1uoted in the respecti'/e c'Jun tries ' ~urrenci99, i . e. in 
M$ , S$ , HK$ , UK o:>uni sterlin'S , US') , :)~utche ~ .'3.r'<s, Fr~nch fr'lncs, 
Italian lire , ani S~iss francs. 
) . ) . 2 Inter- Relatedness of KL38 Plantation St~~~ Pri88s with th~ 
8v era 11 ·b. lays i an Ec on::>llY 
3. 3. 2. 1 Relationship between PlantatioTl Sto~~ Prices ani ~ros3 ~ational 
Proiu~t and its R91atei Indicat::>rs 
Pu:-pose T'J stu.ly t"he ex:te~t of corr9l'ltioTls b9t l-'lee ~ l(L3'ij 1) 
Rubber index ~nd the overall M'llaysian econ:>llY, i . 3. 'lS n~3.sur ei by the 
G~P and its relatei iniicato~s incluiin~ finan~ial 'lni ~onetqry 
aggre~ates 3.ni k9Y '3.gricultural con~odity prices . ~ls:> i'1~luiei in t'1e 
analysis are the traiing turnovers of pl~~tqti::>~ s'1ares 3.S ~onparei t~ 
the perfornances 'Jf t'1e plantation s'1are prices. 
Since the econOllY ani the sto~'< ~arket qr~ i~tricately 
relatei , then the co~ponents of G'lP ani the u~i~rlyLn~ 'J rc~s th'3. t 
stren~hten t"he ex: po rts se~tor rubber ~ni pal~ oil priC~3 , 
11ence exports) sh'Juli be highly correlatei i.e . to the ex:t9nt 
econo~ic rationality stanis . P'Jsitiv9 results th3.t e~erge out of this 
analysis wi 11 forn the basis for the testing of the 'leai in'S iniicator' 
hypothesis . 
Methoiology : Si~ple correl~tion runs are perfornej between ~LSS t 
Ru bber ind ex: and G~P ~n:i its re la tei inrj ica to rs, KL3 E ' s plan tq t ions 
sector traiing turnovers, -noneta-ry ani financial variables, anj \vorli 
p-rices for rubber ~n:i p~lm oil. 
Hypothesis This is si-nilg,rly set out along the sa-ne argullent as 
in the "Follow-the - L~a1er " H-,pothesis , i.e. the null hypotheses being 
set to prove that the T(V3S $ Rubber index is unrelatei and ind ,ependent 
to each of the nacroecononic variables concernei. 
Data: All iqta are obtqinei fron Ban'{ Negg,ra Malqysia's Quarterly 
Econonic Bulletin (various issues). 
3.3.2.2 The ~L'3S Plqnt'ltions Index as q "Leaiing Iniicator" of th~ 
Over~ll ~~lay3i~n Econony 
PurJX)3e : To e« plore the "chi8ken-and-egg" p'1enonenon by finiing 
the'le:1i ti'lle' ',.,rL th respect to the foretellin~ (by the KLSE :l) t 'lbber 
index) of the upturn or the 1Q ',fnturn i!l t'1e econo~y. In ~ 'tlqy to 
incluie in p:1rt t,,.,r,) lines of att~cl( ~v1.ich ~'hnsen ~l 951) iie~tLfiei in 
busine3s . forec~sting, vLz . ~ q) '..rorl( on '~nticip~tors' - the oli leai 
and lag method, ani 'b) the G1P 'p~ttern of -ralatLonship' methoi. 
Rqtionale Knowing roughly when the 'J.pturn or j,) ~.fnturn of the 
business cycle is about to appear in Sqy 1-~ 1uqrters earlier wouli be 
:1 ',farning sign~l for co-rrective or interventionist neqsures to be 
undert~ken by Govern1lent :1uthorities 'the Central SInk ~nj the FLnance 
Ministry in particul~r) with respect to 1l0net~-ry and/or fisc:11 policies 
in qn effort to re~e1Y ~ny iisloc:1tions or ~istortions th~t ~i~ht occu-r 
in the econo'1ly . :1aint'linin.cs or i'1lproving the business ani econo-nic 
climate is Qf vi t'll irnport~nce to ensure a ste'liy Lnflow of capi tal 
through foreign invest~ents - preferg,bly in joint ventures with the big 
multin:1tional corporations. 
4-0 
Methodology By running correlation runs ( and lagging 
observations both ways) between KLSE $ Rubber index wIth that of 
nominal GNP, rubber and palm oil prices, using yearly, quarterly and 
monthly figures, wherever data permit. The KLSE $ ~ubber index is used 
as an 'expectations index' wi th regards to the expected state of the 
domestic economy and that of rubber and palm oi 1 prices on the world 
market. Partial indices are used in this analysis, i. e . with the 
assumption that, 
KLSE $ Rubber index = f E (ExpOrts) 1 
Gross National Product = f ( Exports ) 
where 
Exports = f (RSS1, CPO), 
and "S (Exports) = (Exports) 
E = ex pe c tat ion, 
RSS1, CP'J = Average Prices of Rubber (RSS1 fob K. L. ) ani 
Crude Palm Oi 1 (ci f London/~,tl Europe). 
The difficul ty here lies wi th the G~P quarterly estillates which 
are unavailable. Quarterly estimates are generated using a G1P proxy 
involving scaled product of export value units and conSUller price 
indices that are available quarterly . 18 Quarterly G~P estillates are 
calculated in the following manner, viz; 
Step 1: By calculating "initial" estimates for annual G'1l? 
------ using the scaled product ratio of EUV and CPI for 
each quarter, i.e. like estimating the GNP figure 
based on each quarter ' s expOrts performance and 




where Y = "initial" estimate of nomin8.1 G~P, 
EUV = export uni t value (l I9S,)=1 00), 
118Similar to the estimation technique used by Keran (119711) . 
CPT = consumer price index ( 11 930 = 1100) , 
t = time trend (qu.!3.rterly, i.e. i , ii, 
iii and iv th quarters), 
and GNP , = nomin.!3.l GNP fn base year of the 0 
value indices (EUV and CPT) . 
Step 2: The qU.!3.rterly GNP IS then estimated by allocating 
------ ratios of each Y values to the sum of Y v.!3.lues 
calculated in the four quarters of each current year, 
and the resulting ratio is multiplied with the actual 






(Y . +1 .. +Y ... +Y. ) 
1 11 111 1V 
Yt = quarterly estimate of 
current year GNP, 
Y. = "initial" estimates of nominal lV derived from the scaled prod uct 
EUV and CPI ~n each qU.!3.rter of 
current year, 
GNP1 = actual current Y9ar GNP. 




stocks and the nominal GNP , rubber and palm oil prices 
are unrelated and independent of each other. 
Ha The reverse is true. 
4-1 
Data : Yearly, end of quarter and monthly KLSE $ Rubber indices 
are obt.!3.i ned from KLSS Daily ,Closing Indices 11972-119,'34- ani Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin Peninsular Malaysia (various issu9s), while 
nominal GNP estimates are gener.!3.ted as been explained in the 
methodology above. Data for the indices and annu.!3.l GNP .!3.re drawn from 
the following publications (various issues) : 
(i) Quarterly Economic Bulletin (BNM) - for GNP and rel.!3.ted 
indicators, rubber 
and palm oil prices . 
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(ii) International Financial Statistics 
-
(IMF) ) for export 
) unit val ues 
(iii) International Fin8.ncial Statistics ) and CPI 
Supplement on Price Statistics (I~F) ) ( qU9.rterly) 
3. 3 . 2. 3 The KLSE Plantations index as a " Leading Indicator" and its 
Relationship wrth the M9.laysian Stock M8.rket Crashes of 1973 
and 119811 
This subsubsection is an expansion from the "le8.ding indicator" 
hypothesis test in preced. ing subsubsection - in an effort to explain 
partly the macroeconomic basis for the stock market crashes of 1973 9.nd 
11981 . The data base are the same as in the preceding subsubsection . 
43 
CHAPTER 4 
INTER-RELATEDNESS OF PLANTATION STOCK PRICES 
WITH SELECTED WORLD BOURSES 
4.1 The Choice and CompOsition of Stock Market Indices: The Relevance 
and Rationale 
The stock pri ce indices selec ted fo r this in ter- re la tedness study 
represent a wor11wide action on the world ' s leading bourses and a host 
of the so-called 'mini bourses' or ,. ,11 ml.nnows , as listed in Appenriix 
C. E9.ch of the seven industrialised countries boasts more than one 
stock market index that are being constantly referred to by the 
investing co~munity . :1owever , for the purpOse of this sturiy only the 
world's three largest exchanges 2 are represented by more than one index 
i . e . the New York Stock Exch9.nge ( T,.;i th the Dol" Jones Industrial 
Average , Stand 9.rd and Foo r' s 500 Co~ pO site, 9.nd :;rYSE Corn po sit e 
indices) , Tokyo Stock Exch9.nge (boasts two share price indices, namely 
the Nikkei - I))',.; Jones 225 Average and To1<yo Stock Exchange New index) 
and London Stock Exchan.ae ~ (wtdely quoted by the F~nancial Times 
Industrial Or1 inary and the Financial Ti~es - Actuaries 50 0 - share 
liThe categorisation between the ' leading ' and mini ' bourses W9.S 
based on market capitalisation of the exchanges . The list published by 
B9.rron~ or The Economist is one example of the ma.ior stock exchanges 
oft he wo rId. 
2As from hereon 'exchanges' 
markets' or 'bourses'. 
refer to , stock exchanges ' , , stock 
44 
. d' ) 3 In Ices . 
Almost all stockbrok~ng firms in M9.laysia display the overnight 
closing market indices of New York, London, Hong Kong, Singapore and of 
course Kuala Lumpur4 as a 'guide' to their clients. Also, noon closing 
index for Hang Seng is no mally made avai lable by 1'1 a. m. on e9.ch 
trading day. The performances of the leading overseas bourses are thus 
keenly watched by most market dabblers and appear to 9.ffect their 
sentiments and hence the behaviour or performance of the local market. 
As a case in point, the bullishness or bearishness on say Wall Street 
were in most instances being interpreted by market participants as the 
'lead ' for KLSE's buoyant performance. This will of course be realised 
if, and only if, the overall market reacts in concert wrth the 'lead' 
from overseas. In fact, this scenario seems to be the case wi th KLSE ' s 
behaviour most of the time. Now, whether this 'follow- the-leaier' 
behaviour is totally (or partially) pursued blindly or otherwise will 
be answered in subsection 4.2.1. 
Apart from the daily edi torials5 this 'follo 1,v-the-leaier' wLsdorn 
seems to reach even the highest level of officialdom wi th respect to 
the Malaysian economy, i.e. wLth the Cent ral B'3.nk and the Tre9.sury . 
r 
The constant reference made by the KLSS's own official bulletinQ and 
various other popular economic/business public9.tions , 1alaysian 
3The exchanges are abbreviated by NYSE , 
while their share price indices are denoted 
NYSE Composite, N-DJ 225, TSE New, FT 30 and 
4The indices referred to were the DJl~, 
Times Industrial Ord inary, and Ne w Stra i ts 
respectively. 
TSE 9.nd LSS respectively ; 
by DJIA or DJ 30 , S&P 500 , 
F1A 500 , respectively . 
FT 30 , Hang Seng , Straits 
Times Industrial Oriin'3.ry 
5Which are not surprlsIng since such news or rather opinions 
catching ' and arouse keen interest by the investing public . 
are eye 
6The monthly publication of The ~LSE Gazette even allocate 
to an overseas round-up featuring daily closing indices of 
Austr9.lian All Ordinaries , DJIA , FT 30 and Nikkei-Dow 
Average. 
a fullpage 
Hang Seng , 
Jones 225 
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Business, Asian Finance, Far E9.stern Economic Revie'!, 9.nd even The 
Economist, lend further support to this belief. 
There is considerable testimony from various sources to suggest 
that this conventional wIsdom is no laughing matter and is in fact more 
than skin deep, as for example these quotations and/or statements imply 
1975 : "Followi!ng develop'Jlents in the major world stock markets, 
the Mal9.ysian stock market showed some recovery in the first 
quarter of 1975 after a generally bearish mood in 1974." 
(Economic Report 11975/76 , p.72) 
11976: "The KLSE had a bright start this year. The rally which 
began in mid-December 11975 continued well into January and 
early February, wLth market sentiments and activities buoyed 
by record buying sprees in New York, London and Hong Kong." 
"On the international front, the NYSE after opening 
briskly early in 1\976, began to sag during the second quarter. 
In late February, the New York DJl~ uncreased markedly by 
nearly 117ct over last year's clo se - to challenge the 1,000 
level on several occasions. Its peak was reached on 21st 
April, when the DJIA topped 1,01'1.02 (the highest level in 39 
months} ." (Eco!!.omic RepOrt 11976/71, pp.811- 32) 
11981 "Buoyant cond.i tions prevai led in the KU9.19. Lumpur stock 
market during the first half of 19811 . 
...... Bullish activity in the stock markets of Hong Kong and. 
New York also aided sentiment." 
" M9.rket sentiment turned be9.rish in the third quarter . 
..... 9.nd major downturns in overseas markets, share prices 
fell sharply across the b09.r:i in July ." 
"Buy~ng interest revived. in November ..... 
The rally in overseas markets was also a contributory factor ." 
(B9.nk Negara M9.lay'~~~ I\nnual Report 119811, p. 85) 
29 January 11983: "The abi li ty of the local stock market to 
advance despite the string of discouraging economic news 9.nd 
poor performance of the plantation sector h9.s prompted one 
brok~ng fim to say 'it is either looking f9.r ahead to the 
next recovery or is being 'Jlesmerised by the spectacul9.r 
performance of W3.11 Street since the mid.dle of August .'" 
(Ne~ Straits Times, p . 23) 
Febru3.ry 1983: "The market continued to take its cue froll 
Wall Street but there were a number of d9.ys when sentiment was 
firm that easier performances on W9.11 Street were ignored.." 
(The KLSE Gazett~, p . 13) 
June 1983: "Throughout the month the performance of the market 
could also have been affected by haphaz9.rd Wall Street ." 
(The KLSE Gazette, p.g) 
In retrospect, the practices of the stockbroking firms, daily 
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newspapers, business ma~azines, the KLSE official Gazette and the 
government themselves propagate this conventional w~sdom of 'follow-
the-leader' even deeper. 
What then is the rationale behind these 'followrng' business? 
Before attempting to provide the answers to these somewhat baffl ing 
questions it is proper to set the stage right first, i.e. by tak~ng a 
closer look at the compOsitional make-up of the stock market indices in 
question. The compo si tion by companies' mai n acti vi ty di ffer qui te 
considerably among the stock market indices, as Appen:iix D indicates 
(as at end-December 11983) . 
The KLSE Plantations index on the other hand is comprised of 
shares of estate companies that are principally involved in the 
manage~ent, cultivation, processing and marketing of rubber and/or oil 
palm, or plantations with diversified investments in mixed cropping of 
perennials (rubber, oil palm, cocoa and/or coconut) . 1 Appendix F 
presents the summarised details of the composition of the KLSE 
Plantations index. 
4.2 The "Follow-the-leader" belief 
4.2.1 A Case of a Developing Economy's Response to the Performances of 
the Industrialised Economies and its major Trad ing Partners' 
Economies 
Insofar as the stock 'Uarket indices of the economically advanced 
1The only exceptions are Gleanealy Plantations and Landmarks Holdings 
which are ei ther an investment holding company (in estates) or a trully 
diversified company (including property development) . The other 
drawback appears to be the exclusion of a few 'industrial ' counters 
which have substantially lar~e ' Plantations D~vis ion' under their 
management, among which includes such names lrke Sime Darby, Genting 
Highlands, Multi-Purpose Holdings and Boustead. 
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countries (EACs)8 actually reflect the mood of the corpOrate industries 
of those economies, almost all of them showed a fair degree of 
inter-relatedness most of the ti~e, i . e over the S8-month period (from 
June 11916 to September 11983) taken together. Among all the markets 
analysed all but four (the Brussels, Frankfurt, Copenhagen an1 Bangkok 
exchanges) were significantly correlated (pOsitive as well as negative) 
w~th the KLSE Plantations index, i . e . ranging from + or -0 . 3 to close 
to + or -11. 0 , 9 as Table ~ - 11 i!ndicates . Statistically speaki!ng, each 
correlation coefficient value (r) between each market merely indicates 
the strength of the linear co-movellent that exist between them, as 
reflected by the correlation matrices in Appendices G, H and I . In each 
of these matrices the KLSE Plantations index is featured against each 
of the other overseas bourses' performances. Cross references among 
each of the indices can be draiffi also from these matrices, but that 
aspect is ignore1 for it lies somewhat out of the scope of this study. 
Most ' importantly though are the reasons or rationale behind the r 
values obtained. 
In the overall analysis most of the EACs (except in three 
BelgilLm, West Germany and DerLllark) and those countries falling in the 
GNP per 10 ' capi ta bracket sho'..red significantly high posi tive r 
values, thereby indicating strong co-move:nents in the same direction 
for the Kuala Lumpur market, at least wi th regards to the plantations 
sector . The only two odd-men out here are India and West Germany, which 
8 The IMF classification (for example see, Tun Wai and Patrick 1913), 
or ' industrialised economies' as defined by the Worl1 Ban~. 
9In simplified terms, these figures refer to the range from a 'fairly 
significant correlation' to a 'very significant correlation' (Breckon 
1 915 , p . 1 31 ) . 
10The 1tlorld Bank (11983) define1 these as upper middle-income 
economies ' and ' industrial market economies', i . e . with GNP per capita 




































Table 4-1: Correlation Coefficients of Selected 
World Bourses vis-a-vis ~uala Lu~pur Stock Exchange 




































Stoc~ Price Index 
Straits Times Plantations 
Toronto Stock Exchange CompOsite 
Nikkei-DOw Jones 225 Average 
Paris BOurse Committee 
Rand Daily Mail J'burg Industrials 
Tokyo Stock Exchange New 
Fraser's In1ustrials 
BOmbay SE Industrials Ordinary 
New York Stoc~ Exchange Composite 
Frnancial Ti~es-Actuaries 500-Share 
Reserve Bank of N.Z. Share Price 
Standard 3: Poor's CompO si te 
Banca Commerciale Italiana 
Hang Seng Bank 
Financial Times Industrial Ordinary 
Oslo Stock Exchange Industrials 
Irish Stock Exchange Common Stocks 
Helsinkr Stock Exchange Industrials 
Jacobson & Ponsbach 
ANP-CBS International Concerns 
All Ord inari es 
All-India Tea Plantations 
DOw Jones Industrial Average 
Zurich Stock Exchange All Shares 
A.NP-CBS CompOsi te 
Belgian Stock Exchange General 
Commerzbank 
K¢benhavns Borskurs I ~lt 
Bangkok Boo~ Club 
Madrid Stock Exchange 
Vienna Stock Exchange Industrials 
Taipei Stock Exchange Industrials 
Manila YIining 

























0 . 46565** 





-0 . 61 18116** 
-0.64105** 
-0. 66 1'61** 
- 0. 612119** 






Significantly different fro~ zero at 5~ level . 
Significantly different fro:n zero at W'b level . 
Not significant at 5~ level. 
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surprisingly showed ~ reversal in the expected trend . The Bomb~y 
exchange registered a posi tively high correlation (r=O. 87561 ' ) to KLSE 
despite Ind ia ' s pOsi tion as belongi ng to the 'low-income - - . , economles 
group . West Germany' s Frankfurt exchange on the other hand shows a 
non-significant low correlation with the KLSE (r=O.10293) over the 
study period, which is really an odd-man out if compared to the other 
six nations that made up the ' league of industrialised n~tions '. The 
reason behind BOmbay exchange ' s high r value wtth respect to KLSE 
probably lies partly in India ' s posi tion as an important i'TIporter of 
Malaysian p~lm oil . Fr~nkfurt ' s di vergence from the other in-
dustrialised nations is something rather odd - perhaps the cOllpOsi tion 
of the dominant sectors in the Commerzbank index (as Appendix D shows) 
, I' ll and West Germany ' s position as a ' nation of shopkeepers are the main 
reasons . 
On the other hand, all of the Asian stock markets studied (except 
the 'big ' three - the Tokyo, Hong Kong and Sing~pore exchanges) and 
several European minnows (the bourses of Copenhagen, Mairid, Vienna and 
Athens) even surprisingly registered negative r values, iniicating a 
reverse trend altogether in their performances as compared wtth KLSS's 
plantations sector . 
The scenario of the stock' market trends of the TN'orld's major 
exchanges and the KLSE is depicted in Figs. 4-1 and 4-2. As can be 
clearly seen the stock market movements of the major OECD economies and 
the KLSE/SES were in tande'TI most of the time with each other over the 
period of stu1y . The trends shown by the stock price indices '..rere not 
purely a "folloTN'- the- leader" type in the tradi tion of the chartist 
school of thought, i . e . insof~r as economic rationale or reasons could 
substantiate or disprove this claim or belief. In fact, it could well 
Il l S ee , The Economist , M~rch 1985 . 
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be argued that the "follow-the-leader" behaviour of the KLSE seems to 
coincide ~ost of the time wi th the global economic environment . 112 
Thus, the stock markets of KLSE/SES and the major OECD countries 
reflect the ' trade cycle ' pattern of affairs, U. e . a recovery or 
improvement in the major OECD ' s industrial productivity (e . g . as 
measured by rising industrial production indices, 1PT) would lead to 
expected rise in their de.nand for industrial raw materials (e . g . 
rubber) and hence increases in the world commodi ty prices could be 
expected also . Hence , the KLSE Plantations index would tend to follow 
the performances of the bourses in New York , Tokyo , London, Toronto, 
Paris, MUlan and Frankfurt . These expectations were proved to hold true 
over the study period , as the correlation coefficients obtained between 
the KLSE Plantations index and the stock market indices of these 
financial centres (only Frankfurt deviates from this pattern) showed 
significance at 99% level of confidence . This "follow-the-lea'ier" 
repeats itself too when these ' financial meccas ' turn bearish or when 
their economies lose steam and head for a nose-dive tOw3.r'is recession, 
and the overall chain reaction as seen during the booms or peaks 
reverse backwards towards recession troughs - as reflected by falling 
1P1 values and shrinking demand for renT materials which lead to falling 
commodi ty prices . All these sequence of events are often reflectei by 
stock prices of relevant co:npanies plummeting across the board in the 
industrialised economies and followed by KLSE. The recent stock market 
crashes of 11973 and 11981 were re'Uiniscent of this cyclical ups and 
downs of the business cycle. 
HOi'lever, among stock price in::iices in a particul3.r market, slight 
differences occur in their relative peforrnances as compared to KLSE's. 
" 2Some empirical results on this Ijne of argument T,olll be dealt with 





















Figure 4-1: Stoc~ Ma~ket Trenis of the World's three l~r~est Bourses 
as cornp!1re·j with the KV3E Plantations injex, 
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t~~, r 
( Aklj ( 
NYSE CO'1lposito Il. 
_ rl (31 Dec 11955=ro) ) ~ / 11 1 , ") ( ,~~ rJ 




v\. i\ I LJ V ; 




\ .l"L/ LoJ 
\ 1 
\...r Tokyo S. E. New 
('1- J:ln 1953=1100) 
~ ...•••.•. t 
..... .. ... . , 
• 
••••• \ ee 
• •• • 
., .. -, ... 
, 







,._ • .1 
r '\ 
!.. .-••• ~.. \. .•• e. , ..... 
, ~ .: ', •• , I' 
.... _. _ . .I-,r ... .•.. ,.S 
1979 
\ ... F'r-\c tU:l ries 500 
(110 \pr Ilg62 =II OO) 































































1 , 500 







Figure 4-2: Stoc~ Market Trenis of three of the lar~est 
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To a large extent these divergences are attributable to the selection 
or the coverage or compOsition of the index and the method of 
computation - using ,veighted or unweighted indices and ari thmetic or 
geometric means. 
Coming back to the common practise of the Malaysian investors 
taking a cue or the 'lead' from the major world bourses as the 
direction or yardstick follow, it appears that such a followrng (if 
done not in an indiscriminate manner) has a strong basis - at least as 
the resul ts in this study over the specified period paint to. As it 
turns out, the compositional basis of an index plays an important role 
in this regard, as examplified by the differential strengths of the FTA 
500-share price index over the FT 30 and of NYSE Cornpasi te or even S & 
P 500 CompOsite indices over DJ 30 , in their correlations vis-~-vis the 
KLSE Plantations index. Statistically, the KLSE Plantations index is 
significantly correlated (at 99% confidence level) most of the time 
with all of thes~ indices, i!.e. registering r values in the order of 
0.85311, 0.73292, 0.87052, 0 . 83226 and 0.46972 respectively. The 
differences shown by FTl\. 500 and FT 30 are rather small relative to 
their Wall Street counterparts, but there is still the misconception of 
the FT 30 i.!ndex as 'reflecting the mood of Bri tish industries' . 13 
Dunlop (~~) pIc appears to be the only share included in the FT 30 that 
is of relevance for a comparison to be ma':ie to KLSE Plant!3.tions index. 
Thus, the FTl\. 500-share index is superior to the FT 30 for it's use of 
ari thmeticised means in the computations and w~der coverage, thereby 
reflecting a truer st!3.te of the Bri tish econollY . Across the Atlantic, 
both the w~dely-based NYSE CompOsi te and the S&P 500 Compasi te indices 
113A °t' t o s ~ s crea or, 
such. The index was 
i. e. shares regarded 
investment portfolios 
H. Park~nson, had intended to use the index as 
entirely compOsed of 30 in':iustrial 'bl ue-chi ps' , 
as sure things' and were normally inclu1ed in 
of most conservative institutions. 
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were far superior to the DJ 30 index. The differential between NYSE 
CompOsite and DJ 30 ~ndices is - 0 . 4 , by no means a large deviation from 
a more accurate reflection of corporate ~meric~ . Like the FT 30, the DJ 
3014 ~s compOsed of 30 leading industrial corpOr~tions which does not 
reflect the state of tod~y t s U. S . economy, t . e . a swing tow~rds 
services sector . Thus the use of DJ 30 as the ' lead' for the Kuala 
Lu.mpur market gives a distorted picture. It is true though that the 
KLSE , at least ~s the plant~tions sector goes, tend to follow New York 
and London - to be precise most of the time KLSE followed Wall Street ' s 
NYSE CompOsite or S~P 500 CO~pOsite indices rather than the DJ 30 , and 
from the Ci ty of London the FT!\ 500- share index rather than FT 30 
index . 
On the other h~nd the two co~monly used indices of the Tokyo 
exchange, the Ni kkei - WT,., Jones 225 Average ~nd To kyo Stock Exchange New 
index , perfoMed almost in close tandem wLth KLSE Plantations index -
with r=0 . 94929 and r=0.9068S , respectively . The very small difference 
lies presumably w~th the large s~mple siz9 of sh~res included in the 
indices. The :l - DJ 225 index is compOsed of 225 selected shares (2W'S 
representation of the Tokyo exch~nge) ',.,hile the TSE New index takes 
into account the entire issues listed on the First section of the Tokyo 
exchange (a total of 1,050 shares!) 
BOth the Toro!lto Stock Exch~nge 300 Co-npOsi te and Joh~nnesburg' s 
Rand Daily M~i 1 Industrials indices ~re highly correlated (r=0 . 9501 and 
r=0 . 90961 , respectiv ely) with KLSE Plant~tions index, most probably 
this is purely coincidental because of their pre:iomin~ntly 
resource-b~sed minin~ industries . On the other h~nd the reason for the 
high r value obt~ine1 for Toronto (r~nks second only to ST Pl~ntations 
1140r DJI!\ , but is not an average in the true sense of the word. For a 
fuller discussion see, G. A. Christy and J . C. Clendenin (1191:3), 
pp . 241 - 3 . 
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index , as in Table 4 - 11) could well be that both KLSE and Toronto 
exchange follow 1tlall Street . Toronto defini tely watched Wall Street 
very closely in fact some shares (e . g . INCO) are tra1ed on both 
exchanges, as the analysis indicates (r=0 . g3 , as shown in Appendix G) . 
Since KLSE follows New York (r=0 . 37) then both KLSE and Toronto 
exchange should move together wrth New York , thereby ~anifested by the 
highly significant r values . 
The range of r values from 0. 43 to 0 . 35 obtained in KLSE ' s 
r elation to the other European ' mini- bOurses ' and that of Sydney and 
Wellington simply indicates the importance of the Malaysian market 
vis - a - vis those markets of countries where Malaysia has trade relations 
except South Afric3. . A summari sed picture of the whole si tuation wi th 
respect to Malaysia and among those economies is presented in Appendix 
H. Both the negati ve trend and insignificant correlation of 
Copenhagen ' s International Concerns index is somewhat unexpected . The 
inclusion of Unilever wi th plantations interests also stretched to the 
Far East (they even run a research laboratory conducting oi 1 palm 
cul tures in Malaysia) should then show so:ne effect on the five-shares 
w-index . ? The result of KLSE-~thens ' highly negative correlation should 
be treated wi th caution as the later exchange is not really a stock 
exchange in a true sense . 
Lagging observations were perfor-ned based. on the premise that the 
KLSE ' s behaviour follows that of a se~i-strong form of EMH, l.e. some 
close approximation of inst3.nt3.neous disse~ination of information 
regarding the performances of Overse3.S markets do operate . As Table 4-2 
shows , lagging the data does not affect the correlation coefficients in 
any significant way . In fact the r values obt:3.ined remain relatively 
115Fur thermore , the funish- based Uni ted Plantations W:3.S also Ii sted 
unde r the plantations sector of the Copenhagen exchange . 
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stable for lags over 116 three months . Thus, lagging the monthly data 
does not improve the co - movements between the KLSE Plantations index 
and those of the other markets 111 In short, any information on the 
overseas markets ' performances (in a given month) or the state of the 
respective nation ' s economy th~t could have been useful would have been 
almost totally discounted for by the time such news or information 
reached the Malaysian market . 
Table 4-2: Correlation Coefficients of KLSE Plantations index 
(wtth Monthly Lags up to a Quarter) 
with Major World BOurses over the period 
from June 1916 to September 11983 
KLSE Plantations index 
vis- a- vi s 
-- - - _ . 
Correlation coefficients (r) 
Monthly la~s_ 
Bourse Stock price index 11 2 ') 
New York New York S. E. Comp:>s i te 0 . 86814** 0.861100** 
Tokyo Tokyo S. E. New 0 . 89503** 0 . 88503** 
London FT- t\ctuaries 500-share 0 . 85913** 0 . 85929** 
Paris Paris BOurse Cormni ttee o. 92434- -x-* 0.92490** 
Frankfurt Commerzbank 0 . 05980ns 0.01163ns 
Milan Banca Commerciale Italiana 0 . 81229** 0.182')3** 
Toronto Toronto S . E. 300 Comp:> si te 0 . 94410** 0.9')063** 




Bank 0.13011** 0.15535** 
Singap:>re Straits Ttmes Plant~tions o. 973411-** 0.96053** 
Sydney A.SE All Ord inaries 0.573711** 0.56225** 
* Significantly different from zero at 51 level. 
** Significantly different from zero at 1% level. 
ns Not significant at 5~ level. 
0.85568*-x-
0 . 31843** 
0 . 85981** 
0 . 911394-** 
-0.01190ns 
0.14-412** 
o. 911161 ** 
0 . 13235** 
0 . 94607** 
0.56356** 
116 La~s for over three months only i'lere used 1tlhich arguably seems 
qui te reasonable . For example, the current economic slo 1,'ldown be.ginning 
in 1980 tn the U. S. in fact did not affect ~alaysia's e conomy 
significantly until in late 11981 . The recession even too k ti'11e to cross 
the Atlantic . On this basis the lags used up to a quart e r ( not up to 
six months or more) appears justifiable . 
17Using daily data would have provided a better and more meaningful 
result (with la~s) . But then the d~ta base would be practically 
unmanageable for the purp:>se of this study given the time constraint. 
Furthermore if this study focuses on a few years data only, the 
posssible impact of the business cycle on the cyclical movements of the 
stock market will be missed out - for one thing the stock market 
crashes of either 11973 or llg81 1 , or both, will p:>ssibly be excluded. 
depending on the period chosen for the study . 
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The resul ts in Table 4 - 11 reveal some basic but nevertheless 
lmpartant facts about the inter- relatedness or differences between the 
exchanges ' performances . The highly significant correlation (r=O . 9827tl) 
obtained in the KLSE - Strai ts Ttmes (ST) Plantations indices is to be 
expected , largely due to the dual listing of almost all of the the 
plantation stocks on both exchanges, as Appendix F 18 suggests . The 
other Stngapare ' s index, the Fraser's Industrials index is related 90% 
of the time (r=O . 903) wi th KLSE Plantations index which is slightly 
less related than ST Plantations index . This is to be expected too as 
the comparisons made are between two totally different sectors, -I t • e . 
plantations (agricul ture) and industries . B9.sed on the sa'TIe rationale 
the KLSE Plantations index differ markedly from the Taiper Industrials, 
B9.ngkok ' s BOok Club, and Manila Muning indices - in fact the stock 
market trends in those exchanges moved in co~pletely reverse direction! 
The Taipei exchange has been likened as a ' gambling casino ' whi le the 
stock market crash of 11979 proved to be a haunting experience that kept 
Thai investors at bay (McKrnnon 1985). The other probable reason (at 
least wi th the Bangkok and Manila exchanges} lies wi th the rel9.tively 
turbulent political climate that has existed in these two neighbours of 
Malaysia which forms an integral 119 part of ASEAN . Plantation-wLse, 
there seems to be some degree of relationship as sho'~ by KLSE 
Plantations index wtth ~ll-India Tea Plantations index (r=O.499). 
Possibly the difference in the commodity dealt with (rubber versus tea) 
and probably the ownership pattern of the compani e s involved in the two 
markets contribute to this slightly low correlation. 
1'8 In fact more than 30% of the sh9.res in all sectors were co-liste d 
on both exchanges , t . e . largely J.ue to the historic links that both 
markets inheri ted from the Bri tish . Details on related reasons for the 
closeness between the two markets wi 11 be deal t wi th in subsection 
4 . 2 . 2. 
1
1
9The Association of South East Asian Nations comprlslng of 
Indonesia , Philippines , Thailand , Singapore and Mal9.ysi9. . Brunei joint 
the grouping in 1984 . 
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Last but not least, is the question of KLSE's inter-relatedness 
wi th Hong Kong stock 'llarket (HKSE) . Arguably the HKSE us a haven for 
market speculators, dO'llinated by British subjects, the Japanese and the 
Chinese capitalists who seem to swttch portfolios between HKSE, 
SES/K1SE and the Tokyo exchange (TSE) with ease. The correlation 
coefficient values of from 0 .75 to 0.79 obtained between the HKSE and 
the TSE, SES and KLSE illustrates this point. The inflow of U.S. 
dollars is attracted by the lure of Hong Kong, SiJngapdre and ASEAN 
stocks which saw a growing number of investment groups 1.iversifying 
into East Asian pOrtfolios (Weiss 1985). 
4.2.2 The Partial Impact of "Twin Market " and "Dually-Traded" 
Securities on Stock Prices of major Malaysian Plantation Shares 
The very high positive correlation obtained in the KLSE-ST 
Plantations indices is undoudtedly due largely to the dual listing of a 
majori ty of shares (more than soi) in all sectors , especially wi th 
Malaysian-incorporated co~panies.20 A total of 2~ out of the 30 shares 
included in KLSE's Plantations index computation are also listed on SES 
(see Append i x F). Furthermore, the share compdsi tion of both indices 
are almost ii.entical except th'3.t the sample size for the com~sition of 
?1 Stnga~re's ST Plantations index is probably smaller- and that the ST 
Plantations index is an 'unweighted' index . 
As such the sa'lle shares co-listed on both KLSE '3.nd SES should not 
20By the end of January 1984, some 3 1 plantation shares l/lere quoted 
on the SES (21 shares under the 1st Section and another 10 shares were 
listed under the 2nd Section) . 
21 No det'3.ils of the ST Plantations in:iex Ivere avai lable at the time 
of wri tinge However, the closest resemblance to it '/las probably that of 
the SES Plantations index (weighted in a similar fashion to KLSE 
Plantations index) which had 16 shares (or 66t representation) included 
in the computation in 1978 . 
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differ in prices, otherwise the correlation will not be so striking . 
The findings in T8.ble 4--3 proved this paint, at least wiJth the weekly 
average prices of the plantation shares recorded for 119311 .22 In fact, 
the prices of the same shares are not significantly different with each 
other irrespective of their place of ~uotation. For example, the weekly 
average prices of Sime Darby in Met equivalent were traded at M$4 .1 6 in 
London, M$4.01 iln Hong Kong, and M$4.15 on both SiJngapore and Kuala 
23 Lumpur. This pattern is found to repeat itself w-ilth the other share 
prices as listed in Table 4-3, vlz. in the case of Castlefield (between 
LSE ani KLSE's prices), ConsPlant, Hilgh & Low, KLK, Kulim and M8.lakoff 
(between LSE, SES and KLSE's prices), and for UP and Gentings (between 
SES and KLSE's prices). 
The deviation from being perfectly correlated (i .e. r=+11.0) could 
be ascri bed to the fact that a fe Ttl of the large rubber cO'1lpanies were 
not included in the ST Plantations index comput8.tion. These surprising 
exclusions24 include such n8.~es as Consolidated Plantations 
(ConsPlant), High & LOw , KLK, Malakoff and Kulim (M) - all of Ttlhich 
were also quoted on LOndon. Appendix F provides details of each of the 
component shares of KLSE Plantations index. Note th9.t the excluded 
sh8.res from 8T Plant9.tions index are actually among the 'bi ggies' and 
hence could have cause the sligh~ divergence of the KLSE - ST Pl8.~tations 
indices from being perfectly correlated . 
Nevertheless, 9.'uong all the sectors probably the pl8.ntations 
sector is the most highly correlated one, partly lu~ to the f':lct th8.t 
22The year of the takeovers of Guthrie Corp , B8. rlow Estates and 
Dunlop Estates Berhad. 
23The slight differential in the price quoted in Hong Kong was partly 
due to the shares being rarely traded over there, where most of the 
time the closing quotations ended wiJth ei ther a buyer's or a seller ' s 
quote wtth no actual transaction done. 
24At least as the compdnents of the SES Plantations index suggests. 
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substantial volQ~es of rubber were exported via Sin~apore . Thus, 
details on expOrt dealings ~.,~th respect to Mqlaysian rubber would have 
been trans'Tli tted wi th promptness to SSS - possibly to the e'{tent that 
the SES were 'informed ' earlier than even KLSE, despi te the fact that 
all the plantations are located in Malqysia and were Malaysian-
incorpOrated companies. 
Table 4-3: Average Prices of Weekly Closing Quotations 
of Plantqtion StocKS on the Kualq Lumpur , Singapor9 , 






~verage prices as quoted on various bourses ~ 
-----------------------------------------------------
in respective locql currencies: in M $ equivalent 
------------------------------
--------------------SES HKSE LSE KLSE SES HKSE LSE 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Si:me Darby 50c+ 3.82 9.66 89 .07 4. 15 4 . 15 4.01 4 . 16 Castlefield 10p nq n1 427.90 20.00 nq n1 20. 118 C6nsPlant 50c 2.26 nq 51 . 69 2.46 2.45 nq 2. 42 
High l?£ LOw 50c 2.77 nq 62 .50 3.01 ' 3.01 nq 2.92 KL Kep6ng t Il 3 . 33 nq 80 .02 3.63 "3. 611 nq 3.86 Kulim 50c 2.56 nq 58.10 2.30 2.80 nq 2.72 
Mal akoff $11 5 . 21 nq 11 6. 31 5.67 5.66 nq 5. 51 U td PI ant ' ns $1' 4.75 nq nq 5.09 5. 17 nq nq 
Gentings '1> 11> 8 . 97 nq nq 9.73 9 .74 nq nq 
------------------------------------- ---------------------------------~ KLSE= Kuqla Lumpur Stock Exchange , SES= Stock Exchange of SLngapore 
HKS~= Hong Kong Stock Exchange , LSE= London Stock Exchange , 
nq = not quoted . 
Quoted in S$ on SES , HK$ on HKSE , UK pence on LSE, ~nd M$ on KLSE . 
+ Listed under industrials section on KLSE and SES, under com~erce 
and industry on HKSE , and under overseas traders on LSE . 
> Listed unde r industrials section on KLSE and SES . 
, 
The other interesting pOint to note here -";:3.S the probable i~pact 
that the jeals involving the buying over of Dunlop Estates Berhad (DEB) 
by Malaysian Chinese ~ssoci~tion t s investment ar:n , ~1ul ti-PurpO S8 
Holdings Berhad '''v1PHB), in late 11982 have had on the S~S whi~'-l -'11{ ::11'1 
increasingly lar~e divergence from ~LSE t s trend, ~s is clearly 
portr~yed by Fig . 4- 2. This could well be lue to excessive speculqtion 
r nning loose on ths 3~S (and XLSE) w~th the residual sh~res of Guthrie 
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Corp B.nd Dunlop (U1() plc25 still in iniividual hands being B.ctively 
chased , and hence the sharp rises in thei r prices . The announcement 
made by ~PHB on 1"3 November 119811 over the intended purchase of DEB 
itself exci ted all three exchanges LSE , SES B.nd T{LSE . ' Spillover 
effects ' were observed by shB.rp increases in the prices of ConsPlant 
(+ 118c) , Hi & llo (+28c) , KLK (+21c) , Kulim (+"34c) and UP (+l iOc), with 
DEB itself jumped 22 cents on that pB.rticular day . 
4 . 2 . 3 The Relationship of Natural Rubber "Producer- Consumer" BehB.viour 
as Reflected in the Stoc~ Prices of major MalB.ysian Rubber 
Plantation Companies with that of the World ' s largest Rubber 
Goods Manufacturers : A. Case of "Supply- following" or 
"Demand- fo llowi ng"? 
A.rguably this part of the study wi 11 in effect provide a ~~co_nd 
stag_e relationship between the proJ.ucers and consumers of rubber . The 
proposi tion then is that improved IPIs in the maj or OECD econollies 
would lead to increasei iniustrial output by the major rubber gooJ.s 
manufacturers which is translated in rises in their delland for rubber 
(following depletion of their rubber stocks) and hence contributed to 
rises in the world price for the raw material. With the industrialised 
econo:ny booming, more trade for rubber products will grow I e.g. 
increased replacellent tyre business} and hence increased profi tabi li ty 
for the corporations. The ffiB.rket's expectation of profi tabili ty of 
these corporations would be reflected by appreciation in their shB.re 
prices - e . g . Firestone, Goodyear or B.F . Goodrich on the NYSS, Dunlop 
on LSE , Michelin on the Paris Bourse, Continental Gummi-Tllerke on the 
25Dunlop (UK) was the interested party to dispose its 51ct stake in 
Dunlop Estates Berhad . 
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German exchanges , Pirelli on the Italian and bourses, 26 and 
Bridgestone, Yokohama and Sumitomo Tire an'i Rubber Pro-iucts on the 
Tokyo exchange. 
It is through increases in demand for rubber (presu'TIably by the 
rubber goods manufacturers) that expectations of a rise in rubber 
prices is realised, thus increased profitability of the rubber-
exporting companies. Again, the Malaysian market's expectation of 
increased rubber prices and hence profitability, is often reflecte1 in 
the market - probably taking cue of the upturn of the raajor OECD 's 
industrial production indices. 
Results in Table 4-{ appear in the overall analysis to support the 
above line of argument. IN i th the exception of a few minor -ietai 1 s of 
indivi'iual corporate operations andlor developments, in general 
si~nificantly high po si ti ve corre lations in the order of fro'll ') . 54 to 
0.93 were proved to be the case in tne relationships bet';veen stock 
prices of the ma~or rubber-producing companies (listed on KLSS) and the 
world's largest rubber goods "llanufacturers (listed in 'TIajor world 
bourses). 
Pair--,.;ise differentials in t~e r values obtaine'i betT..reen each 
company illustrates some interesting yet logical corporate developments 
in the rubber goods manufacturing business . On the average, only four 
of the corporations (B . F . Goodric~, Continental GUffi'1li-~verke, Pirelli 
SpA and Briigestone) indicate stock price trends t~at are highly 
correlated wi th the major Malaysian rubber projucers (except Dunlop 
Estates and partly KLK) . The obvious explanation may ste"ll fro"ll the 
higher proportion of na tural rubber tilised 21 in their operations, 
26prrelli International is base-i in Basle and 1uoted on both the 
Basle and Zurich exchanges . 
21Details of natural rubber consumption by cO"llpanies are not readily 
available except by countries. 
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meaning that these multinationals could have a relatively higher 
natural rubber/synthetic rubber ratio usage in their production lines, 
especially wi th regards to tyre operations for trucks and heavy duty 
tyres (including aircraft tyres).28 This assertion is partly based on 
the Special Report series of the EIU' s Rubber Tr_e}~.d_s. For instance, as 
far as Continental Gummi-Werke is concerned this assertion holds true 
as West Germany is regarded as 'big ' in terms of rubber consu~ption. 
Table 4-4: Correlation Coefficients between Major Rubber Stocks 
(listed on KLSE) and the World's largest Rubber Goods 
Manufacturers (quoted on major world bourses), 11981: 
Bourse: New York London Paris Frankfurt Milan Tokyo 




Genting . 830*-)(- . 261 -.0711 .210 .060 .863** .780** .540** 
S. Darby . 828** .326* .554-*.)(- .723** .306* .8411** .797** .787** 
ConsPlant . 807** .278* . 329* . 661** .061 .844 ** .8113** . 830*-x-
Dunlop Bj 
-.1 36 .037 -.1180 -. 046 -.562** -. 088 -. 1 53 .1 55 
G Ropel . 8115** .31 8* .294 * . 627** . 11 2 .786** . 731** . 636** 
HiD'h&Lo'li 
::> .703** .231-* . 5111 ** . 726** .1 09 . 759** .7511** .897*-* 
KL Kepong .541** -.002 -. 538**-.179 -. 188 .577** .503** . 050 
Kulim( M) .771-** . 345* .300* .644-** . 01 18 . 791*'+ . 733** .827** 
Malakoff . 877** .259* . 0711 . 387* . 073 .931 ** .852** .635** 
C'field .735** . 1133* -. 020 . 355* -.107 . 71 2** . 62J** .433* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
* Significance at 5~ level. Non-significant values are not denoted 
** Significance at 1% level. by any symbol. 
+ Rubber goods manufacturers, i.e. representative stocks on each of 
the industrialised countries ,(other ~ajor corporations incluie 
Firestone and General Tire in the U.S., Pirelli Co. in Italy, 
Pirelli International in Switzerland, Yokoha~a and Su~ito~o T~re 
& Rubber Products in Japan). 
" Listed on KLSE under Industrials (for first two), Oil Pal~s 
(ConsPlant and Utd PIts), and Rubbers (for the rest in the list). 
In the overall analysis, U. S. rubber goods ~anufacturers (except 
28For exa~ple, the Australian subsidiaries of Dunlop, Firestone, 
Goodyear, Uniroyal and Olympic between them share around 9~~ of natural 
rubber usage, in 1979. 
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B.F. Goodrich) show low correlations (but still si~nificant) with 
KLSE's rubber producers. This can be attributed to the high proportion 
of synthetic rubber being used in their tyre operations. However, most 
corporations are nOI'; moving from crossply to radial tyres which wtll 
then account for an increase in rubber consumption bV 301 for passenger 
car tyres and 151 for heavy truck tyres (Rubber Market Revieitl Jl911). 29 
In fact the populari ty of radial passenger car tyres in the U. S. is 
growing at an 81 annual rate, according to a projection by B.F. 
Goodrich (MRRDB 1980, p.4) Thus, B.F. Goodrich's subsid.iary in the 
Philippines was aimed at reducing production costs of tyre 
manufacturing as well as tryrng to capture the tyre market in the ASEAN 
region. Why else then 1id B.F. Goodrich establish a tyre manufacturing 
plant and also manage rubber estates in the southern part of the 
Philippines?30 The same applies to Uniroyal's strategy of having a 
plantation base in Penang, as Uniroyal Malaysian Plantations. On the 
tyre manufacturing si1e only, Goodyear and Dunlop have established tyre 
factories locally on joint ventures with Malaysian interests since 
1 912 . 
The odd-man out behaviour appears to be displayed by both Dunlop 
Estates shares on the KLSE and Dunlop (U . K.) pIc shares on London's 
exchange . The reversal in trend as compared. to the rest of the pack 
seems to be due largely to the nervousness and excessi ve speculative 
mania that gripped the three exchanges over the intende1 takeover 
rumours by Malaysian investors on Dunlop CU . K. ) pIc ' s 511"& stake in 
Estates Berhad . 
29CLted in LLTTl and Chai 
utilising hi~her proportion 
shock of 19811 which cause 
synthetic rubber. 
(11918) . The other reason for swLtching to 
of natural rubber was the impact of the oil 
escalation in petroleum prices, and hence 
30Malaysia 's conglomerate , SLme Darby 
interests in the Philippines in late 19S11. 
have taken over Goodrich's 
CHA.PTER 5 
INTER-REL~TEDNESS OF PLA.NTATION STOCK PRICES 
WITH THE OVERA.LL MA.LAYSIAN ECONOMY 
It •••• To the average man in the street, the Stock 
Exchange is a shrine of mystery . It 
(C{.B. Rydge 1934 , p.13) 
5.1 Relationship between Plantation Stock Prices and Gross National 
Product and its Related Macroeconomic Indicators 
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To the extent that I economic fundamentalism' is able to expl3.in 
real world si tuations, the behaviour of the stock market should be of 
no exception and hence operates within the confines of economic 
rationality . Thus, when analysing from a macroeconomic viewpoint one 
cannot escape from being centre-:i on to the GNP world 1 as from perhaps 
an investment analyst ' s approach. 
Insofar as Mal3.ysi3. remains an 3.rdent follower of the 'free 
enterprise ' dogma and maintains its open economy framework to the 
international trade arena, the performance of the overall economy 
should depend largely on the socio-poli tico-economic climate of the 
country and the region in which it operates. The stabi 1 i ty in the 
? 
socio-political atmosphere is of upmost importance- '3.round which the 
- --- ------
1 For an argument on the economists ' role in investment an3.lysis see, 
Moor (119711). 
2Something which is difficult to quantify even in relative terms, and 
lies within the scope of the political economy discipline . 
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business and trade cycles rotate wi thin the Keynesian macroeconomic 
framework and through the Heckscher- Ohlin- S9.muelson international 
economics apparatus . 
In gene r al , GNP and its annual aggregate co~ponents all showed. 
highly significant correlations (r)O. 904) at 99~ level of confidence 
wi th KLSE Plantations index , over the stipulated study period from 11972 
to 11982 . On this basis alone it warrants a closer study into the trentis 
of these two identi ties . A. summarised picture of this si tuation is 
presented in Table 5-1. When viewed graphically then the trends of 
these a.<:1.<:1reO'ates would move ::::>0 :::> in tande~ wi! th each other , as Ftg . 5-11 
shoiNs . 
In terms of percentage changes in no~inal GNP and gross nation9.1 
savings (GNS) , insignificantly low negative c orrelations (r<-0.216) 
were obtained . This is illustrative of the fluctuations in annual 
growth rates and business cycles that the Mal9.ysian economy had 
experienced over these years . On the other hand, both the export ratio 
(gross total exports/GNP, or X/Y) and the investment ratio (gross fixed 
invest:nent/,}NP, or I/Y) displayed by the Mal9.ysian economy :luring the 
11972-11982 period be9.rs a significantly close relation (r=O. 690S 9.nd 
r=O . 70911 , respectively) to the movements in plant.9.tion share prices . 
This proves that the X/Y and I/Y ratios move in close concert with the 
stock market . 
On top of that a closer look at the 1965-11934 period reveals a 
medium- term 6 year to 12 year Jugl9.r cycle in the ratio of gross fixed 
investment to GNP, sho 'wing a posi tively increasing trend over the 
perioti , as Fig . 5- 1 illustrates . ) The graph also shows that the pe9.1{s 
and troughs in the X/Y ratio shape:l up e9.rlier th9.n the I/Y ratio . 
3For an account on the I/Y r9.tio and its importance to the M9.l9.ysian 
economy over the 11960- 11gS0 period see, Shinoh9.ra (,lg35) . 
Table 5-1: Correlatrion Coefficients of 
KLSE Plantations index vis-a-vis M~croeconomic 
----
and Financial Variables, and Key Agricultural 
Commodi ty Prices, 1972-11982 
r values of 
KLSE Plantations index 
vis-a-vis 
Correlation ~efficients _C£)_ based _~~ 
Annual Quarterly 
A. Macroeconomic aggregates: 
i) -AWeg~te dema"lld 
Pvt consumption, C 
Total capital formation, I 
Govt consumption, G 
Total exports, X 
Total imports, M 
Nominal GNP, Y 
Nominal GNS, S 
Per capita GNP 
ti) P~rcentage ~hanges 
~ change in GNP 
% change in GNS 
iii) Selected ratios 
---Pvt consumption ratio, C/Y 
Investment ratio, I/Y 
Savings ratio, Sly 
EXfX)rts ratio, X/Y 
B. Frnancial a~gregates: 
Total money supply (~11) 
Pvt sector liquidity (M3) 
D~scount rate, 3-month 
Treasury Bills 
Interest rate, avge lending 
rate by Com~ercial Banks 
New issues, Govt securities 
New issues, Corporate 
securities 
C. KLSE turnovers: 
KLSE $ Rubber-[vol) 
KLSE £ Rubber (vol) 
KLSE Otl Palms 'vol) 
KLSE $ Rubber (val) 
KLSE £ Rubber (val) 
KLSE Oil Palms (val) 




Rubber prices, RSS1 fob K.L. 
Palm oil prices, cro cif NNE 
Significance at 5% level. 
Significance at 1 1~ level. 
Non-significant at 5% level. 





0.9046** n. c. 
0.921 '7** n.c. 
0.9402** n.c. 
-0.9385** n.c. 
0.934<3** o. 9100** 
0.89114 ** n.c. 
0.9244** n.c. 
-0.2163ns -0.0679ns 





-0. 31 09ns 
-0. 2509ns 


















O. 111 121)* 








0 . 691 '2** 
0 . 721 17** 
0.2825ns 
rubber smoked sheet of 
Grade 1 • 
= crude palm oil. 
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Since both the r9.tios 9.re posi tive 9.nd significantly correlated wi th 
the plantation stock prices it seems very likely that the investment 
cycle correlates closely with the cyclical changes in the export ratio 
- which W9.S in turn markedly affected by an external factor, i.e . the 
terms of tr9.de for rubber . 
In the overall an9.1ysis the correlations obtained using quarterly 
data were much better, wi th the possible exceptions in GNP 9.nd its 
aggregate components . It W9.S also found that KLSE Plant9.tions index 
shows significant correlations with the annual totals of both new 
issues of Government securities and corpor9.te securities, while 
comparing these quarterly movements gave surprisingly low, insig-
nificant and negative relationships . The most probable explanation of 
this observation lies wi th the somewhat inconsistent and not "\<1ell 
spaced or staggering in the public issues of the Government and 
corpor9.te securities . The other possible reason could well be that riue 
to ei ther the end of years' or the end of quarters', or both, closing 
indices of the stoc~ prices use1 in the runs analysis just by 9.ccident 
fluctuates quite markedly 9.way from the moving aver9.ge or trend line. 
The highly significant resul ts obtained in the end of peri01s' 
total money supply (M1) and that of private sector liquirii ty ( 11'3) in 
the qU9.rterly correlations (r=O. 3195 and r=O.9246, respectively) seem 
to support the monet9.rists' view wLth respect to monet9.ry policy chosen 
by the Malaysian Govern~ent.4 In essence, increases in ~1 and ~3 would 
mean that the financial sector wLll be laden wLth c9.sh from which 
insti tutions and the public at large can borroTtl for , allong others, 
investment purposes . It was the speculative use of such cre1i t that 
- -----
4In the past selective monetary policy was arioptej in an effort to 
ensure that the growth in money supply 9.nd cre1it was in line with the 
growth of the n9.tional economy and price stability is maint9.ined (Daim 
Z9.inu1din 1984) . 
Export ratio (X/:;NP) 
Investment ratio ([/~NP) 
0.625 
0.500 
Figure 5-1: ~LSE Plantations iniex, Gras9 National Pro1uct 
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characterised the strong bullishness during the last run ups prior to 
the 1 973 and 119811 crashes , and the 1 983 mini - crash . 
The positive significance of interest rates, as represented by the 
average lending rate by commercial banks , underscore its importance not 
as a repellent factor for speculation in shares but rather the reverse . 
It is believei by certain quarters in the stockbroking business that a 
rise in i nterest rates would inhibit borrowing for i nvestments in 
businessess , but that would not deter tho se busi nessrnen from 
redirecting their available funds into the share market on a temporary 
basis until the prime lending rate of commercial banks fell back to 
' realistic ' levels - and hence a si tuation of speculative mania lS 
enhanced . Furthermore , the buyeng and selling of shares can be executed 
in the short run , even wi thin a day - e . g . buying in the morning and 
selling before the closing bell in a bullish market, or short selling 
in a bearish market - and by margin trad ing. It is of common practice 
that share scrips of an original purchaser bearing his/her or a 
nominee ' s name still float around in the market and changing hands 
without requiring any re - registration unless chosen by the new 
purchaser . The ease in which share transactions can be done in the KLSE 
and the ever present prospect of capi tal gains in the short run are 
attractive enough than other alternative investments. 
, 
With regards to the actual volume of plantation shares traded and 
the value of shares changing hanis, all but the sterling rubber shares 
show highly significant correlations with KLSE Plantations index . These 
resul ts seem to support the chartist school of thought insofar as the 
transactions actually reflect the supply and demand for the shares. But 
then it is difficul t to ascertain whether a particular transaction 
actually involves a genuine buy~ng and selling or are merely 
speculative acts (e . g . in the form of short selling, insider trariing, 
etc . ) . The inactivi ty T,fhieh characterised the sterling rubber shares 
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is largely attributable to the few shares quoted on KLSE - only two, 
viz. C9.stlefield and Inch Kenneth - and they were largely owned by 
British interests. 
Average quarterly prices of rubber are significantly correlated 
most of the time (r=0.7217) with the corresponding pl9.nt9.tion share 
prices. This is perhaps to be expected, i.e. si:nilar to the 
relationship between gold bullion prices and gold stocks. Nevertheless, 
a similar relationship does not appear to hold wi:th crude palm oil 
prices. This could well be due partly to the relative stability in palm 
oil prices as opposed to rubber prices. A. closer look at these two 
commodi ty prices wi th that of KLSE Plantations index will be featured 
subsequently in subsection 5.3.2. 
5.2 Gross National Product and Related Macroeconomic Indicators or 
Stock Prices - which is the "leading indicator"? 
This part of the study attempts to shedsorne light into the 
causality nature of the behaviour9.1 pattern of KLSE's plant9.tion stocks 
over a period from 11965 to end of 11984. It is worth noting here that 
the data base stretches way back to 11965 (as far 9.S the data is readi ly 
available) represented by the Straits Ttmes b Rubber index5 
(11962=100), up to the first half ' of 11973, thereafter substi tuted by the 
KLSE $ Rubber index6 (11970=1100) - followi.!ng the spli t and fOMlation of 
50ne of the few barolleter of the plantations sector 
Stock Exchange of Malaysia and Stngapore . 
6 Actually represents 
inclusive of oil palm 
'KLSE Plantations index' 
the plantations sector 
s toc ks . The KLSE changed 
on 11 October 11932. 
as 
the 
of the then joint 
a wh ole , 1. • e • 
nomencl9. ture to 
12 
the KLSE which co~menced operations on 2 July 1913 . 1 
In this connection, sh~re prices of pl~nt~tion co~panies listed on 
KLSE were treated as a ' leading indicator ' to the perfor'llance of the 
exports sector (in which rubber and palm oil exports alone contributes 
close to 50% to total exports f . o . b ., in 19S0) and hence to the overall 
performance of the Malaysian economy (where the exports sector 
comprises some 60~ of GDP tn the same year , i . e . value added by the 
rubber and oil palm industries to GDP was in the order of nearly ))~ of 
GDP) . This ' leading indicator ' hypothesis approach follows partly along 
the lines studied by , among others , the NBER in the U. S., the National 
Institute of Applied Economics and Social Research (~IESR) of the U.K., 
and Melbourne University ' s Institute of Applied Economic and Social 
Research . However , in this study only one leading indicator was singled 
out , L. e . share prices of the plantations sector. This folloTHs the 
' recogni tion ' attached to the stock market as a leading indicator of 
the economy ( Clarke llgSII) . Few will doubt the stocl<: market's 
inextricate linkage to the economy . In essence then, the 'leading 
indicator' hypothesis ~aintains that the stock market forecasts the 
future rather than the present . For instance, the KLSE's crash of 1973 
tends to support this assertion - where stock prices peaked and 8rashed 
during the economically very good years . 8 This scenario can be gle~ned 
from Fi!g . 5- 11 . 
It is then the question of causali ty, i.e. which calle first: the 
KLSE " chicken" or the G~ "egg"? It ~3.y be argued also that any close 
correlation between the two may not necessarily i'TIply a cause and 
1The Stock Exch~nge of ~hlaysia and Stngapore was closer} fro'll 3-113 
M~y 11913 for the official splitting into two separate exch~nges, L. e. 
The Kuala LU'TIpur Stock Exchange ~d and the Stock Exch~nge of SLngapore 
Ltd (KLSE 1913) . 
SA. further discussion on the economic basis behind the stocl<: 'TIarket 
crashes of ,1913 and 11981 will be covered under Section 5 . 4 . 
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effect relationship, but rather both the KLSE index and the G~ .just 
happen to re9.ct to the same C9.uses or the observed relationship may 
well be purely coincidental. 9 
Whether or not, or to what extent, the KLSE Plantations index 
really leads the Mal!3.ysian economy is but one question. It could well 
be that the index has proved to be a leading indicator to the overall 
stock market, i.e. by setting the pace for bullishness to the KLSE. Or 
the index can be viewed as simply acting as a leading indicator for the 
agricul tural exports sector which then permeate or spi lls over to the 
over9.ll economy. These two lines of reasoning seem plausible and in 
fact were held in high esteem in high places, as for example these 
headlines and excerpts from various reports and articles imply:-
11979: " The Mal9.ysian Stock Market - plantation stocks set 
the p9.ce" 
"The highlight during the first seven months of 
11979 was the advancement of plantation stocks, 
particularly rubber stocks • 
.... Buying in rubber shares spilled over to palm oil, 
which also enjoyed fairly good support. Trn stocks also 
held steadily with the favourable physical tin price •.. 
.... price indices on the KLSE recorded wider margins 
wi th $ Rubber rising by 29.3t, properties by 119. 7~, 
fin9.nce by 12.8~ and industrials by 6.3% . 
.•. . the m9.rket was spurred by favourable commodity 
prices especially rubber prices as well 9.S good 
corporate results 9.nd news of corporate takeover bids." 
(Economic Report li979/g0 ,p.154) 
January 11930: "The KLSE in 11979: Rid ing the Crest' of a 
Commodities Boom" 
"Sector after sector felt the surge of investor 
interest as the good fundamentals began to filter 
through. First the rubber stocks, then the tins, later 
timber stocks, industrial stocks, properties and hotels 
were all buoyed up on the strength of investors' 
expectations . 
.... the export sector was in top form, spearheading the 
upward thrust of the whole economy (9.n 9.ttractive 
growth rate of 23% over 11978' s) ..... 
.... The strong export earnings not only had a direct 
impact on the profitability of exporting companies but 
also benefited other co~panies indirectly through the 
9A.s similarly argued by Hurst (11970) for the Dow "chic1.cen" (Dow Jones 
30) versus the GNP "egg" (U.S.' s GNP) . 
rising levels of affluence • 
.... the plantation counters, particul~rly rubber, came 
in for a good deal of bullish attention even ea rly in 
the ye~r, setting the p::lce for the rest of the market ." 
(Malaysia~ Bus iness " 980 , pp.5 & 7) 
5.3 Some Empirical Evidence on the 'Leading Indicator' Hypothesis as 
applied to the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange's Plantations Sector 
5. 3 .1 Exploring the 'Leading Indicator' Relationship using Quarterly 
Data B'3.se 
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The correlation coefficients between KLSE Plantations index and 
the GNP obtained in the quarterly-interval runs demonstrate a very high 
'3.nd stable correlations over the six quarters analysed, i.e. as 
summarised in Table 5-2. No significant differences were found in t he 
r values between the stock prices and GNP - from wh ichever way one 
looks at, " I L . 9 . whether KLSE Plantations iniex , leads' the quarterly 
perfornance of the GNP or otherwtse. On strictly statistical terms this 
is what appears to be the case, "I 1.: • e • the end of quarters ' KLSE 
Plantations indices and the quarterly esti!1lates of GNP may in fact 
react to the same or similar causes - possibly the stable economic 
environ!1lent enhanced by the govern!1lent is one of the causal factors . 
However, one factor that see'llS to affect the stock market , at 
least as observed in the past, 'Nas the poli tical development on the 
domestic front which was not captured. in this analysis . 1 C) 
Nevertheless, for lags up to the first two quarters it appe'3.rs that the 
KLSE Plantations index leais slightly over the corresponding qU'3.rterly 
GNP estimates , while for the preceding four qU'3.rters the reverse 
I
I
OIn fact this is the tricky part to study 1.u'3.nti tatively . 
example Hurst (11970 , pp . 1511-157) for an analytical ::lccount 






Table 5-2: " Le:ld-l 3..g" Relqtionships bebveen eni of QU'3.rters ' 
KL3E Pl3.nt~tions iniex, QU'3.rterly No~i~ql G~P ~3ti~ates 
8.ni Qu~rte rly ~vera~~ Prices of Rubber qni Pql~ Oil , 






Corr el3.tian 80efficients with la~s 
(La~s in qU:lrters) 
II 111 IV V VI 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) Stock p:-iceg ~ }1P: 
~LSE ~q le:lis QG1P 8 . 951 ** J . 9t'5** ).9r)** J.937** 'J . 923** 'J . 9116** 
QG~{P leais ~LSS$q '). 94- ') *.* 0 . 94-'2** 0.94-3** 0.94-7** 8.14-~ ·*l(- 0 . 94- ~)(ol(-
( B) Stock ?rices ~ CO:lmo1.ity p:-i8eS ! 
C) Av.?,e prices of Rubber 
KLS E.l)q le9.1.s RSS1 -0.057 -().051 -0.0,t4 -().O,t6 -().0~3 -Q.04-2 
RSS1 ' leais KLSS$q -0.0') 9 -0.04-6 -0.039 -0.02~ 0.001 0 . 0')5 
b) ~v ge price3 of Pql'Tl ')il 
-~LSE 3q le8."is CPJ 0 .53)** 1 . 536** ).529** ).5,')2** ).47)'** ·J.435*-l(-
CPO leais t{LSS 1)q O.46t** O. 4-53*')(- O. 50) )(0 .)(- 0 .571 ' ** 0 . 611** 0 . 627 ** 
--------------------------------------------------------- ---- ---------
* Si~nific9.n8e Cit 5~ level . t{LSS,)q = 1(L3S ~ Rubber in"iex . 
** Signifi8ance ~t 11 level. Q' ''~D ' J _ _ = ,~,.l ~ rterly G:lP 8sti'Tl:lte. 
Non-s i~nific~nt fi~ur~s are not Q3'31 = Rubber s~okej sheet Gr '3.i 9 
ienotei by '3.ny synbol. pri8es. 
CPj = cru·ie p8.lll oil prices . 
rel8.tionship see 'ns to hali. A.s fq,r as the results inii89.te, the KLSS 
Plant'ltio!1s iniex ten"is to leari t~e overall econo~ie perfor'Tlqn~e by '3. 
cle~r six months of to ~ore 
t th r! ',TP q U8.r ers , e ~ _~ appe:lrs to lea1 The re '1 SO'1 to th 1. s 
lie s presu~:lbly 'tlith t~e eeono.1ly qS ~ ':(~ole '.('1ich proviies the i~petus 
or st8.rtin,g poi'1t for the 'Tlark~t to le9.i thereon . O!1e possibl9 clue to 
this :lr~unent lies in the observ:ltion th'lt the ~qrkgt ~ost of the ti~ e 
reacts to offici8.1 projec:tio!1s on the stq,te of the e~ano~'{ 12 llonths 
into the futur e - '3.S for eX'3.'Tlple 9.nnu'3.1 bu"i.get spe e ches woul ,"i h'3.ve 
9.ffected th e 'Tl3.rk9t. In this context , the r e 3ul ts 8.re 1lore incline i 
towq,rds supporting the 9.r,:sunent thqt the KLS S Plantqtions iniex is the 
I chi8ken ' her ' eO'O's ' 
-:>..., in ter1ls of tot.ql .goois 
:lnd services pro:iucei by the econo~y. 
From here tltlO points shouli be borne in llin1., i . e . being the 
limitq,tions for the abo7e an9.1Y8is . Firstly, co~p'3.rin~ qU8.rterly 
fi~ur'~s ~:tY not qC8ur~te picture especially with recs~ris to 
stock ~ar~et rnove~ents. T~e stock ~arket for one thin~ ftu~tuqtes 1uite 
err~tically even '/l ithin ~ Iveel{, let alone q lu~rter! So to the extent 
th~t qu~rterly G~P 2sti~~tes w~re close to bein~ ~ccu~~te, ~ny 
inaC8Ur3.cy couli fallon the:? KL38 Plant'3. tions ini ices - in this C'3.se 
eni of qU'3.rte~s' closin~ quot'3.tions t'lere usei. 1'1 the bro'li 8.nalysis, 
the stocl{ ~8.~ket injex ~'3.y move along q 3-~onth ~ovin~ avera~e. But the 
qU2stion 8.rises here in th'3.t if byacciient the stock prices '3.ctu~lly 
fell below the movin~ average '3.t the en1 of ~ p8.rticul8.r qU'3.rter, then 
in effec t the r value measurei W'3.S a correlation between an 
'unjeresti~atei iniex' with the G~P esti~~te at the eni of th~t 
lU'lrt2r. If, by qni l'3.rge, the enj of lu~rters' figures for t"1e KLSS 
Pl.'1nt'ltions iniex were unieresti~ation3, the'1. the result t,v,)uli be 
tellin~. Ho1,.,9 V er, it seellS th'lt the injic es f,.,ere either overesti~'3.tions 
or f.'111 alon~ or close to the llovin~ 8.vera~e 'is the hi~hly 
sissnific'int r value (r=').91 1 ) iniicates. 'f~us to reiu~e the r'3.njo~ 
fluctuations, s"1orter int erv~l runs shouli proviie '3. better re~ult. ~ut 
the n to 'i P po r t ion 8. t e G ~ Pes t i ~ ate s i !1 ~ 0 nth 1 y t e r~ s 11 ~ Y not be '3. 
fe~sible proposi tion or rqther 1,.,ou1j be open to serious cri ticis11 . 'rhe 
closest possibility woulj be to ru~ a correl'3.tion between e ni of 
~ont~s' T{L3S Plant~tions iniices l!lith their correspo'1.1in.g ('lnd llonthly 
la~s) merchqndise export figures or vqlu~ 'l1iei by the ~ 3e:?8tor. 
The seconi li~itation to note here is the possibility of 'rel qtive 
t 1 ' 11 s '1 eness 
1 1 _ l-]. e t e ~ 'c 0 r po r ~ t e sl-]. ell s ' h q s bee:? nco in e 1. 
iescrib~ '3.~on~ others this ~oniition of the 
co~parei with nost shares in other sectors. 
un by K'1Y~ ~l q'=31-) 
plqnt~tion sh~res 
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contribute to th,= re'1l:lrl.{,3.ble stability12 in the r values bot'"! T"1.yS up 
to the six quarters 1.nalysei . Perh1.ps the industrials sector would have 
riispl1.yed llore vol1.tile fluctU1.tio'1s in their sh.!3.re price 1love1lents , 
and hence 9 ' le8.i-1a o ' ~ rel8.tionship could e1l,=rcse po si ti vel y from it . 
The salle ar~ullent can perh1.ps holi true when comparison is marie between 
:(LSS Pl8.nt1.tions iniex 1.n1 the v8.1u~ .1.i'1e1 by the A. '3ector or estates 
sub- sector in place of the total GNP esti'1l1.te . 
, 1ea1- 1aO" 
? r elationship betv.;~en stocl( prices 1.n1 
l(9 Y agricu 1 tura 1 c orn'1loi i ty prices the I' val U·3S obtained were not th3. t 
stroncs , '3.S T1.ble ') - 2 Ln:iicates . In f!lct rubb ·er price fluctu'3.tions cast 
!l 1l.!3. .jor i'llpact on the accuracy of t~e results , 1.S the very 1JTH' and 
ne,gative correL3.tions prove1 to be the case . Nevertheless the resul ts 
see1l 1:J S~J·." th'3.t the t(LSS Pl1.f1t1.tions injex 1ea1s the crui ·e p8.1:n oil 
prices: r<J . 5')), i1lplyin~ th1.t the '1lark,=t tr':3.iers '3.nticip'3.te rises 0r 
falls in cru:i3 U1.111 oil prices far better th1.~ their expect!ltion along 
Sill i 1 a r lin e 0 'f err u b be r p ric e s . ~ 0 n,= the 1 e s S, '1l 0 nth 1 y .-l '3. t 1. 1 ') TNO U 1 d 
proviie '3. better insi~ht i'1to the possibility of '3. 'leai-l8.CS' 
p ric '= s 0 f rub b e r '3. !1 i p'3. 1 11 0 i 1 . T'"! i s f J I' n s t h '= n e"( t s t 1. .g e 0 f t h 9 
an '3.1 ys is . 
12\8 for inst'3.nce W'3.S provei to be the C!lse -lurincs the SSS' s b'3.1 
t i rn e s 1 '3. stye 1. r : " . . . . the p 1 u n ~ e in t "1 e Sin cs a po rem !l r k e tin 
199~ .•••• , one of the world ' s \O{Jrst perfornances in 193~ , ·.o{'3.S s'3.v8i by 
the b uoyancy of Y[1.1'3.ysia ' s plant'3.tions sector" ~ Z'3.chs 1'935, p . l1) . 
13D'3.ily dat'3. Tlloul'1 be the best solution but 'Iloulri be pr:lctically 
unrnan:l~e1.ble within the scope of this thesis . 
79 
5.3.2 EKplorin~ the 'Le~iin~ Iniic~tor' Hypoth~si~ usin~ 10nthly D~tq 
B~se on Rubber qni Pql~ Oil pri8es 
Without ioubt the scenario went in opposite iirectio~s with 
respect to th9se two commodities 110St of the ti~e as correlqtei Rgainst 
the KLSS Plantatio~s in1ex, qS Tqble 5-~ 1e~onstr~tes. Correlqtion 
coefficients ~vith monthly lags 3ee11 to reflect the KLSE Plantqtions 
iniex qS the leaiing iniic~tor to expectations in rises or falls i~ 
cru:ie pql~ oil prices - ;,vi th r=-~.1 1'31 ~fter a '!lonth's lag as cOllp'lrei 
with r=-O.1967 when palm oil price'S were qS3ullei to be the leaiin~ 
indicqtor. 14 On the other siie of the coin the reverse situqtion 
eller~e3, L.e. rubber prices qS3ullei qS the l~qiing iniic~tor proviiei q 
stronger correlqtion wi th the KLSE Plantqtions injex - ',;i th 1'=). 657~ 
after one ~onth's lag (r=O.6473 when the iniex is la~~ed). 
Tqble 5-3: "L3a'i-Iag" ~elqtions't1ip3 betw'gen enrl of ~onths' 
~L3S Plantqtions in:iex qni ~onthly Avera~3 prices 
of R'lbber qni Pql:n OL 1, J'lnuqry 197) -D9Ce11b9r 119'3) 
----------------------------------------------------------------
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~LSS~q = ~L3E 3 q~bb9r or ?l~nt'ltions iniex. 
141 '-1e ne~'3.ti'lely :3llall l' -.,qlu:!s in:iicqte thqt the 1l0nthly 1l0'le'!le'1ts 
of crui9 pqlll oil prices, an P19 '3.'lerag9 , flustu'1 tes clase to p'lrqllel 
ta the x-q'{is qnd in approxi~Jltel y opposit9 dire8tions to l(LSE ~ 'lbb 9r 
iniex's treni bet',;eenqpproxi~qtely th3 '2nj l.uarter of 1 97~ ani thiri 
qU'3.rter of 193') (sge FL~. 5-2) . 
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Fro~ these two 0pp~sin~ results ~~ i~no~t~~t prob~ble relqtionship 
eller.!Sei 'If I-} i chi s i llport~n8e, i . ~ . 'It leqst 
prices can b3 usei ~s ~n expl8.n8.t)ry v8.ri'3.ble if q lloiellinfS exercise 
lS to be 8.ttellptei. 
It 8.ppe8.rs th'3.t th3 rubber pri8es teni to le8.i the treni in 
plant~tion sto~'< pri~e:3, '3.S FiCS . S-2 :rnnl y sh~ ,:.,s. This re'3ul t seellS 
logical since rubber cOllp'lnies constitute a llajor p8.rt of KLSE 
Pl8.nt'ltio'1s in:iex, i.e. 7)~ of the cOllp~nies incluiei in the iniex ar8 
those principally involve:i in rubber estate llanacsellent. In ter'ns of 
nu~bers 22 of the counters (out of ))) ~re clqssifiei as ring~it rubber 
cornp'lnies, even th:JuCSh a lar~e nUllber of the plant~tion ~ollp'lnies '3.re 
~iversifyin~ into oil p~lll ani ~oc~a/coc:Jnut; with '3. few (5 cOllD8.nies -
investllent holiinfS cOllp~nies~ni ~t le~st one (L8.nd~'3.r':<3 Holiin~s) even 
d i versi fiei in to prope rty 'i e"1 e lop-nen t. In £''3.C t in req 1 ter1l s on the 
'lverage only r)~ :Jf total pl'lntei .qre~ :Jf th~ )) cOllp'3.ni-es are unier 
rubber, '.tTi th u'lier oil ~ni another de 'lotei t:J coco~ 
even excee:ie1 th)s-e occupiei by rubber. 
Palrn oil pric~s :iii not move in sten ~tTith rubber pric~s in the 
1971(11) - 1977([II) q-:1i 193)(LV) periois, -,v'1ere the y llove invers-ely to 
ea~h other. As su~~ p'llll oil price3 will h~ve ~nly qn e1uilibr'3.tin~ or 
adjustin~ eff-ect on the b~sic tr-end, 'It le'3.st with r espect to these out 
of tren:i perio:is. 'wh-e n both ~o~lloiity pric~s ~ove i-:1 step they Tlfill 
exert '3. rnqrke:i i1lp'3.ct on the pl'3.nt'ltion sh'3.re nrices. In f'let ~ost of 
the tille pqll1 oil prices ten:i to foll) -If cl:Jsely \'lith t'1e 1l0'/ ellent in 
rubber prices. For inst'3.nce by co~p'3.rincs th3 tillinfS of the pe~ks in the 
15'3 3e Appendice3 A, D '3.ni F for jetqils on the pl8.nt'3.tion stocks 
1u)tei on the KLSE . 
gO 
prices betwe en 11930-JI 934 , then historically rubber pe3.ks fi rst (in 
1930) , followed by the plantation share prices (in early 193JI) and 
later by palm oil (in 1193 4-) . Since palm oil prices 'ilove after rubber 
prices , then it would seem logical that KLSE's plantation share prices 
move ahead of palm oi 1 . Hence , it is purely coincidental that KLSE 
Plantations index ' leads ' palm oil prices . However, this line of 
argument may not seem a plausible one - at least with reference to te 
earlier periods prior to the 1973 crash and during 11974("I1) - 1977(I1I) 
when the two commod i ties tracked opposi te trends . Nevertheless, this 
b r i ef deviation from the normal trend could well be due to the first 
oil shock of 11973/J1974 to which the Malaysian economy took time to 
adjust . ~s it turned out the economy was well prepared when the second 
oil shock carne in J1979/J1930 - and the trends in the rubber, shares and 
palm oil prices follow the normal pattern . 
The reason behind the argument that crude palm oil prices act as 
an equilibrating force to the basic trend lies largely fro'il the 
commodity ' s relatively more stable spot prices (compared to rubber) on 
the world market in the 1976-11932 period, i . e. hovering in the vicini ty 
of M$1 , 000 to ~$1 , 500 per tonne . This is largely due to palm oil's 
wUder base as a cookUng oil, consumption product and industrial end 
uses (e . g . in the manufacturing of soap and margarine) and ~1alaysia' s 
ability to capture a burgeoning share in the world 's oils-and-fats 
market . In fact the current recession could have bi tten harder into 
~alaysia ' s international reserves w~thout palm oil acting as a 
• cushion ' (together with petroleum) against the worsening export 
receipts . Wi th regard to rubber , the scenario differed 'lui te marked ly 
which is largely dependent on the state of the EI\Cs ' industrial output 
and to some extent to stock ad.justments as a resul t of increased 
manufacturing output . Rubber prices would move ahead of palm oil 
prices because of its investment nature, i . e . that of an industrial raw 
gIl 
material). Meanwhile , palm oil being largely a consurnption pro:luct 
would tend to move after the movement in investments - in this C9.se 
following the trend set by the rubber prices. 
5.4 The 'Leading Indicator' Hypothesis and the Stock Market Crashes of 
11973 and 119811 
lhe next question to 9.sk is whether or not the 'le9.ding indicator' 
hypothesis did hold true :luring the stock market crashes? The 
correlation coefficients only indicate the extent to which the 
movements of the KLSE $ Rubber index and the rubber and palm oil prices 
conform linearly w~th e9.ch other most of the time. Random fluctuations 
do occur and this aspect will be discussed later. 
W~thin the space of merely 12 rears the KLSE had experienced two 
stock market crashes - t .e. in 11973, the effect of which lasted for 
nearly two years, and in 19811, followe:l by a recession which lasted for 
11- months (Neoh 11933). The two crashes had both common as well as 
different features. The common feature was that many investors got 
their fingers burnt - as ' greater fools'! The differences between the 
two crashes, apart from the duration of the recessions that followed, 
were several - among the notable ones include:-
i) the economic pre-conditiQns prior to the two crashes differ; 
i i) the upturn in the share pri ces I"as bri ef in the run up to 1191'3 
while the run up to 1I9311 extended over a longer period; 
iii) the downturn in the share prices w'as sharper in the 119311 cr9.sh; 
and iv) the M9.1aysian economy was boo~ing during the 1973-74 ye9.rs, 
while 11981 saw the effects of economic slowdown in the West 
that began to hit the econo~y . 
As Fig. 5-2 indicates, the pe'3.king in the KLSS $ Rubber index did 
not coincide w~th the price peaks in rubber and palm oil in 
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Figure 5-2: Monthly Closin'Ss of t(LSE Pl'lnt!ltions index 
'lnd Monthly Avera~es of Rubber ~nd pqlm Oll prices, 
Jan U-9. ry 1 972 - June 11984 
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Table 5-4: Percenta~e An~u'3.l Rqtes of Chqn~e 
KLc)S $ Rubber 
i ch ~yr enj) 
~ ch (high)-
~ ch (lovi)-
G~?( ~1) bil.) 
trch ~yr en1) 
RSS I pric'9s+ 
% ch (yr qv) 
" LY\ • " IJ r- J pr1.ce s 
--c:rch ~yr 3.'1) 
KLSS turnovers '! 
in KLSE $ q~bber i~iex , Gross N~tionql Proiu~t, 
Rubber 3.ni P3.lll Oil prices, 1 'J72 - 11992 
72 T3 71- 77 
262 295 208 222 
113 13 - 30 7 
n.3.. ~J 3 23 
n.q. 4- - 33 . 3 
76 77 
218 311 447 
- ? 42 44 
1 2 42 65 
-7 -. 2 . 3 
79 131 32 
625 9~~ 929 747 
40 32 .6 -110 
44 313 5 -.) 
. 02 -. 02 21 3J 
13.913.121.921.525.931.136.21-3.150.154.358'1 





179 1 37 
9 - 24 
1'99 2')3 2)0 279 
46 2 , ) 22 
)12 273 2J1' 
12 -117 - 22 
616 917 1574 10J2 1027 1316 1415 1425 1212 1299 1059 
- 2'i 71 ' 72 -36 2 23 3 I _1 17 6 -l i S 
~ q~bbers: 11.3 1 5. 7 
y~ 
9 . 6 
-1 7 
)2 . 1 
104-
7 . 3 
-21 
24 . 9 36 . 3 +7 . 7 185.3311 . 2 95 . 4 S~ . 6 55.1 
~ ch ~yr tot) 253 
,)Ll ?'3.11ls : 11.5 
-:reh (yr tot) 12 
-22 43 )0 
3 . 7 11.9 38 . 1 
1 6 39 1 77 
121 - 23 119 -12 -35 
19.716.154.3 4!J . 4 26 . 5 
-35 -1 8 237 -26 - 34 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
~)TS: - As cOllparei with hi~h'9st ani l~west levels in e~ch year . 
+ ~ubber prices in M~laY3iqn sen p9r ~~ . 
, Cruie palll oil prices in 1~ per tonn'9. 
~ {LSS tra1ing turnJvers ~volulle) in llillion units . 
Sources : KLS~ D'3.ily Closing Iniices, 1 972-1 99~ - ~LSS iniex . 
T~e {LSS Jqzett'9 - hishe~t/lowest levels for KLSS Lniex . 
Quarterly ECJnollic Bulletin - the rest of the v'3.ri'3.bl'9s . 
5 . 4 .1 11-}e ~~laysi'3.n Stock :hrl.('9 ,t Cr'3.sh of 197) 
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From q purely lealin~ iniic'3.tor expect~tioTls '3.ppro3.ch th'9 ~L:;S ~ 
Rl1~ber index vns cleqrly le~iing the G~P '1'1i 1.(ey cOllmoiity orices, ~s 
Tsbles 5- 1- and 5 - 5 iniic'3.te. Prior to the 197) erqs"'l, by the eni of 
1972 the plant'3.tion stock pri~es '3.ppreci'3.tei by ~s llu~h '3.S 11)'6 -,,"lile 
~~P grew '3.t sn annual rate of nearly 1)~ . By the end of the Sa1l9 ye'3.r 
both the rubber '3.n1 pqlm oil prices fell by 9~ '3.~1 231 resp3ctvely . In 
the fi r s t qua r t e r 0 f 1 9 T3 , 1\1 a 1'1 y s i a' S ..r 'f P fell C; ~ in r e!11 term s from 
the seasonally 3.1justei annu'3.l r9.te of the pre.ceiincs three llonths , 
prj ces peql.{ei juri ncs the seconri 1U'1rter of 1 g73 . It q?"peqrs th'lt t~~ 
- ~t le'lst ~s t~9 stron~ rql1y st3~ei by t~e ~'lr(ets i~ ~ew Yorl.{ , ~6~yo 
:Inri 1-{on:s ~on~ ,;.,ouli su~~est IS~3 Fi~s . 4- 1 '1nj -+ - ~~ . IYl ':tIl thr~~ - t"1e 
~Y3E CO'llposi te , rro~yo s . E . ~e ~.,r :In-i H~n~ Sen~ i ni i ::!es 
p9!l1(~j befor3 Kl.,SS ' S . bio bull .., r'lYl 0 f 
1,)71 - 7~ -"'13 probqbly ',r8ry fr'l~jle qt beC)t sin~e it 'tl 'lS not 111stifiqble 
in t~r~s of the 8cono~jc cnvironnent of the ti~e . 
1973 for rubber qni 1971 Ln t''1 (~ c~se of D1.1~ o il, befor'9 iecljnin~ to 
prices by ~lT.ost 1-? ye '=irs! ?rob"lbly t'1? r?'lson b~hi:d tie S''1'1 .... o ~r'1sh 
~e'3e s~'lrp junp3 in the oric~s of ~he both 
Fol10,tlin~ the be..,innincs of the crqsn in the thi r ·i l. 'l'lrter of 1 g7 , 
s "1 ~ r p io wn t 11 r n sin the tun 0 v ~ r for ri n ~ ~ i t rub b e r s 11 q res ~3 1 ter1. 
fallin~ by 5S~ qn1 1~~ iurin ~ t~~ thiri ~ni ~ou th 1Uqrt~rs of J~e sq~ e 
ye'lr . In conLr'lst . ~~ turnover :or oil 0'3.111 s~'3.res f e ll prior to the 
c r '3. S h (f ell by 5"3 -.; q n i 4- '5 ~ -:1 u rj niSI J 7 2 ' s fo u r t ~ 111 '1 r t e r q nit ~ e fir s t 
Tqbl e 5- 5: ~erc~nt~~e ~u'3.rterly ~qt~s of C~'3.n~e 
i:l ~LSS ?lqnt'ltio:ls iniex: , ':iross Nqti6n'3.1 Proiu~t , 
Rubber qni ?ql~ )jl prices iurin~ t~~ 
Stock ~'l r~et Cr'3.shes of 197 3 '3. n i 1 931 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
' ;:''3.sh of 197~ ' ' ~rqsh of 19-=)1 ' 
------------------------ -------- - -------------------
1'172 ....... 1g7"3 ....... . 
I r t I I I I 1 I '! 
1<"13J 
~V 
• ••••••• 1 g~ 1 ••••••••• 
t II IV 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
t(LSS .... Rubb~r 21+ <i')C- T3J ?l~ 2g~ S2t g?"3 F)lC) ·S <")1 S21 .) -7 - ') 
., f"h'3.n :"'-" l') 11 t - 1"3 _. 1))"3 5 1 2 1 ) - )4 2 ') :J ..... ~ -:> ...... 
G\l?( '11) ~j 1 . } ?)S7S "34-5 1 4-217 1-~~') ]- SS"34- 1 2,)74- 1 )"3'11 1 ")gP5 1 "37"32 1 ") ')72 
--:r-chqn~e 1 ,.- ')? 1 S 1 1- - ) 1 1 4 - 1 - "3 - ":) 
~~S I pri~es+ 1 )5 1 ) 1 1 4- 9 13) 1'15 ")T5 217 ?rg _J 2~1 21 g ; 
ch'3.nge 19 23 1 1 21- ,.- 2 -) - '1 - 7 -12 0 'J 
S?) pri~es 50S ')11 371 }Sl 12)) 122J 1 4-) ~ 1121- 12')7 1 1 ,)7 
----:r-ch'3.n~'= - ? 1::) '),.-- ) 1 ') 21 I') 17 -1 - 1 1 -I ) 
T{L,)S tu rnovers!l: 
1) q;.lbber : ) . 7 4 . 1 7 . ~ 2 . ) 2 . J 1 5 . , 23 . 4 "3"3 . '2 1 ~ . 1 11 . S 
-1 ~hqn~9 1 2 1 1 79 - oS 3 - 1'3 - 3,=) 1-1) 42 - )') '1 :J 
? qlrn ')il : 2 . ') 1 . 1 1 • g 2 . J 4. 6 7.3 1 1 . '1 16 . 4 '7 ~ 1. S I • 
" 
--
v chqn~e - ')"3 - +) 77., ::) 1 <i') - y} C)"3 Y3 - ')] - ')S 
-------------------- - - - - - ------- --- ------ -- - ------ - - - ----- - ------- -- -
:.I)'fs : ~otqtions 113-=-:1 q?:e 3'3.11~ 1.S 1'1 ~'lble ) - . 
I , II , I_I 'In-:1:1 r-=f-=r t~ 1st, 21.i, )!'1 'ln1 1l~ T.l'l?::,=rs. 
Sources : Sln~ qS for ~'lbl-= )-1 . 
In contrqst to t~e run up to the 197") cr~s~ , t~is ti~e the re9.sons 
behin'i the rises prior to the 19':)1 cr1.sh 1S so Hvie~ qn'i see~ to 
f 0 1 low the e c 0 neil j c f u ni a 11 e n t '11 s q tIe q s l s c't. e 0 f t ~ e c '3. '.1 S e s '1. ~ e 
enrjo~enously b'1Se1 . T~e 1.nnu'3.1 ~rowt~ ~1tas of olant'3.tion stock prices, 
rubber '3.n'i 0'3.11: oj1 prices '3.11 ~r~\V gr'3.'iu'3.1Iy froil t~e aftarn1.th of the 
last cr'3.sh '3.ni out of the 1974 - 75 recession . T~e rubber prices b8~'3.n to 
f ·'111 frorr. the first 1ulrt~r of 1'131 O(Hrlr'is, i . e . f'3.11ing by ")r.; , g-:; , 
71 ani 12 1 respecti~ely in ter~s of 1u1.rterly ~rowth r'1tes . T~~ falljng 
COrT:1101 i t y ori ces 'tlere soon C'3.UCSht '.1"9 by pq111 oj 1 \-r~j ch t~3n re':!or1e1 
1ec1ines in the orjer of 11 , 11 1 qn 1 1 7. '1) • ) ] n th~ sqconrJ to £'ourth 
l U '3.rtqrs ~e'3pectj'!e1y. In t~'3.t respect the f1.11inCS cO'TlT.oiity prices 
serve '3.S s:i gnqls for '3.n q'ventu'3.1 stock 't'3.r1.(et cr'3.sh in nlqnt1.ti on stoc <: 
notice'3.b1e incre'3.ses in interests o'ler pl1.Ylt1.tion stocl<:s 1.S '[ore qn1 
pl'3.nt'3.tion stocks '3.S co't~ojjly orices ~0rs9nei . 
time 'Ilhen the ''';0:-11 8con011 Y ~O['3.S 1.1 ,justi n~ i tsel f to t"1e se':!on'i oi 1 
16T~e so - c1.11 e'i 117") '3.td 1 g'jl cr'3.s~e'3 1.r3 not re1.1 ~r1.s~es, '3. • .., 91.S 
not i nth e T. 'L) nil 1 i 3 1. sse e n by t ~ e TIll 1 1 ') l :- '2 2 l ~ 1. S ~ 0 f 'l21 . 1'~ <; Y 
'.vere in f1.~t 'rd11' cr'3.shes 'IS l~e oercant1.'S3 iec1inr;s in t~e iniex 
sho ',-rei - '3.t l ::nsl T.vit~ t~ 'e pl'3.nt1.Uo~s sec or - TV; ~ '3. -1 ")~ '1ni -)t"\ 
f'3.I1s iuring t~e ")ri 111'3.rl e s of 1'17 ) 'Ini 1911 r~sp9ctively . 
Furth :~r-nore, t~e lr'3.iin:s turnove~ 'vere not t'11." l1.rge :'0 iniicq e q'1Y 
p'lni sel1jn , 1.S '3.ble C)-C) 'o[ol.11i in1i,:!qt ~ . ::t ':lOuIi see'll ~en this 
sec tor ':1'3. S not b '3. i 1 y ~ '1 1-{ en '3. t e r 1. 1 I , I' e 1 '1 " i 'I e ~~ 0 ~ ~ e 0 t h 3 r e c t 0 ~ s 
~e3'9 13ci'3.11y iniustri'3.1s, fin'1nce, ~otels qn1 prooe~ ies~ in ~e contex 
of the over'3.l1 m'3.r~e · cr'3.sh . 
further inereqses in cC'Tllloiity prices p'1rti~ul8.rly t'le st08 1(pilin~ of 
1 99~ , p . s) . All these ~Qi ~'11v8.nisin~ eff~8ts on eonlloiity price 
tr9n·is , p~shjn~ Dr-ices to '3.11 - tine hi.CS':1s 
stron~ e xport e'1rnin~s 8.ni cquse positve illp'1ct on the profit'1bility of 
+ . exporvln~ conp'1nies . net result IoJ''1S series Qf 'Sood corpor'3.te 
~or eX'1~ple , by 193~ '1 ?~1~ 
inc r e q s e i n t r '3.1. j n ~ vol u 1: e S Ttl '3. S '3 e e11 j n p q 1 11 0 j 1 co Ut'l t e ~ s q 10 11 ~ • .\ 1 lin 
'3.11 , th9 y eq r 1971 '3'1','; the p l 8.nt'3.tion stoc'-<:s ~'Je'Sinnin~ ''lith rubber 
sh1.r l~s) setting t~e for '1 biry bull run for t~e w~o]e l11.r'-<:et - ] . e . 
-, 
re'Tl i nis8ent of the eqrly lj78s . If! contr'1st t~ou'S"1 , t~9 \le '.; Yor1( 1.ni 
S8ellS to frorn t'le 
seellincsly clouiless iOl1estie eco11o'Tlic 9nviroYlT.ent to thqt of the 
~qtheri n~ clouis in the i ni 'lstri 1.1 i sei 9conolli "33 ',';'1.S the too prosperous 
incre'1seri filT9fol1. fro:n the 1111 le'T91 , i . 2 . fron 1~4 , S7~ 11i11ion to 
:1S2 1, 616 reillion by eni of 1971. 6,,11 t~ese contribute to excessi"Te 
1 t · . 11 ,. h STI·ecu '3. lve 111.nlq ·';1.1~ . , Dreei ni tq tei 1. 
in '1 sh'3.rp crqs~ thqt, eventu'3.11v qrrjvei iurinrs t~e Sent e :r.be r 1uqrt~r 
of 1931 - '>lith 1. )+ ~ 1.rop O'ler the prec : djn~ '3 9coni or .}lly 1 '~'3.rt9r. 
If t~e exp·eri ence of 1 g31 er'3.sh is tq\<:en '1'3 '1n e XTr:p1 9 of t~ e 
1 7For exampl e , of the stocl( iqrlings qt t"1~ir peql(s 
recordei price - eqrni.n'S r'3.tios 1'1ell i.n excec; of 1~)~ , e . ~ . '~ql'1yqn 
';re :U t (213"b) B.n::l O~B~ ~15g~) if! 1171 , 1.n1. "1UI (176 "6 ), Pegi (~41~) Qn1. 
Pqc ifi c Dev (96~~) in I g71 C'leo~ 1 S,)b , 199,)c) . 
19!3.iincs i!iiic1.tor 'rt,{pot"1esis, t"1en in CS~T"!.er'1.1 iL wouli '1Pge'3.r Pl'3.t t"1~ 
KLS8 'S'i'.1bber iniex follo'",s the treni set up by the r1.1bb '~r 1."'1i TY3.111 oil 
prices . Tn essen~e L"1~!i rubber 1.r!i p9.11l oil p ices "tct qS si'SYl1.1s, i . ~ . 
D1'1nt9.tion stock D.::'i~~s . T~ that sense the ~LS~ Pl1.nt'3.tions iniex: 'tf1.S 
no t 1. 1 e 1. i i n ~ i n i i C'1 to :' i ~ 1 g g 1 • ~he other lesson h8r~ T.i~ht be th'1t 
strict '3.iher1.nce to iO'Tlesti c or ~o:ne - bre:i f'3.cto:::'s 
the other hqni , usi n~ overseq'3 i ni i C'3. tors 1.S the leqi i n~ y1. ris ti c~ 
coul:i spell i i s1.ster too, 1.S t'1e exued arlee 0 f t~8 1'17 ) cr1.s'1 h!3.i 
proven . 
l~e other interestin~ event thqt eller~2 ~Lthin the b9.ckirop of the 
pl9.nt!3.tion ~i9.nts of coloni'3.1 ori~in by 1!3.1!3.ysi'3.n inter~sts . ?he events 
h'3.v~ b e~ n '31.ii \11. 1 '3. 1'3 i 1. n t 1" 1 S t 
~onD'3.nies th1.t i'=ri'lei '3ubst1.r..t1'3.1 DrODor+.-ior.. of their orofits froT 
vi'3. the stocl{ T.1.r'-cet . :''1e iecli!iin~ CCT.'toiity pri~es, '.Je'3.~er.i!iCS of t'1e 
POuni st ~ :'1 i r.~ '3.ni t"le broqil y f1.11 i ~~ rubber stoc '-c ori ces OT"!. t'18 
Lo n ion t'1e o p po r t U!'l i t 1 for S 11 -:: h 
buyin~ O'fer of T.1.jori t'{ st'11.-(~ ir. 1.':l:nber of 
I'3T'1 '~ t '3rllS Ijk~ ' b1.ckioor rl'1tior."tlis'3.tion' ~jn'lolvjr.~ '1 b01.rirooll 
tllS 1 '1ni it: tr'1n ferin'S t'1 ,~ iOllicjl~ of il1= D'l by froT. Lonior. to 
:(ll'll!3. L1111p1.1r , ir.. 1'1te 197 5i, 'ronLioor r.'1tic!11.Us'1tio"'!' 'over '1'} 
so - C 1. 1 1 e j 1. '1 T,m r!3. i i 0 ' f ~ 1" ~ '.1 t h i ~ ~ 0 r p by P \l' '3 0 n 7 y:~ D t err. b ~ r 1 191) 1. n i 
_eono:r.i~ n!3.tion'3.1is!3.tior.. ' '1'3.\[ 8 b ·~en _oir.ei '.1D on \[qriou'3 o~cqsior..s in 
fin1.nci'11 ircles - in D'3.rti~ 11.1" in h~ lity . 
':!ornp8.nies trl'lL ',lere still ir. forejesn 'rl·H~i'3 . SOll~ of the conpqr.ies t'rlqt 
were su~cessfully brou~~t ~o~e 3r~ listei in Tqble ~ - 6 . 
T8.ble 5-6: Fo ej.=sn- o ivr.ei "?l'lr.t1.tior;. COllp'l!li~s T1.~e~ f}ler 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Gut"lrie Corp'*' 7 Ij /31 1rr 7 ?"I "-3 ~)4-~) 73 , 54") q , 'JP , ,., , JJ . J 
B1. r1 0 i f Sst . 21 IS/91 1')7 . J PTB (49;) ~ 1 4 , ')62 R, ')? 
?erl i s ?l 'lnts . (Y)"S) 
Dun 1 0 P ~s t . 29 Ij /'31 2=)2 . ') '1P:-I3 (r-l -1, \} 22,2S7 :1, I) P, ,., \ ') :J , '.J 
'J<=>~i 
.~-:> '\11.l1.Y3i1. ~ I' 7~) 
H'1E/}f1P3" 1 IS 192 )')6 . ) PNB (r 3-1) \ ') 'J 72 , ~'30 R, !) P, C 
Uti Pl'lr.ts. 6/1)/32 6)') . . ) '('11: 1)'.111. n ~iil q (7')1,) 1 C) , 921 JP 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
- tubber ~q), oil pqlT. ~)p) ~r.i 80C01. (C~ . 
* Only Guthrie Co rp W'lS ielistei fron Lo~io~ Stoc~ S~C~qnes9 fol10wir.~ 
P19 ' s successful 1 J)~ t'l~90Ve~ bji, 'lnd W'lS l~ter r9structurei 1.oi 
ren1.nei Ku~ou]Sln Guth-::,i~ S~rh~i i~ IgS2. , 
" ~8.rri90ns ~1.laysi3r. ~9t~t8S , ~qS 18.ter ~estru~tur8j Slni r3nSlnei 
q1.rrisons M'll1.ysi'lr. Pl1.r.t~tior.s B~rhqi in 1 ~9~ - 8.ni listsi on both 
the KL38 'l~d S~S , ~~i12 ~lS r~n'lins 1uotei on LSS. 
9j~) ; qni 78.rious issues of ?1.r 8qstern 
~~e ~i~~r.ci8.l ~irnes 1.~i T~e StrSlits Tines . 
CH\P-rE~ 6 
ca'C LUSIO NS AND PJLICY I~?LICATIONS 
~e t"lO -pron'-Sei obiective of t"1is stuiy boils io'';r. to 'lscert'3.in 
the V'3.1iiity of the "fo 11 o',v- t~e-l e1.ier " 'lni " 1 ..:J. e1. 11 n'S 
i n i i c '1 to:' " hypo t'1 e S e s '1 s '1 "001 i ~ ito t'1. e 1{ '.1 1.] 1. L u 1: 0 U I' S t 0 8 l{ S X C ~ 1. n'-S e ' s 
pl'3.nt1.tions s88tor . 1'1 bot~ p'lrts of the stuiy t"1 e 1{L'=3S ?llnt'ltions 
i nii ces of tlte ~wr11 ' s 11 r:sest bourses '1.8tu1.ll y r-efJ -ect t'1.-e i r:.vestors' 
e XD38t '3.tio!:s or o3r:!ej'rei vie'.'; on t:19 st1.te of +)1~ in-illstri'll , business 
. t 1 1 n u'1e to extent 
th'3.t those eXD3ct'3.tio~s '3.re r-e'1ljsei . ~o t'1 !3 l'1ter exposition , t1!e 
of tr'lie for r.1bbe:- '1.ni D'1.l't oj 1 . It ''1'1.3 '-vi..t~in the oren1se forth 
1.nd ::; . T'1 e ~ e n e r '1. 1~ 0 !: (! 1 11 S ion 1 ~ i no 1 i ~ Y i i! P 1 j ~ '1 t i 0 ':1 S t"1 '1 t i 8'3 e v 8 
iniex were s'l"Onort~i 31 :>ni 1 ~'lr..t1v ',vi tit r~3De ~ t to : 
i) ~ll of the iniustri~lised n'3.tions that ~'3.ke up t~e corrum 
f~r the Econo~ic Su~~it (except the Faieral R~p~biic of 
j~rnany , Fqj) - i.e. U.S . A., J~pan, Franc3 . U.K., C'3.n~ia ani 
It~ly; 
ii) al~ost '3.11 of ~qlaY3i~'s ~ajor traiing p~rtners - i.e. 
U.S.A., Japan, the ESC (ex~apt F~G , Belgiu~ and Den~ark), ~~CD 
)~eania (~lstralia ani New ~ealand), Hon~ {ong, Sin~apore ani 
l~dia; 
iii) so~e of the cou~tries which h~ve ~inor/n0 traie relations 
with ~alaysia - e .g. C'3.nada , SJut~ Afric'3., Norway, Finland, 
3~aien, ~lstri~ ~nd S~itzerl~ni ; 
iv) the country with no iiplomatic relation - Sout~ Africa; 
v) all courltries w'10se stock exchanges have co-listei share 
or shares as KL38's (ex~ept Copenhagen. Den~ark) - i.e. U.K., 
Hong ~on~ ani Singapore ; 
vi) ~ll countries of io~ocile or base to the world's lar~est 
rubber goods ~anufacturers (except FRG) - i.e. U.S.A. (wLth 
Firestone, BF Gooirich, Gooiyear , General Tire ani Uniroyal), 
U. K. ~ wit h D-l n lop p 1 c ), Fr ,a n c e (w i t h M i c h eli n), 1 tal y ani 
Switzerlanj 'with Pirelli), ~nd Japan (with Bfid~estone, 
Yokoha~a ani Su~ito~o Tyres ~ Rubber Proiucts ) ; 
and vii) the 3to~~ price iniices that rep~esent the sa~e or si~ilar 
sectors as ~LS8 Plant~tions index, i.e. in the c~se of 
Singapore (Straits Ti~es Plantations iniex) ~ni Iniia :All-
l~iia Tea Plantations iniex). 
Also, "l'1i thin ~ stoc~ ex:::han-se t~e i i fferent ini i~~s sh,)w varyin.g 
1egrees of correlateiness -,fith the KL~E Plantations index. A~on~ the 
not~ble finiin~s fro~ the ones analysed incluie the followings: 
i) Straits TL~es Pl~ntqtions index (r=l . g~~) outperfor~ed the 
Fr~ser ' 8 Injustrials ini ex 'r=a . 9J~) - as e~pected iue to the 
iifferences in se:::toral e~p~asis ; 
ii) Both the ~i~kei-w -f Jones iniex ~ r=O. g'f)) ani 10 '-<:y') StOC 1{ 
Sxchan~e ~ew in1ex (r=') . )17) ware hi~hly correlatei ~.;L th that 
of ~L3S's, with the forner showin~ a ~ar~inally stron~er 
correlation - as expectej also, largely 1u3 t') the l~rge 
nu~ber of stocks represented in both iniic e3 ; 
iii) 0\0{ ~ornes the interesting result ~.;'-li~h ~ould be s~en qS '3. 
iispute over the T,.,ijely heli const.qnt referen:::e to W-11 Jones 
Ind~strial Average ' nJ ~a) as the leaiing iniex for corporate 
A~erica and the world at lar~e. In ~o~parison , both the New 
1 0 f the t h r e e cor po rat ion son 1 y B r i i g est 0 n e T';'3. sin c 1 u i e i in the 
analysis iue to unavailability of dqta on the other two. 
Yor'( Stocl.( Exchqnge COl1posi teqnri th '~ Stqni'3.rri .y Poor's ~f)J 
C!Ol1PClSi te iniices were highly correl.qtei (1'=0. 371 ' ~nri ').9):2, 
respectively) wit~ ~L3S's, while the DJ ~) iniex registereri q 
low yet si~nific'3.nt r v3.1u3 of 0.169 . T~us, the DJ 3Q iniex is 
by fqr inferior to the othar two iniiceg; 
iv) Likewise, the Financi~l Ti~es-\~tuqries 5JJ iniex ~~s 
s~perior to the Financial Timeg Inriustri'3.1 Oriina~y (r=O . g~q 
ani ).733. resp3ctively) - both in terl1S of qctu3.1 wiier 
cover'3.ge qni l1ethoi of co~putation employei. For one thin~, q 
few of the ~o-listei rubber sh'lres on KL~E/S8S were incluiei 
in the FT-~ctuqrie3 50')-sh.qre index while only Dunlop Rubber 
'3.ppe3.rei in ~T 3') 's list of shares since its inception 2 ; 
'3.nd v) ~l1sterian's ANP-C!BS Internation'3.1e Concerns iniex shClw3i '3. 
superiority reference to KLSS's than the ~~?-~BS Co~posit~ 
iniex dii, with 1'=).592 3.ni ').428 respectively - as expectei 
with the presence of Unilever, also q plantation ~i3.nt in its 
01ffi right, in the '5 -sh'3.res ini ex of the fo r1l er. 
The '3.vera-se Dricas foOl' 1' 1'31 1 of pl'3.nt'3.tion stoc1{s '1uoterl on the 
13"8, SE3, HKSE 3.nd "(L3E ('-3il1e Dlrby) , on LSE, SES 3.ni ,{LS8 (CClnsPlant, 
Hi~h ~ 10".-1, I(LK, Kul im ani ~b.l3.1(off), 01. LSE '3.ni KL'S'~ (C3.stlefield), 
qni on KLSE ~ni SES (lP qni Gentings) '3.11 s~ow~i non-signific'3.nt 
i i fferences betTr'leen them ~ see T3.ble 4-')). This supPoOrts the expClsi tion 
th3.t the v'3.1u'ltion of 3h'3.res is ~eutr'3.1 to pl~ce of tr'3.iin~ 'lni teni to 
adjust accoriin~ly to fluctu'ltions in the exchan~e r3.tes. 
Tne relationship3 betT,.,r~en sh'3.re p~ices in 1931' of rubber proiu~in~ 3.ni 
rubber goois l1'3.nuf'lturin~ cOl1p3.ni~s iniic3.tei th'3.t in generql only 3.~. 
Gooirich ~l.S.~.), ~ontinent'll ~ 'll1rni- "v~rl(3 ~FRG), PLrelli ~[t3.1y) aTli 
Brirl~e stone ( J3. pan) ShJ iiei hi~h 1 y cons is ten t co rre 1 '1 t ions - r'1n::s i n:g 
frol1 an r value of 0.7) to ').g~ - ~ith 3.1110St '3.11 of t~e l1ajor rubber 
proiucers, 'lS sho~.,n in T'3.ble t-1. ~he b'lsis for these hi~h correl3.tions 
could be iue to the corpor'ltions' hiah US3. 7 e of natu~ql rubber in their "> .., 
o perq t ions, n~turql rubber/synth~tic rubber I' '3. tio. 
Furtherl1ore, B. F. Gooirich even h'lve (usei to) q Dl'lnt'ltion b3.se in 
Southern ~ilippines. 
2..... -l • 11 ~ee, 11'3.gr'3.11 in 
Argu9.bly, this stuiy TNell proviie '3. seconi 
relationshio. How~ver, if u-~ier the s.ssu11ption th'3.t the investors in 
the '"Q9.jor E~Cs are by 9.ni ls.rge intelligent r'3.tional 
in1iviiu!lls/insti tutions, th3n their aggre'Sate v9.lu'3.tion of the stocks 
are expecte~ or C9.n be expectei to be accur'3.te or close to being ong. 
As su~h their lfalu3.tion of S9.y B.F. ':i')oirich, must be b9.sei on sound 
econollic '3.ni investl1ent r'3.tion9.le - e.fS. in their perceivei ex:pect9.tion 
in 9. rise in the profit'3.bility of Gooirich, ~erh'3.p3 seen throu~h 
incre'3.sgs in Goodri8h's iniustri.ql output. This is then tr9.nslatei 
into G')oirich's risin~ 1e11ani for rubber to sunplelle~t the iepletion in 
its rubber stocl{s '3.S its plants st '3P up proiuction in response to 
incre'3.s:d ie11ani fro'1l the :notor an~ repl9.Cel1ent tyre iniustries in the 
U.s. ani it'S worl 'lwirie oper'3.tions. T~ short the '3.ppro'3.~h vi~n.,ei here 
o~ Go01ri8h's future iell'3.ni for rubber, r'3.ther th'3.n fro'll proiectinfS 
su~h ie119.ni b'3.sei on purely econolletric Sil1Ul3.tions~ or even t'3.l{in~ the 
cue fro11 the futureielivery prices 1uotei on the :t'lbber F'ltures ~ w1ier 
the 3.egis of th3 KU'3.l'3. LUllpur SOl1'lloiities Exch'3.nfSe, ~L~S). 
713 '3.nw':lile, th~ p'3rfornance3 of the other ~'3l'3.n stock 113.rkets '..;ere 
in sharp contr'3.st with KL3~'s. The 'llOlellents of the sh'3.re pric3s on the 
T'3.ipei, B'1ng1.(0l{ '3.ni ~'hnila exch3.nges TI1~nt in oPP0site iirections ~.v'~en 
cOllpareri to T.(LSE 3.ni the other big three - :lallely '::O'-<Y0, 40ng :(on~ ani 
~ ~10st econo11etrlJ projections on ~ol1moiity prices 'ire b3.sei on the 
trtiition9.1 supply/1e'llani forces, in which C!lse t~e expect'3.tions 
'3.ppro'3.ch '3.S seen through the eyes' of the stock l1arl{et Lnvestors in 
the S.\Cs l1ight 11'3.tch the results of econol1etric forec'3.stin~s - both of 
which rni~ht use the S'3.11e or sl llilar unierlyLng forces '3.S their b'3.sic 
criteri.q in their juigel1ents. 
Sin g 9. p~ I' e . 4 C~uld it be iua t~ the notion thqt investors '.lse t~3 
ll9.rket as a g9.llblin~ cqsino ~ for Tqipei) or t~e b3.j experience of the 
1979 crqsh thqt 'ieter T"lqi investors, ':lS ~1~Kinnon (1 193')) 'lssertei? Jr 
coulri it be iue to th3 unsettlin:g politic~l clirn':lte? H~wever, these 
questions qre best left U'1q~SW3reiqs they f1.11 outsiie the scopa of 
this thesis . 
~~croeconoTIicqlly speaking, the results '1ery 
correl9.tions betvleen t(L'3S ' s plant'ltion sh3.re prices ltlit'1 Gt{P l.ni e3.ch 
of its cOTIponents ( r,vi t hI'> '). 9~ 1 ) , the exports r':ltio 
' r=0 . 5911), the investlleTlt r':ltio ~r=O . 7)1), totql 1l0ney supply ~r=O . 3'3), 
private sector liquiiity ~r=).g25), 'lverq~e leniing rate by co~merci3.1 
ban~s I r =0 . 7))), an'i rubber prices f.o.b . ~r=0.72~). 
T~e I'L:3qii'1g [niicator" H'{pJthesis p'lrt of the thesis hi~hlight ':d 
sever'll ~eneral finiin~s with respect to t~e KL3S Pl'lnt'ltio'1s iniex. ~o 
the extent of the lillit'ltions, 'lS iiscussei in C~'lpter ') (pp.75-77), 
the results C'ln t~'.lS be concluiei 'lS follows: 
1 . T~e KLSE Pl'lntqtions iniel( TIar~inally le3.is the G~? 
9stiTI~tes by two 1uarters; 
2. Very ll3.r~inqlly, th~ KLSS ?lantqtions injex seellS to la~ 
behin'i the TIonthly average p~ices of rubber - illplying thqt 
the rubber prices can be vi:3wei qS t~e le'liin~ iniicqtor to 
the general 1l0venents in plqntqtion sh'lre prices; 
and ). A~'lin very mar~inqlly, the t(LSS Pl3.nt'ltio'1s iniex seens to 
leai the nonthly qverqge p'llll oil prices - couli w311 noint to 
the notion of t(L3S Pl3.ntqtioTls iniex 'lS the le3.iin~ iniic'ltor 
to ch'lnges in the prices ~f p~lll oil. Bowever, it is purely 
coinciieTltal th'lt t~is pattern of relationship eller~ei . It wa3 
rather thqt the gener'll 1l0'lellents in p'llm oil prices follow3i 
in step with rubber prices llost of the tille, ani thqt the t(LSS 
Plant'ltions iniex h'lppe'1s to f3.11 in between th3 t~J price 
trenis. 
1~o reference with the Seoul 'lni J'lk'lrt'l stoc~ l1ark3ts W3re l1aie iU3 
to incollplet J ti-ne series iqtq on the foner 'lni u1.3.'1'lil'lblity of 'i'lt,q 
for the latter' except iaily closin~ price listi.ngs for a few sh'lres, 
which incluie Gooiyear In'ionesi'l, in 3e~1 ~ ]hi ly). 
1) 
both ~ubb2r '1r..':l p'11"t oll pri 8es 'novi '0.CS 'll:r.ost i n conc~rt '.{L th ea(:h 
S~-N '1 cO'Tlpletely in'/erse rel:J.tjor..shiu . "?or one t'1in'S , the trends in 
these two co~noiities showei q consistent leqj- l'1~ rel'1tions~iu - wit~ 
~r.. t~e ot~er h'lrri the u~riojs froT. 
effect tq'<i n!S pI 'l~e -"hi 8~ 1.:3.i '1 ~'lrkei i llU1.ct on the nqtionql econollY . ) 
Since rubber ani the KLS~ ' s ulqntation sh"=ire prices rr.ove almost in 
t:3.niern -,'lith e'3.8h otl-J.~r - I/rit'1. t'1.e fOMl2r Ie"=iiincs 'lS early 'lS one \<Thole 
if the I • , ] n te rrn s ) i n rubber ~ i n 1 93') ) qni stoc,< 
prices mus t h 1. \! e 2xerted . , f" t '1 Sl :snl ,1 c'3.n to tl-J.e 
b'1sic lreni of ~L3~ ' s pl"=intatior.. shqre p~ices . 
~ubb3r nrices wer~ iefinitely the 1e'3.ijn~ iniicator qS f1.r '3.S the 
bull run prior to the 1'::;31 cr'ls~ "=ini t~e '1~?-11S) bri ef bllt sh'lru 
recovery 3u~~est Fi7 . ::> 5-? 1. i t only 'lfter 
iT1ini - p'lni~ of 1":.13'7) t~1.t palT. oil prj 883 'lr. 3.1 ]-tjT.~ 1. t '1 
corr:~oiities t1.e in 3.1 1 , 
pre - conditions nrior to the t-,m cr1.shes ii:f3r~i . ~1.e '::i 8.'vr. r~ii' ove ~ 
Guthrie Corp ~f'1S e ,(2~utei :lbO'.lt 1 1l0nt'1.s 'lft~r t~~ '13, :!r'ls1., -"~ile 
q:1S 'lwl th8 D3.nish- o'rmei Unil~l Pl'lnt1.tior.s or..ly T..'lteri'11isei iurin~ 
the r~cession1.ry p2rioi of 1:3.t2 1 (f31 - 1 ::rr2 . t\s it t'.lrr.2i out tl-J.e ~' ltl-J.ri? 
or'lb W"=iS by f1.r th ~ 'TIO t expensive of t~e lot . 
5 f,f~ich is definitely the C3.se in ... he current ~e ession '<{here pqlrn oil 
(qp1.rt fro'TI petro12umJ rn:3.n'l~e to '<eep the n1.tion goin~ despite t1.8 fqll 
i n prices o f '3.11 five pri'Tl'3.ry cO'TIrto::iities! 
11, ]oo1.(s '18 t~ou~~ t-'IO 1~880G8 C'1n b~ 1~1.rn~1 ~ro'Tl bot~ Cr'181.eS, 
l . ~ . t'3.lcinCS '3. cu ~ f:ooT. OVer8~1.8 le'11 D~r 8~ cou1i S'O-311 ij'3q8t~r ~~S 
situ'3.tion of the jO~9stic econoT.Y 1.10n~ ~ith~ut ~jvin~ iu~ qtteGtion to 
the 1.evelop~eGt ir. t~'3 8~Cs coul1 qlso be iisqstro1~s 1. si tuqtion 
prob'3.bly r~'Tlinis~ent to the -0['111 Str-'3et cr!lsh of 1 g'2g . 
~1ecl i r..~ j G :oubb'2r prices for six cOGsecutj ve ~OGt'1s 'lTlri thr9~ 
110nths in 1.iv'3.nce iYl p'3.1'T: oil 'Oric~s 'Orec~iei th~ 19~1 crqsh ~see 1''1ble 
of th~ ~ulpr1ts , 
~..,jjespr~qi sD9cul'3.tive U3~ of cre1it shouli be curb ·:d . SiT.ult8.r..eous 
fqlls i Tl rubber '3.ni '0'11 'Tl 0 i 1 for thr3e :nor. t'1s or '1:01'13 COU1 '1 
S '10 u 1 i 1, hen i Gte 1'-' en ~ '3. t t h j s po i G t '3.t le'3.st to ensur-3 t'11.t su ~h 
1.ecliGing prices qr~ ch~c~ei , per1.'1ps thr~u~h st'3.bjlis'3.tio~ 'Oolic19S or 
r 
',vo r32 by ' j 1:8'1SUres . 
1. st'3.bl e 1.n 8.ver..ue 
i nt2r'lenti ons 
for e1111 ty 7 or. '1 l' '.( r; t 
(e3p '~ci'3.11y by T..'.lltinqtion1.1s or trl.r..snqti or..1.1 s, Dr3f~r'1bly J1.rOllc;h 
S \ Ion 3 0 r i n '1 .., I'o U D j r.. s , 
n'3.tior..s . 
7 I r.. I' '3 S Don set 0 '1 'S ro ~.., in.., i r.. t '3 I' 2 S 1, for p'J. b 1 i c 1 i '3 t i r.. ~ by '30 1: ~ 0 f t'1 e 
prj'l'11,e CCllp1.r..i 9 -,'l~j ch 1.re in --lj ~ r..'3ei :or C'1'Oi 1,'11 '3XT)1. ~ cd or.. '1r..i 
tocse1,~wr ,'lith the ~roT_'liG'S in e n'1tior..'ll confji9r..c~ in tl'13 'hl1.Y3i1.G 
s t 0 ~ l( 11 -3. ~ l( e t p l '~ t '1 ~ r.. ~ e 1 t 0 ~ '1 i n I' ~ ~ 0 ~ nit j 0 r. '18 '1 r.. i n 'J ~ S 1, 1: _ r.. 0 ' l et , 
the KL~S '18.S '1ppliei for the T..~llb ~rs'1jp to l~e ~eier1. ion 1~ ~ r..1.tior..1.1 
Des 13;) rse;:) De V'11~ur8 in 1 Til (\hl'1.ysi1. 11'11l. 
joi nt ventures TiL 1,11 tlle ~~st csov9rr.lle~t ) r.2::!i to h-= foster9i. S 
Fu r t 11 2 r i n - i eDt ':1 stu i i e s '3. l' 9 ';. e e i e ito S 11 b '3 t q r.. t 1 'l t e the 3 e po 1 icy 
i 'Tl P 1 j C!:l t 1 0 n s, '1 T. C n ~ ",'1'-1. i chi n::! 1 u i 9 : 
(1) l evelopir.cs 1. T.ojel or. Dl'lr..t'ltion stOC'( prices 'Tle'lr.t for 
forec!lstincs p'.l:'pGses, i . e . t~'1t 'voul:1 In 'ioubt3ily, jf successful , 
(2) stuiyinCS t~e jT.D'3.Ct o~ t~e tq~eOVer9 'lni b'.lyir.~ over of 
Guthrie Corp, 91.rlow Sst3tes, Dln10p 8states, H1.rrisons ~1.1'3.ysi'3.n 
~L3~) '3.r..i ~cT.llojity futures i~ D'11~ oil 'lni rubb~r (tr'1ie~ on t':19 
{L~~) - '3.~i ie7910pi~~ 'In 'l Driori econo'Tletric ~ciel suit'lb1e 
for forec'3.stin~ Durposes, 1.S in (1) . 
91'l1e pr93ent VI'3.1:lysj'1n ?ri'Tle "1i.nister once iecl!lr~l th'l 1. s1:'3.119r 
slis_ of '1 bL:>"'Jer C'3.~9 1S better th'3.~ 1. l'lr~er sli::!9 of '1 s'T1'3.11 c '-3,1(e' -
T,of'r],1Ch !lbout SUIlS ~lP the }overr.:nent's 'ltti Luie tow1.rds for i~n 
inv est'Tlent. 
\PPE~DIX ,\ 
PL~NTATION CO~P\NIES ~ITH KLSE QUJTATION, AS ~T END DSCE~BER 1993 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
CO llp'lni es 
& P3.r V.!3.l ue 
I M::>/cts! 
03EL D~te ~~ . of H3ct'lr'l~e u~ier cultiv.!3.tion~ 
** (Pl.!3.~e) of ~st'lt~s 
incorpor3.tLon ownei 
QUBSE1 01L P\L~ ~O~0\ 
~ I~ ~ 1~ 1 I~ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
R Lng g i t Ru b b e r s 
~si3.tic ~V)OC S 
Ayer Hit.!3.m~1 S 
A.. y e r '~b 1 e 1{ ~ II S 
B3.t 11 Lint.!3.n-'Sr!)1 S 
13:dfori)Oc S 
Bu~it K'ltil)1 S 
~ '~in T3c\{q)1 S 
Duff Dev:)1 S 
D:l n l 0 D 83 t :; 11 ') 
Ga13k ~~)~1 L 
(;le:1e.!3.ly Plt31 1 S 
Guthr-ie RopelSl -
qL~~ ~ L~w5Jc LS 
Jerqm KU.!3.nt'lnSl -
:<lu'ln~ ~'lbber)1 -
l(L K'~pong)1 LS 
~u'll'l SLiill,)I , S 
Kulim I M);1 S 
KU:1:i on~ T ?'l u 31 1 S 
Ll~:i~ar1{s7')~ S 
\hlakoff ff'1i') II LS 
Y1 ' sia!1 Pl.!3.nt'51 
"1~n t'l k.!3. b:; l' 
Ne'.i SereniClh1)1 
Plrit P~r9.1.( 1 
R i v e rv i e 'I{ S 1 
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C'lstlefieldl l On L 1 5 IS I) 6 ('J K) 
-
1 23'3 9 ') 120 5 211 
Inc~ Kenneth10n LS 1 ') IS 11 J (rJ() 7 91 ,)~2 156 
OLl P1.lll s 
---------
Austr1.l En t) 11 S 21 /112/S5 U1) 4- " 64- ,)C)~5 22'5 87 54 
B'=!tu K'l "w3. n')1 --. 1/12 16=) ( 1) (1 J) 601 19 8119 4779 1306 J 2~) ')22 
Bent'=! PlantSl ' C) 24 .I 3 In 7 ( ~1) ? 2561 521 3191) 560 ')5 '))') 
Cons Plant'5'J~ L3 1 ~ 17 179 ~ 'A) 29 1 1 02 'J '))3') 31414 1337 26')9 2672 
11.1P3S11 L 3/111/76C1) 51 22515 6509 ?9569 f)C)O 1 5932 1 5911 
Kell~ Y3n'Dl C) 1 ~ II ':2 16'5 ( M) 2 ')1')6 11 g9) 164 
LL n'Sui'50c S 27 1112 IS 7 ( ~n 1 1055 
~S()? ~ 1 S ')) I) /23( M) ) 50')') ?5 ,. - ") 
S ' gor C ' nutsD 11 S 16/';2/111 (:'1) '3 ~951 316 )37'J 56') 17 
Unitei Pl an t:t l ('H " v J 1 ' 9/ 1 2/17~M) 7 f20121 r40311 1420 21 41 2975 55':2 
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Other stock ex~h3n~e listin~s : London (L), Sin~apore (S) qnd 
~o p3nh'=! 'S en ~ C) • . 
~ = ll'=!ture stanis , I~ = illll'=!ture stanis . 
\3 '=!t enj of 1932 . 
As at 31 Ja~uary 19'34 . 
1ullber of est'ltes throu~h investllent h0ldin~s . 
~oconut hect3 r e'=!ge . 
~xclujing coconut hectarea~e ~1 556 ~3 ll'=!ture, 107 h'=! illmature). 
Excluding 145 hq ~f illllqture co~onut . 
Sources : KLSS, T~e ~uqla L~llpur Stoc~ 8xch'=!nge \nnu'll ~olln'ln i e s 




ORIGINS ~ND DEVELQP~~NT OF THE M~L~YSI\N S8CURITIES INDUSTRY 
PrI~SS I : 
1 SgJ3 





Beginning of shqrebro~ing 
busine3s in Peninsulqr 
~1 '11 !3.ys i 8. • 
Rubber boo~ boostei the 
fleiling llqrket . 
First 113.r~et crqsh . 
Seco!11 llarket crqs"1 . 
Singqpore StD~kbro l<:ers 
\ssDciqtion w~s for-nei . 
~qliY'l"'1 Stockbro~ers 
\ssoci.qtion ':I3.S forllei . 
'btes IR811arks 
Street corner ll1.rket ; stocks 
tr!3.iel were in British rubber 
est'ltes qnd tin l1inin~ c01lp'lnies . 
Sharebro~ing firns sproutei in 
in most l1qjor towns. 
Following a decline in iel1qn1 
for rubber ani overheating of the 
l1~r~et in rubber boo1l ye3.r3. 
D1ncin~ to W3.11 Street ' s tune! 
~onstitutei by 15 fims; ail1e1 
to re~u1ate tr~iing activiti~s in 
t"1e i!1:erest of t"1e public (?) ; 
Fr1.ser ~ Co . iOl1in!3.tes. 
Re- re~istr3.~ion to reflect the 
?'In- 1alaY1n ~haracter of t"1e 
llellbershio. Sxistei until 1 9S0 . 
?7..J:~SE II: 
21 I) IS J F 0 r-n 1. t ion 0 f t"1 e ~h 18. y3. !1 ~ ~ con s tit ute i by 1 9 11 en b 2 r 
Sto~l< Ex~"1qn~e . fi rns(1) in S ' PO!'3, '1 i"'1 '·bl3.Y'1~. 
9/5 / 1 gS') 3e~in!1ing of t~e first reql \ioption of t"1e Slin~y bo~~i 
195) 
en-:i 1 9S) 
1961-6~ 
stoc~ ex~"1qnge wit"1 two system of trqiin~ . 
tr~iing roons est3.blis~ei . 
Inte~r~tei into 1. sin~l~ 
~eor~'lnisei 3.ni re!l~1lei 
the Sto~ l<: Sxcltqnge of 
~~laysi'1 . 
~i-hoc 3.rr~llt. estqblishei 
between 3~~, StDC~ Exchqn~e 
q!11 Regi.strqr of Conpqnies . 
13W issue bOOl1 in Mqlqy3. 
3.ni '3Ln~~pore . 
Ren1.11e1 the Stoc~ Exc~3.n~e 
of 13.1'1ysi3. 3.n~ Singapore . 
Br1.nc"1 re~isters of 3ritish-
incorpor'ltei conp3.!1ies W'lS 
establishei i"'1 ~q1'lY'l . 
Sst a b 1 ish n en t 0 f a go 1. r). :v i t "1 
'1 full - ti1l8 l1qna~er 1.ppointei. 
\ioption of q new set of Rules , 
Bye-1qws qni Listin~ ~1.nua1. 
~il1ei 'It pronoting qn orierly 
llqr~et, vettin~ '111 ne~ issues 
seeking 1istin~ . 
Sxcessive spe~u1'lti.on q1so 
).oninqtei t"1e nqr~8t. 
Followin~ t~e seD~r'ltio~ of 
Sin~!3.pore fron 1~laY3i~, but tlte 
b~urse rel1ainei a joint boly 
fu~ctioni.n~ li~~ insep'lrqb1e 
S i a 11 e set ., i ns • 
A.ug 1 955 T>1e ns ',{ Co~panie3 <\ct, 
1 95'5 ca~e i nta farce. 
19S9 Far~ation of the C'loit'3.1 
Issues COllllitt~e ''jI'j) . 
Feb 1959 Establish~ent of the 
3u~i p'.l tera Stock Exchan~e . 
Proviiei a mare co~prehensive 
legal fr'3.~ework for supervision 
of the ope rations of companies . 
To supervise the ~rowth of a 
healthy c'lpit'3.1 market - heaiei 
by the central b'1nk , 3N~ . 
To assist in prolloting the 
partici~ation of increasin~ 
bu~iputera in the cO~~9rci~1 qni 
iniustri~l ~ctivities . 
13/'5/69 Clasure of bot~ Kuala Due to r~ci[11 riots in Kuala 
L~~pur 'lnd S L~~apore L~~pur and other tawns - w~ich 
traiing rOO~3 . sent share prices plu~~9tin~ . 
1970 - 71 Slu~~ish tr'3.iin~ prev'3.ilei . Senti~ents i~provei in 1971 qS 
1 ') 1 
Malaysi'l e~er~ei fro~ t~e shaiows 
of the 13 ~'3.y inciient. 
Oc t 11 '}70 Tr~iing in Bu~iputer'3. 
Stock Exchange co~mencei . 
1'971-73 ' Bullish up- 3Iving . 
5 Mal~y co~panies were quotei , 
traiin~ turnover was nojest . 
Beginnin~ i~ J~nuary I g7 1 '3.nd 
cul~in'3.ting in February 1973! 
13/2/73 First 3tock ~'3.rket crash Sh'1rpest f~ll in the history of 
~ f t e r the llh r - ',; r ash 0 f t i1 e ~~ '113. ys i 8. n s to c k 11 a r k8 t - its 
1973 '. i~pact lasted for ne'3.rly 2 yeqrs . 
tl.pr 11973 :::0~merci'l1 b~nks relax A.. move to facilitate thq 
thei r credi t s1ueeze on d.evelopment of '3. heal thy market. 
investments in stocks/shares. 
pqA..SS III : 
9/)/73--- Split of Stac~ Exch'3.n~e 
of ~'3.1'3.ysia ani Sing'3.pore . 
July 73 
Sxch'3.nge (KL3S) W'3.S 
inc 0 r po r'3. t e j • 
18 r 'n i !l a t ion 0 f cur r e n c yin t e r-
chqn~e~bility a~~ree~ent bet~~en 
~qlaysia an1 S in~ap~re. 
27/1 '2/76 Securi ty 1~l'iustry \ct, 1913 1he le~'ll auti1ari ty ta 8urb 
ani Sec uriti83 Indust ri es excessive specul'3.tio~, insiier 
Regulation , 1976 COlles into tr'3.iin~, 3hare ri~~in~ ani ot~er 
effect . forns of ~ar~et manipul'3.tion . 
15/1/73 L'lu~chin~ of the B~~ip~ter8. 
Invest~ ent Fauniation by 
the Prille '1Lnister . 
Jan 1979 Be~i~ning of '1 bull run, 
coinciiin~ ~ith t~e 
cOll~aiities baon . 
Co~noii ties' prices 'H'9re qll 
'3.ppro'3.chin~ qll-ti~e hi~h3. 
A.ug 1\93') 'joll~oiity Tr'1iin~ ,\ct, Seginning of f '.ltures ~ark~t in 
193) ca~e in full force . ~~l'l ysi'3.. 
23/1J/~) ?~tures tr'liin~ in cOllmoiity P~lm oil is the first 'lnd only 
be~an in the n3wly establis~ei comnoiity tr'liei. 
19311 
gil ' 1~1 
Ku~la L~~pur COllmoiities 
Exchan 7 e ::> ( (L '~~) . 
S9co~i stock rn'3.r~et cr'lsh 
- ' 'j r '1 s h 0 f 1 931 i ' • 
1ransfer of 650 million 
shares of llajor co~panies 
wLth ~1') 1 1 . 5 billion to 
1~rou~h ti1e &l~iputer'3. l~vest­
~~nt Fa uni '1 tiol1, h tion '3.1 ' 1 ui ty 
Carpor'ltion (?~~) anj ~'3.t ion~l 
Unit Trust (<\S~) . b~~iputer'ls to increqse their 
share of the n~tion ' s corpor'3.te 
'H'e'3.1th . 
21!t/91 Lqunc'1in~ of the N~tion~l 
U'1it Trust Schel1e by the P~. 
2'1/7/S1 T(L,=) E 3.nn:)uncei '3. series 0 f 
me3.sures to help restore SOl1e 
order in the be'3.rish 113.rKet. 
7/g/g1 S~ift t'3.keover of Gutl-trie 
Corp on the London exch'3.n~e 
by P~B - 3. ' dawn r'3.ii' ani 
'front ioor nationalis'3.tion'? 
15 / ,) Igl l BuyLn~ over of 51 ~ 
interests in B1.rlo~ Est3.tes . 
2 9 /1 /3 1 D.1 '.110 P S3 t '3. t e s (.J K) be c 1. m e 
the )r1. Lonion-b3.sed comp'3.ny 
in 1. 1lonth to sell its 511 
st1.ke in pl3.nt1.tions. 
A.pr Ii 932 FI'1A. ' s t1.KeOVer bi i over 
Unitei Pl'3.nt'3.tions (up). 
~'3.y 1932 Closure of traiin~ due to 
sli.ght fire 3.t T(LSE's 
t rsd i ng rOO1l. 
1/5/1'932 P'iJB Qnnou'1cei its Lntention 
to 1.C1uire )~)~ :)f ~S ' s V3.st 
pl'3.nt'3.tion interests in 
in M'3. 1 a ys i 9. • 
D'3c 1'992 0r'3.ckio\.Yn on ille::sal tr'3.iin::s 
by Re::sistr1.r of Societies. 
21 It I~) GOlrt noi for rubber fu ture'3 
tr'3.iing on the KL~S . 
. hy ~:n Unpreceientei '::)ull run. 
1 Ij 13) Rubber futures stqrt tr1.1ing 
on t~e !(L8S . 
12w ~ode for ller~ers '3.'1i 
~qKeOVers il1plel1e'.1tei . 
Foreign 1'1~est'Tlent CO'Tll1ittee 
~?I~) W3.S set up . 
J u 1 y 31 1'1. 1 k 0 f Se con i BJ 1. r j Q ~ 
tl-te T(L3S ~Bu'Tliputer1. Boqrd?). 
Apr 95 ~3.1l for the ending of iU'l1 
listin.g of S~'lres on S3S? 
The Arn1.n'lh S'3.h1.ll ~qsion'll 
Berh'3.i (ASN) WqS est3.blishei . 
Response to unusu3.11y stronfS 
~'lves of selling . 
1)2 
T~e be~innin.g of 1. series of 
t'3.keov ers /buyin.g into ll~jority 
st1.kes in forei~n-b1.sei 'lssets 
in ~alqysiq, vi1. l1'3.rket route. 
C'lsh ie1.ls ~.;ith F 'l!3 t'3.king up 
19~ 3.ni Perlis Pl1.nt'ltions ~J~ . 
Th e i e'l 1 in 'I 01 v in fS Mu 1 t i -
Purposle Holdings (51 ' 'S), to form 
a joint ve'.1ture co~p'3.ny with 
Pegi ~1.lqysia's 11~ st'3.ke. 
UP L s q n 0 i 1 P 3.1 m ,~i'l nt, ';'1'1 s 
fOr1lerly o '.Ynei by the D'3.nish. 
Resunej traiin.g on 1~ ~3.y . 
Q3.rrisons ~1.1ay3i1.n E3t1.tes or 
rr'fE ·tlqS fot'1lerl y ownei by Lr{ IS 
H'3.rrisons ~ Crosfield . 
~.((lich le1 to susp'3nsions of 
brokers 3.ni sever'll ~e'Tlbers of 
the KLS E BJ a r ,1 • 
Switc~ from ~'3.1'3.ysi3.n Rubber 
~xch~n~e ~~RE) to T(L~E. 
Sxcessive 3p9~ul'3.tion gripped 
the 11'lrK3t. 
Rubber be~a'Tle the seconi 
cOl1modity qfter pQlll oil to be 
tr'3.1.ei 0'1 T(LCS. 
~ ~e~ns of r9structurin~ the 
p'3.ttern 'lni structure of o~ner­
ship qni control of the 
CO~DOrqte se~tor. ~TC is t~e 
~ 
boiy responsible for t~e 'Tl'ljor 
issues on foreign investl1ent. 
~DpLic'3.ble to ~ql1.ysi'ln -b'3.s e1 
~r incorpor'3.tei s~'3.~es (?) . 
S:)urce3 : B3.n'c ~efSq.r1. :"19,lqysi1. , 1 g7g . '1o~~y 1.nrl B3.'11-ci~.g in '19,l'118L1. , 
:<>.13.13. LTnpur; T1.n , P. T., 1979. '1''rte fu'lelop'Tlent of tl-te 
Securities In1. 1.1stry', SP~, vol.4,no.l; Drqi<e , P . .]., 1' 1S')q . 
Fin'3.nciql Developnent iYJ. 'hl'3.1Siq '3.ni ,=)Ln::S'3.pore, ~"'fJ Press, 
C3.nbert"1: ' 1'he "Scono'Tli-;-; of 1'"pceov~l, 6.si'3.n Fi'1'3.nc~ , '192 : 
3.ni vqrious issues of Scon~'Tlic 1ep0rt, v1.r ~1.3tern ~~ono'Tlic 
Revie'tI", 1''1e 43C0-:1011ist '3.ni. Bqni< Ne'Sqrq >'hl '1Y3i'3. £\':1'1111.1 
qe p0 r . 
\PPENDrx C 







A) )ECD~. ~'1E~I8A 
U.S.A. 
2 Cana1a 











1 3 U. K. ** 
14 It3.1y:+:~ 
15 [relan::l** 
1 6 Spai~ 
17 Jreece 
N~\'l Yo rk 
Toronto ~ 
~ l ri~h 
Sto ·~kholm 











~1 9. 1 ri i 
Athens 
19 \ustralia Sliney 
1' 9 Ne 'N Zealan::l ll1ell in'Ston 
StC)ck/S~are Price I'1iices 
Injices 1"'1 ... 'vOll P 
NY'S E 8011 po si te 
St9.niard ~ Poor'g 500 
DoTN J)nes Ini Avge 
Toront~ SE CO'Tlposite 
31/1 12/65=)0 All 
191-11-4-3= 10 S')') 
1 92 S=20 )') 
l' 9T5 =1 ')00 3')') 
61 rich SE ~ll S1Lare 1975=1'00 102 
Jacobs~n & Ponsbac'1 Ind 11 /1 1 /53=10') 30 
<B;rskurs I ~l t 197 1 =1 '00 
COllllerzb9.:1k 11/12/11953=1')') 6 ,) 
')310 SS Iniu'3tri3.1s 197C)=IIO) 
Bel'Si9.n :3~ General 31 1 /12/63=100 l ' g7 
ANP-SB3 ~l~ene~ 197)=100 SO 
: '\ '~ D-S33 Intl CC)ncerns 1'97)=I ·)) S 
P'lris Bourse Cc)l1mittee ')/JI/72=l i(}) 257 
Viennq 'SS Injustrials 119T5=100 36 
H~lsL!1kL SE Iniustri'3.1s 1975=100 
F~-Actuaries SOD 1)/t/62=108 500 
1;' TLlles In::l Ord 11/7/11935=1100 30 
Banc'3. COll'll It 9.1 i ·ana 2/1 1 /1 197) = 10') 1 1-") 
Irish SS CC)nmC)n Stocks 1975=1100 
'1airii 'SS Il gT5=11)') 
~th~ns SE Industrials 197'5 =1 '0 ,) 
ASE ~ll Orjinaries 
R3 N~ A.ll Shares 
1/11 /1 193)='500 25') 
1197') =1 ) ,) 
1 J) 
D) \SI~~incl. ASE~~ *) 
21 S L ng, a po re * 
22 ~on:s ~on:s 
23 T'l i ,.,an 
24 '1'1 1 a ys i ~ * 
25 Philippines:E-
26 T~~ilan:1 * 
27 Inii'l 
D) \FRI8A 
S L n~9.po re 
H,)ng (ong, 
T9. i pe i 
K 1  q 1 A. Lu'TI pu r 
~anil'l 
B'l ng k:) k 
Bornb'lY 
~ll-(~1'ii~ + 
~'re>1{yo SS ~3i.'l 
\ NL kke i - W-,f J:)nes .~ vg,e 
Fr~ser' s 1niustri~l 
>Str~its Time3 Rubbers 
H'ln~ S9ng "Ehnk 
T~iDeL SS Iniustri~ls 
KLSS ~Lng,git ~lbbers ) 
M!lnil'l '1ining 
B'l ng, ko k 13') 01( Cl ub 
Bo~b~y SS Ini Ord 
\ll-I~ji~ Te9. PLant'ns 
~3 s. Afric~ Jo h~nnesburg Rl ni D1 i ly fJI'1 i 1 Ind U'3 t 
4/11 11 1 95~=1 1 00 1 Q2c) 
1 S I~ I ~ 9 = 1 ") '5 Q ? 2 ~ 
") 1 111 2 IS g = \1 QO 
2) /t'~ 16~ =1 00 
)1 17/S4-=1100 )) 
11 97Q=100 
1970=1100 ")') 
I' 970-711 =101) 
1 910 -71 =1 '0) 
1 9') 3=11 00 1 00 
Sources: See App9niix E ; 'r~e S~on:)'TIist, Lon:1on, v~rious iSSU3S. 
-'I 
< 
Number 9.ni cO'TIpe>siti)n of sto~ks s9.'TIpled in the co~put9.tion . 
'roronte> SE Lniices were co~pletely revisei in J~nu~ry 1915. 
Total iniex (I Alt) is 9. co~p)site of banker,' forsL~ring', 
services, etc .~listei unier K)benh~vns b:)rskurs). 
Roy~l Dut~h ail Cy , Unilevar, Philips , \K~O ani Hoogovens 
(compJsi tion of ANP-'j BS beursiniex unjer '(ntern~tion~le 
Concerns). 
~overing ~ll iSSU3S liste:1 on the First section of 1oky) Stoc1{ 
Exch~nge . 
\ F)r J'.11y 1971 -\oril \1975 refers to N3B revisei 'lverage of 225 
selectei stoc~s ani fro'TI ~qy W3T5 :)~;tlarjs refers to ~i'<1{ei-D::>-., 
Jones 'lverages :'r . S. E. 225 selectei stocks) . 
> Refers to plant'lti:)n stocks, i.e. rin~git rubbers, sterlin~ 
rubbers '1ni oil D'11'TI sto~~s. 
+ Refers to total :or t~e region~l sto~1{ ex~h'ln~es of BO'TIb'lY , 
~~lcutt~ , ~'lir~s, ~~~ej9.b~i 'lnj IAlhi. 
\PPENDIX D 




Ixnl Jon9s ) 
Iniustri!il Avge) 
Toky0 S. E. N~w 
Fin~ncial Ti:nes) 
In:lust. Ori. ) 
1'0 ron to S. E. 300 
C:)llrnerzb'lnk 
fu ,n in '3.n t S9C to rs 
in the iniex 
Rubber estqte ~~nq~e~ent 




FLnance ~ insurance 
Electric'll ~q~hinery 
8ther 1lachinery 
Fooi, jrin1(s ~ tabac~o 
Slectronics 
1 Shqre ~ 'lo. c>f 





























(1 1 41 ) 
(7 ) 
('5 ) 




( 1 '5 ) 
Metals, 1linerals ~ golis 
OLl 'i g~s 
Utilities 
C-n91licql s 
~~oto r vehicles 
B'3.nks 
Electricals/technologr 



















S:)urces: The Ec:)nollist. Lanion, v!3.rious issues; qni for the 
KLSE'SLndex the figures !ire c'3.1cul~tei basei on iata fron 
~LS~'3 Annual COllpanies Hqniboc>k Vol. ~. 
11S 
-\PPENDIX E 




!}l tq re ference 
(~onthly cls~ prices) 
D'l t'l Source 9£ 
P1'3.ce of Publication -
----------------------------------------------------------------------
~YSE Co~posite ) 
StqndarJ ~ ?oor ' s) 
50J Co~posite ) 
:1qi 1 y 
avera'Ses 
Dow Jones 30 end of ~onth ~ 
2 Toronto SS 30) -io-
3 Zuric~ SS ~11 ~~ . 
~ Jqcobson ~ ?onsb . 
5 B¢rs~urs 1 Alt 
5 SOl1merzban1{ 
1qst Fridqys 





Scan In1 i Cq tors, Tvas~ ., D. C. 
Scon qaport of ! he ?resiie~t , 
l.vashin~ton, D. C. 
~~e FL!lqnciql Til1es, Lonion 
Rev u e i e 1 9. Ban 1 u e '1 u C q n a i 9. , 
'J t t a "V'l 
~ain Scon Iniic'3.tors , P1ris 
rr-~e ~Lnqncial -rL~es, Lonio~ 
~tistisl< ~rbo'5 ' K~benhq'I"'1S 
a . n:he B'Lnqncia1 'r L:n es , Lonio!l 
b . ~~e Scono:nist, L~nion 
7 ls10 SS Iniust 15th of each ~onth ~q in Scon I~dic'3.tors , P~ris 
?~e Fin'3.nci~l Tim3 s , Lon~on 
~~qnds~hrift , Gr1ven"1q~U3 
3 Be1~iq~ SS Generql 
g \~P-'jBS ~lgellen 
\1D _~BS Intl Conc 
1!) ? '3. r i s Eo u r seC 0 11 m 




11 Viennq SS Iniust qvges of Fridays 
12 ~e1si!lki SS I~dust iaily qv~es 
1 3 ~T-~ctuaries ))) e nri of ~O!lth 
FT In1ustrial ')ri 
- '10-
1 ~ B'lnc3. Co~m It'11i'1n'1 - io-
1 5 Irish SE CO'Tl~O~ S~ • belJ'i.nnin.lJ' 
"':> ? of 
'1lo!lth* 
1 5 VIall ri 1 SS eni of 110nth 
17 \t~ens SS Indust ri ai 1 y qv~es 
19 All 8ri i nq ries 8n1 of ~onth 
1 9 TBN3 !\ 11 S~ '3. re s iaily ''1 V .g es 
20 To'.(yo '3S ~12 ' I{ ) aV8r9.;se :1'3.ily 
'H kk':d. - 1)':Hl Jones) pri.ces 
21 Frqser I In1ust end of ~onth ) '3 
) 
Straits ~i~es ) 
-10-
Plqnt'3.tions ) 










-r~e B'Lnqnciql ~L:nes, Lanion 
'·hin Scon Iniicqtors , '?'3.ris 
-io-
B1~~ of En~lqni QUlr:erlv 
13 1 11etin , Lonion 
E80~011ic ~renis , Lonion 
- 00 -
~qi!l Scon Iniicators, Plris 
-io-
- 1.0-
Far Sqst~r~ Econ ~ev , ~ . ~ . 
-- --q3serve B1.n1{ 3:111, Tve l1in~ton 
Scon Statistics ~n'1uql , 'r)'< yo 
1~~ )rient'll ~cono~ist , -r~~yo 
Fqr Sqst~rn Scon Rev, ~ . ~ . 
-- --~~e \si'1n Wall St~33t J , l . ~ . 
of 
C ') ~ ~ e r ~ e '3 '1 1 1 , i n ~ a DO r '3 
~~e ~cono:nist, Lonion 
Fqr S'1st_r~ S:O'1 q.v, q . ~ . 
23 T'3.ipei 3~ Iniust 
21 ~LSS ~lant'3.tions 
2f) :1'3.ni 1-'3. ML ni ng 
26 B'3.n o kok Boo~ Club 
-:> 




27 BOllb'3.Y SS Indust Or1 '3.v"Se of 'Tlonths) 
en i e 1 S'3. t u r1 '1 y S ) 
~l l- Inii'3. T8'3. Pits 
23 Rand D'3. i ly ~'lil Ind 
V'3.rious issues . 
- .10- ) 
en1 of 1l0nth 
1')7 
~onthly Bull of St'lts , T'3.ipei 
~LSS D~iiy ~losin~ I~dic~s , 
KU8.1'1 LUllpur 
Ii' q r S q s tern S·::! 0 n q 9 V , H. K. 
- 10-
Report on Surrency '1 FLTl'3.nce 
Vol It : St'ltl St'3.tellents , 
B:Jll b'3.y 
The Fin'lnci'll Times , Lonrlon 
... 
~xclu·}infS cOllp3.nies I!IL th 'Tlar'-<:et c'3.pi t'llisation of < £ f))I) , 00) • 
Enj of ~onths refer to t~e clQsin~ prices on l'lst traiin~ 1'3.Y of 
e'3.ch 1l0nth . 
1 J3 
APPENDIX F 
COMPOSITIONAL DETAILS OF KLSE PL~NTATIONS INDEX, AS ~T 31 J~NU~RY 198~ 
C011 p'3. !ly 
~ F3.ce 
;1'). 0 f o Pl'3.ntej Are'3.* Pl'3.ntej R~tios 
Outst1.niin'S S (hect::lres) Areal ( in "S)~* 
N0. V'll u~ 
(in ~1~/cts) 
S~'3.res 
( "JJ) ) 
E ----------------------- 1,J00 ------------
L q OP K Total she R/r J?/T ~/T 
1 Austral Ent~1 15,J00 S 64 3270 141 3475 0 .232 ? g1 
2 B'ltu K'1W1n1)1 1 129,500 S 6533 6)115 565 134'33 ').104 51 45 
3 ConsPl'3.nt5)c 470,251 L3 1435S 3)301 5~11 5~957 0.113 27 63 10 
4 L{ '1PBSI ' 41 g , 152 L 29:)24 '))570 757') 701 67 O. 167 4 1 45 1'1 
5 Ke11'1Y'3.nS1 130,1')8 S ')1')6 21S7 5~93 0.041 59 ~1 
6 LLn'SuiJ')c ')9 ,1 64 '3 1055 " 1855" 0 . 027 1'00') 
7 NS,)!:> ') 1 2 g, 1 1'3 '3 53,)g 53-]9 O. W32 - 1 f}') 
>3 rJt i Pl'3.nts)11 99 . 56') ':jS ~ ?420l1i3551 3627 - Il g5,)3 ().197 69 15 
9 Batu Lintang~l 17.723 3 231 '3 2554 5~72 0 . ')03 5'2 4'3 
10 3~~Lt Kqti131 6 , 3')) S 203 270 47~ ') . 075 4~ 57 
11 ChiYl ~ec '( ~1 44 . 550 ') 936 6559 749t 0 .1 59 1'2 9'3 
12D.lrllop E'3t!Jl 262 , 37 0 S 10 19') 9500259~ 2227<3 O. 03S 46 43 12 
1 3 Gleane'3.lv ~ 1 56 , '359 S --------( 3 1 ~ of B'1t~ K~wan Berh'1~) --------
1 4 :;. R')p~ljl l 32 , 353 - 10354 1 ~3')4 2419'3 ') . 293 4') 57 
1 5 Hi'Sh ~ Lo -.-1 5')c ')02 ,1 55 LS 1,)0'29 1 S9t6 ')751" ~9T34- O. :)gS ')'f- 54 
1 6 J e r TTl -( 11'1!l t '1 n ') II 1, 726 721 72 1 O. 41 8 1 0,) 
17 Kluang1;1 2 , 00S 1-15 ~57 1' 5 753 O. ')75 ')g ')5 
1 9 K. L. Ke pong~ I I 379 , 00 1 L3 15244 225 '09 37753 O. 1 00 ~O 60 
19 Kual'1 Siji~$1 97 , 3')9 S 5297 4133 17 9747 O. Ogg 54 45 
20 [(u1i11 ~:1)50c '32 , 95 1' (L)) 43')6 11577245- 116655 0 .1 6 1 29 
21 K. T. P'1u81 3 , 3')2 3 931 '))') 1 231 O. ')24 76 
22 L'1nr3.11'3.r~s50c Ii 13,110 ') 316 165J 2466 ') . 021 33 
23 ~'3.1'1koffS l 42 , 744 LS 495') 646') 137 11563 0 . 271 4') 
2 4 ~1' s i ,a n P L t s :; I :] 0 , 0,)) 1- 5 '3 J ') 6 9 + 1 2'5 5 404 O. 1 40 55 






26 19\'1 S3renjah)11 24 , 592 S 19')~ 1975 3779 :) . 154 5C) 5C) 
27 R i v e rv i e -,-I 1 I 0 , '38'3 L) 1 5 93 1 I '3 1 7 6 I q 3 7 O. 1 7 S '34 
28 '3 'S. 131. CS .'3. n 3 I I 1 , 31) 76 1 213 1 05 9 ') . 551 ' 72 2 '3 
29 Te11e r1 ohSl 15,3 '31- S 1 ')S7 9)6 1 0 1 20~ t 0 .1 ~2 5') 4~ 
30 J t i ~h 1 a C C '3. ) 11 1 3 , '325 S 241 7 276') 1 OJ 2 > 5329 ') . 40') t 5 52 
~SEL Other stoc~ e xch'3.rlcse 1istin~s; L.~. L = Gonion S . E., 
~ = C~penh'3.'Se ~ S. E., ani S = Sin~~por~ S . E. 
( 
r 
q = rubber, OP = oil p'3.1~, 'lnj ~ =COCO'3.. 
Concentr'1tion r'3.tio of cr.Jp to tot'll p1ant e i hectqre'1~~ . 
) iniic'3.tes ex-listin 'S of sh'3.res in Lonion S . S . 








Inclules 1. 563 ~~ of C00onut . 
Incluies 1~5 h~ of 0oconut . 
l~clules 5 ~q of fruit ~orch~rj) . 
s.)urc~ : t(1SE, 11995 . lhe K1S~ A.nnual CO'1lpani~s Haniboo1( Vol. '< , 




CORRELA.TION COEFFICIENTS ~ATRIX Of MAJOR WORLD BOURSES (PLUS THE KU~L! 
LUMPUR STOCK EXCH~NGE PLA.NTATIONS IND'gX), JUNE 11975 - S~PTENBER 1983 
NE.'l YO"'tK LJND)N TJKYO TO~ 4K SYD P~S I~~ FKFT 
Injex:KL:t S~P SFI NYC S&P DJ)O FT~ FT NDJ TSS '1')00 l-{S AI) P13C B,]I S()"1~ 
KL:t 1. 00 . '1'3 . 90 .'37 • '3) .47 • '36 .7'3 
STP 1. 00 . 911 . '39 . 95 . 49 .99 .76 
3FT 1. 00 . 1) • 91 . 64 · 9 1 . 32 
NY': 1. 00 
· 9'1 .79 · '39 .79 
S~P 1. ')1) . 94 • 36 . 7"5 
DJ30 1. 0') 
· 5'3 . "52 
[i1TA. 1. 00 • 94 









Stoc~ ?ri~e T~1ices: 
KL~ - ~LqE ?lant~tions 
.95 
· 91 • 95 .79 .5'3 .92 • '3') • 1 ') 
· 97 • g,~ · g) .76 · 5~ · 93 · '31 1 • 1 4 
.9'3 .95 • ,'32 .75 .27 .78 
· 9 1 • 1 6 
· 911 • 9') . 93 · 61 .39 • '31 r • '3'2 .29 
· '37 · '36 . 95 . 60 . '37 .7g . 90 . )2 
• "51 · 53 · 52 · 1 9 · 1 2 . 44 • 49 · 4'3 
.93 . 9"5 . 77 . ')'3 .'2 4 • 91 .7 6 . )2 
· 9'2 · 9,5 · 61 · 4 ~ · O~ · 61 · 6"5 · 47 
1 . 'JO . '19 . 99 .7 "5 .1 2 . 9g . 94- · 1 S 
1. OJ • '3) '7) • j "- · 29 · 93 • S') · 21 
1. 00 . 79 
· 71 . 19 . 71 . ')6 
1 . ry) 
· "52 . 69 . 97 -. )2 
1. J') . 61 . '27 -.1 ) 
1 . OJ 
· 6'1 • ')'1 
. J') -.1') 
1. ')') 
NDJ - ~Lk~ei-~~~ Jones 22"5 \v~e 
~SS - To~yo S. E. ~3W ST? - Straits Ti~es Plantations 
S~I - ~raser' s T~iustri~ls , 
1Y'] - ~YSS Co~posite 
1'3C}] - ~oronto S . ~ . )')) ~ollp'osL te 
S~? - Staniari ~ ?oor's 5')0 
DJ3') - D~H' Jone'3 Ini us t Av~e 
FTA - ~ . L~eS-\8tu~ries 5,)J 
FT - Financial Ti~es ')0 
HS - H~n~ Sen~ B~~~ 
\0 - \SE \11 ')riin~ries 
PE,] - Paris BJUrS3 8ollllitt3e 
B~I - B~~ca COll~er~i~le Itqliqna 
CO~~ - Co~~erzba~~ 
1 1 1 
\PPENDIX H 
CORREL\TION COEFFICIENTS ~~!\TRIX OF "MINI BOURSES" WITH THE KLSE'S 
(EXCLUDING A.SIAN STOCK M~RKETS), FRO~ JUNE 11976 TO S~PT~Bm 11983 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
fuurse: ~L JSG ~UR SSL 08P ~/1ST STK f-IKI OSL V~A. '\fDR DUE A. 1' !i N~ 
----------------------------------------------------------------
In1ex::KLR J13G ~a.S B'3G K03 ,\(j Ie .J ,~? QSI OST VSI ~·ic) I ISC ~SI iN~ 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
~L 1. 00 • 91 .4-7 • 1 S -.03 .c)9 .62 .69 • 72 -.65 -.62 .1~ -.90 .35 ( ~< L ::;111 b b e r s ) 
J'S3!.RG 1 . 0) . 35 . 22 -.03 .73 • 79 · '33 .79 -.74- -. 4-8 • C) 1 -. 92 · 93 
(Joh'3.nnesour~ I~du'3t) 
zm TjH 1 . 0) .43 -.66 • 33 • 29 .23 .37 -. 13 -.C)9 · 5 l' -.22 · 1 6 
(Zurich SE \11 S'~ ) 
BRUSSELS 1 . 0') 
-. ·4-3 • 65 .53 • 61) .47 -. 1 () -. 14 . 09 -. 1') • 22 
(B91gi '3.n SE Gener31) 
COPS~H\GSJ 1 . ()) 
-. 10 -. 09 -. 0 1 -. 19 -.34- . 1 9 -. 11 -.20 • 21 
(I::>benh1.vns SE I h.1 t) 
t\~Sl'S:t D\ '1  1. 0) 
· 95 · 9'2 . 92 -. 39 -. 10 · 23 -. C)S . 77 
(ANP-j3S Int1 Concerns) 
STD': KQOL"1 1 . 0') 
· g+ . 3'2 -.49 -. 1 ') · 21 -.S6 · 811 
(J '3.cobs':)n ~ ?:)nso3.ch) 
HELSINK[ 1. 0) . 97 -.58 -.22 
· 24 -.77 · 95 
(~e1sinkL SS I!1dust) 
OSLO 1.00 -.32 -. 1 5 • 23 -.7? · 31' 
( t)sLo SE I'1r1 us t ) 
V[SN~\ 1 . 00 • S4- -. 19 . 311 -. 63 
(v Lenn'3. SE I'1dust) 
Mt\ffiID 1. 00 -. 76 • C) 4- -. ')) 
(M1.J. ri 1 SE I"d ust) 
DU3LI~ 1. ')') 
-. 55 
· 44 
([ris~ SE C01lman S'-l) 
~THEN3 1 • ').) -. gI l 
( A.thens SE Indust) 
~~~ ZEALt\~D 1. 0J 
(~~serve B'lnk of ~n A.11 S:1. ) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1 1 2 
APPENDIX I 
CORREL~TION COEFFICIENTS ~ATRIX BETWEEN ASI!N STOCK MARKETS (INCLUDING 
ASE~N STOCK MARKETS) JVER THE PERIOD FRO~ JUNE 1976 TO S~PTEMBER 1983 
Bour3 ~ : K.L. S 'PO~S t{l( T 'PEl '3' KO K ~1~LA BV1BY I :lDI 6.. 
Ind e x : t(LSER 3F T 'iDJ T3 81 BC 
K.LU~ PUR h 1 . J~Q . ~g~ . gQ~ . 319 . 907 . 79~ -. 662 -. 2) g -. 672 . g76 . ~gg 
( ~L S S Plqntqtions ) 
SI1G\ PORE " 
(S . TLll es PL -:m t) 1 . OJJ . 9g5 
(Frq s~ r' s I n1 ust) 1. ))0 
T) K'C) 
( ~L ~~~i - ~~ w Jones) 
(To \( yo '33 'l= '..r) 
:-r0 1G :{J JG 
('1 '1 n 'S S ~ n ~ B 3. n ~ ) 
T.\ IPSI 
(T ':1 i p~ iSS I "11 us t ) 
BA~GK)l( " +-
( 130 0 '-( C 1 '1 b ) 
,\{ 6.. ~n L \ 
( 'hnin a ) 
-., 
B J-13h. Y 
( BOllbqy SS I ~iust) 
h.LL- T ~ DT \~ 
(h.ll- I nd iq Teq ?lq~ t) 
. 97) 
. J~ 4-
1 . QJO 
• (1'39 
. 759 -. 67 4-
. 9V3 . 7t)1 -. 65t) 
. 1lS . 716 -. 707 
1 . JJQ . 71S -. SSt) 
1 . ) J) 
-. 59') 
1 . OQJ 
-. 225 -.71 1) · g97 .447 
-. ")71 -. g')5 · g22 • 1 S 1 
-. 2")2 -. 75g 
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